

officers of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff from the beginning of the war, because of the threat of bombing, to work in the basement of the General Staff building, which was not suitable for these purposes, and later - to move every night to the hall of the Belorusskaya metro station. Army General S.M. Shtemenko recalled: "Now every evening we collected the documents in our suitcases and drove to the Belorussky railway station. Throughout the night, a central command post functioned on one half of the metropolitan platform, while the other half, separated from the first only by a plywood partition, filled with residents of Moscow at dusk.

Is it necessary to prove that in such conditions it was not so easy to direct the operations of a multimillion-strong army. Only in August 1941, a room with a communication center and other rooms was equipped for the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and operators at the Kirovskaya metro station.

On June 19, 1941, the Kiev Special Military District received an order to form a front command district on the basis of the headquarters and departments and transfer it to Ternopol (Tarnopol). Obviously, the organization of the command post of the front near the state border was also determined by the intention to be as close as possible to the advancing troops and, in any case, not in the interests of effective control of the defensive actions of the front troops. After all, in the event of an enemy attack, this command post turned out to be (and indeed turned out to be) in the enemy's fire zone. So, on the morning of June 22 in Brody, i.e., 60 km from Ternopil, a convoy of the Southwestern Front, led by Colonel I.Kh. Bag ramyan was bombed. And when the convoy arrived at the command post of the front in Ternopil, its connection with the troops had already been broken³⁰.

It seems that the so-called miscalculation of Stalin in

the timing of the German attack was predetermined by his unfounded belief that the initiative was in his hands. He did not allow the thought that, without ending the war with England, Hitler would decide to get involved in a war with the USSR, since in this case he would have to wage a war on two fronts, which was doomed to inevitable defeat. Perhaps it was precisely these circumstances that explained Stalin's stubborn disregard for practically all signals about the specific date of the impending German aggression against the USSR.

In the course of preparing the preemptive strike, the General Staff carried out many measures which, according to its calculations, ensured the success of the planned action. And of course, neither Stalin nor the General Staff imagined that Hitler would not only preempt them in delivering a powerful blow, but also use the military measures carried out by the Soviet side as a basis to justify his aggression. However, between the desire to strike a preemptive strike and the ability of the Red Army to carry out such a task, there was, in the words of Griboyedov's hero, "an enormous distance." Apparently, Stalin began to understand this, especially from the beginning of June 1941. In any case, after June 10, having received reliable data on the concentration of German troops in the western border zone, and not excluded, and convinced of the possibility of a German attack at the beginning of the 20 x numbers of June, Stalin made desperate attempts to delay the start of the war. For this purpose, the well-known TASS statement of June 13 appears, fruitless attempts are being made to draw Berlin into the negotiation process, deliveries of strategic raw materials, food, etc. to Germany are being punctually carried out. However, the situation was such that no force could stop sword of Germany, brought over the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Red Army was not ready either for an attack on Germany or for the defense of its

Stalin's strategy of a victorious offensive war in 1941 turned into heavy defeats for the Red Army. Instead of a "jump" to the West, a "throw to the East" was carried out. The burden of a defensive patriotic war, not the war planned by Stalin, fell on the shoulders of the people. It was the people who, at the cost of incredible losses, won the Victory in 1945.

In conclusion, I would like to cite two "fresh" quotations from archival sources characterizing Stalin as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in the difficult days of the war that had already begun. One of the quotations somewhat contradicts the image of the "leader" that has developed in our country over the years of glasnost, while the other

On May 27, 1942, after repeated requests from the leadership of the South-Western Front (S.K. Timoshenko, N.S. Khrushchev, I.Kh. Bagramyan) for reinforcements, Stalin's reply was sent to him, in which, in particular, it was said: "Keep in mind that the Headquarters does not have new divisions ready for battle, that these divisions are raw, untrained, and throwing them to the front means delivering an easy victory to the enemy. <...> Isn't it time for you to learn how to fight with little bloodshed, as the Germans do? We must fight not by numbers, but by skill.

On November 13, 1941, the leadership of the Leningrad Front was given the following instruction from Moscow to the besieged city: huts of settlements in the basements, which they usually deepen. No doubt the Germans are establishing themselves in the same way in front of your front. Therefore, my advice is that when moving forward, do not set yourself the goal of taking one or another settlement like the 1st town of Sinyavino, etc., but set yourself the task of destroying

sew settlements to the ground and burn them,

burying the hiding German headquarters and units under them. Throw away any sentimentality and destroy to the ground all the settlements on your way. This is the best way to break the road to the east.

In the first of these statements, Stalin he argues in the same way as any sober-minded military leader should have reasoned in the conditions of a shortage of manpower prepared for battle. In this regard, his call to "learn from the Germans" is interesting. After all Behind such a call is the recognition that the inability to fight with little bloodshed was a characteristic feature of the Soviet military school.

Stalin's second statement slightly lifts the veil on a topic that has not been studied in our country: the fate of the civilian population in the conditions of fierce hostilities during the Great Patriotic War. Huge sacrifices in this case were implicitly recognized by historians as an inevitable price for military success. To some extent, this seems to have been true. But Stalin in this, as in many other things, decisively lacking measure.

NOTES

¹ History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. M., 1961. T. 2. S. 14.

² Is it true. 1941. June 23.

³ Hitler A. Mein Kampf. Munchen, 1933. S. 742.

⁴ Cit. Quoted from: *Dashichev V.I.* Bankruptcy of the German fa strategy shizma: Historical essays, documents and materials. M., 1973. T. 2. S. 128.

⁵ War of Germany against the Soviet Union. 1941-1945. Berlin, 1992, p. 32.

⁶ See: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union.

1941-1945. M., 1965. T. 6; Big lies about the war: A critique of the latest bourgeois historiography of World War II. M., 1971;

Magenheimer H. Neue Erkenntnisse zum "Undeternehmen Barbarossa". Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift. Heft 5/1991.

⁷ See: Was Stalin preparing an attack on Germany? // TVNZ. 1992. Jan 4 Hat der Generalstab der Roten Armee einen Praventivschlag gegen Deutschland orbereit? // Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift. Heft IS 41-50; Did the General Staff prepare Kras

Noah Army pre-emptive strike against Germany? // Today. 1993. 28 Sept.; Was Stalin preparing an attack on Germany? // Search. 1994. No. 24 (266). June 17-23; The beginning of the war: heroic and tragic // St. George the Victorious. 1994. No. 19, Sept.; The beginning of the war: why did we retreat? // There. 1994. No. 21, Oct.; The beginning of the war: the creation and activities of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command // Ibid. 1994. No. 24, November; Battle of Moscow: a look through the decades // Ibid. 1994. No. 29, Dec.; performances on Radio Liberty, Radio of Russia, etc.

8 Full text with scientific commentary first published
van in the Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift. Heft I. 1993. S. 41-51.

⁹ Historical-archival and military-memorial center of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of Russia. F. 16. Op. 1951. A. 237. L. 4-5 (hereinafter - IA VMTs GSh).

10 See *ibid.* L. 1-3.

11 See *ibid.* L. 5-6.

12 See *ibid.* D. 238. L. 63.

13 *Ibid.* A. 237. L. 5.

14 *Ibid.* L. 44.

15 *Ibid.* L. 8-11.

¹⁶ A red star. 1990. 18 Aug.

17 New and recent history. 1988. No. 6. S. 7.

18 See: *Vasilevsky A.M.* On the eve of the war // New and latest is
thorium. 1992. No. 6. S. 6-8.

19 IA VMC GSh. F. 16. Op. 2951. A. 237. L. 11-13.

20 *Ibid.* L. 33, 45, 77.

21 *Ibid.* A. 235. L. 65.

²² Military history magazine. 1989. No. 3. S. 62-63.

23 *Rokossovsky K.K.* Soldier's duty // Military-historical
magazine. 1989. No. 4. S. 52-55.

24 IA VMC GSh. F. 16. Op. 2951. D. 256. L. 3.

25 See: Big lies about the war. Criticism of the latest bourgeois historiography
of the Second World War. M., 1971. S. 327; *Suvorov V.* Ledo Col: Who Started World
War II? M., 1992. S. 333.

26 See: The initial period of the war (Based on the experience of the first campaigns and
operations of World War II). M., 1974. S. 211.

27 See: *Danilov V.D.* VGK rate. 1941-1945. M., 1991. S. 15-16.

28 See: Development of the rear of the Soviet Armed Forces. 1918-1988. M., 1989.
S. 118-119.

29 *Shtemenko S.M.* General Staff during the war. M., 1981. T. 1. S. 37.

30 See: *Bagramyan I.Kh.* Thus the war began. M., 1977. S. 85, 88-90.

³¹ Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. F. 45. Op. 1, 441. L. 32.

32 *Ibid.* A. 483. L. 131-132.

Kirill Alexandrov¹

"PLANNED A STRIKE ON ROMANIA IN THE DIRECTION OF OIL FIELDS"

GENERALS AND OFFICERS OF THE VLASOV ARMY

ABOUT STALIN'S PLANS AND THE STATE OF THE

RKKA IN MAY - JUNE 1941

Among the wide range of sources that today are used by specialists in the study of the conflicting plans and intentions of the party and military-political leadership of the USSR in the prewar months, the attention of the researcher is attracted by the testimony of Soviet prisoners of war, primarily representatives of the command and command staff of the Red Army. One of the first to contact them was the well-known German historian Dr. I. Hoffmann (Hoffmann), a native of Königsberg, who died in 2002. He introduced into scientific circulation interesting fragments from many survey materials and protocols,¹ which influenced the nature of the modern discussion about the dramatic events of the spring and summer of 1941.

A sharp controversy among scientists and publicists was caused by the statements of three captured generals (A. Z. Naumov, I. P. Krupennikov and L. A. Mazanov) at different times, concerning the famous speech of the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. V. Stalin at a reception-banquet held on the evening of May 5, 1941 in the Grand Kremlin Palace in honor of the graduates of courses for the improv-

1Kirill Mikhailovich Alexandrov - Candidate of Historical

Sci., Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the military history magazine *Novy Chasovoy* (St. Petersburg), member of the editorial boards of *Russkoe* (St. Petersburg) and the *Military Historical Archive* magazine (Moscow). Lives and works in St. Petersburg and documentary almanac past"

academy. M. V. Frunze. The testimonies published by Hoffmann coincided in the main: on that day, in front of numerous guests, Stalin allegedly announced the end of the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and proposed a toast to an active, offensive policy, "to a new era of development and expansion of the Soviet state"². The war with Germany, according to the impressions of eyewitnesses, has become close and inevitable. Moreover, the initiative in the upcoming clash with the Wehrmacht was to belong to the Red Army.

The Moscow historian O. V. Vishlev sharply criticized this source. In the traditional style of Soviet historiography, he immediately branded the work of Hoffmann, whose works, from the point of view of his opponent, are "events not of scientific, but rather of political life"³. According to Vishlev, testimony about the Soviet Union preparing an attack on Germany was willingly given by "defectors or those who, having been captured, decided to go to the service of the Germans"⁴. However, the real picture looked much more complicated. On closer examination, Wischlev's position is more vulnerable than Hoffmann's.

Commander of the 13th Rifle Dagestan Division (1st formation), which was part of the 5th Rifle Corps of the 10th Army of the Western Front, Major General A. 3. Naumov was captured in the Bialystok ledge in late June - early July 1941 Chief of Staff of the 3rd Guards Army of the Southwestern Front, Major General I.P. Krupennikov - northwest of Stalingrad December 21, 1942 Commander of Artillery of the 10th Guards Army of the Western Front, Lieutenant General L.A. Mazanov - at the Orlovsky Board on July 13, 1943. They gave their testimony about the toast-speech of Stalin on May 5, 1941 at different times and independently of each other. At the same time, the last two generals at the significant banquet did not attend

were present and told about him from other people's words. Krupennikov spoke more cautiously, Mazanov more categorically.

O. V. Vishlev called Krupennikov and Mazanov "Vlasovites"⁶, based on the fact that both generals in captivity spoke sharply negatively about the Stalinist socio-economic model and did not hide their sympathy for the political program of A. A. Vlasov, primarily to elimination of collective farms, forced labor and repressive system in the homeland. The involvement of a specific person in Vlasov's action, from the point of view of Vishlev, a priori devalues any evidence he gives due to their conditional partiality. Therefore, such testimony has no meaning and value. The objectivity of such

strange approach seems to us very doubtful. On a similar basis, for example, researchers today would have to ignore the anti-fascist statements of the members of the German Officers' Union (FOD) and supporters of the National Committee for a Free Germany (NKG). Although in 1944 among the German prisoners of war in the USSR there were calls for the creation of the German Liberation Army⁷.

However, in this particular case, Vishlev is either completely unaware of the biographies of A. Z. Naumov, I. P. Krupennikov, and L. A. Mazanov, or deliberately concealed from the reader some significant episodes of their dramatic biographies. In fact, none of the three named generals *participated* in the Vlasov movement and in the troops or apparatus of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR) in 1944-1945. *did not serve*. Indeed, in the Soviet Union, Naumov and Krupennikov were shot in 1950: the first for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (talking and chattering), the second for obscure circumstances of captivity in December 1942. But Krupennikov was posthumously rehabilitated already in 1957,

recognizing the charges against him in 1950 as untenable. Mazanov, after returning from Europe to the USSR in 1946, was not subjected to repressions. He successfully passed a special check in the state security agencies, was reinstated, awarded the Orders of Lenin and the Red Banner, then served in the Soviet Army in responsible teaching positions. In 1953, Lavr Aleksandrovich retired and six years later died quietly in Moscow, being a prosperous military pensioner⁸. Krupennikov and Mazanov became "Vlasovites" only in Vishlev's imagination. Contrary to his assurances to the reader, the mentioned generals did not go "to the service of the Germans". Therefore, to their testimony about the words of Stalin, sounded at a banquet on May 5, 1941, it is necessary

consider carefully, comparing them with other materials known today.

By the way, Vishlev, criticizing Hoffman's publication, accidentally or deliberately did not comment on the statement of Colonel I. Ya. F. Engels of the division (63rd Rifle Corps of the 21st Army of the Western Front). On July 17, 1941, Bartenev was the first, *independently* of Naumov and *long* before Krupennikov and Mazanov, to give the Germans similar testimony about the Stalinist toast on May 59. Bartenev also did not serve in the Vlasov army and did not participate in the activities of the KONR. Apparently, such a twist of fate did not fit into the concept of Vishlev, so he avoided discussing Bartenev's data. Probably, Oleg Viktorovich is sincerely convinced

in the fact that various reports of Soviet prisoners of war about Stalin's preparations for an attack on Germany were maliciously created in the depths of German military intelligence for propaganda purposes or came from people who just wanted to "please the Nazis"¹⁰. However, to be guided by personal ideological predilections when evaluating evidence in

prisoners are not allowed. Suppose that Bartenev, Naumov, Krupennikov and Mazanov made statements about Stalin's offensive plans under the influence of their own anti-Soviet convictions. But then with not me On our basis, it can be argued that those military the prisoners, who denied that Moscow had aggressive intentions, did so under the influence of their pro-Linish views. So, for example, during interrogation on July 18, 1941, such versions were resolutely denied by senior lieutenant Ya. armies of the Western Front.

“ Were there really such intentions?

- No I do not think so. You were the first to attack, right? Not the Soviet Union attacked Germany first, but Germany attacked first! I am told that there is a speech by Stalin that says that if Germany does not attack first, then we will do it. I have never heard anything like it! Never heard! Never heard! This I can say. I don't know."11

Is it possible to easily ignore the words of Dzhughashvili, just as Vishlev proposes not to take into account the statements of Bartenev, Mazanov or the Vlasovites?.. Of course not. From the author's point of view, the content of specific testimony was primarily determined not so much by the personal attitude of this or that prisoner of war to the Stalinist socio-economic model, but by his awareness, official duties and private vision of the real situation that developed at the place of service in May - June 1941 Individual views (including "anti-Soviet") played a secondary role here. In this regard, it is interesting to know what different participants in Vlasov actually said.

of the movement during the war and postwar years about the state of the army, Stalin's plans and intentions in 1941?

The answer to the question is not the same

meaningful.

Let's start with the fact that Hoffmann and Vishlev lost sight of another eyewitness - Major General V.F. Malyshkin, former chief of staff of the 19th Army (1st Formation) of the Western Front. The German diplomat G. Hilger met him on January 24, 1943, in a special interrogation camp of the I (Königsberg) military district in Letzen. Malyshkin presented his version *after* statements by Naumov and Krupennikov, but almost half a year *before* Mazanov's testimony. In 1938-1939. brigade commander Malyshkin was repressed by the NKVD, then released and rehabilitated. Vasily Fedorovich, unlike General Krupennikov, at the banquet on the evening of May 5, 1941, was not only personally present, being a senior lecturer at the Academy of the General Staff, but also wrote down the main theses of Stalin's speeches during the feast. By the time he met Hilger, Malyshkin had been cooperating with the enemy for a long time and quite effectively. The meeting at Years to the price did not fundamentally change anything in his fate, and the secretary of the fictitious Russian Committee no longer aspired to "please the Nazis," as Vishlev wrote about it. However, for the entire previous period of General Malyshkin's captivity (October 1941 - December 1942), none of the Germans, except for Hilger, were interested in subjective memories of the half-forgotten Moscow banquet. Unfortunately, the author has not yet been able to establish how Hilger's report

about the conversation with Malyshkin in the winter of 1943 was deposited precisely in the documents of the Investigative Unit of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence SMERSH (MGB).

"A banquet in the Kremlin on 05.05.1941 was arranged in honor of the graduates of courses for the improvement of staff

officers¹³ at the Moscow Military Academy. Frunze. There were about 2,000 people at the banquet. He [Malyshkin. - K. A.] was present as a teacher at the Academy of the General Staff. He wrote down the main points of Stalin's speech. Stalin was sober¹⁵. One of the participants¹⁶ proposed a toast to the Soviet government and the successful continuation of its peace policy. Stalin immediately objected¹⁷: "The assertion that the Soviet government is successfully implementing a peace policy is correct, but now

it is untimely to emphasize the peaceful policy of the Soviet government. It means incorrectly orienting the people and directing their thinking along a path that no longer corresponds to the present stage of development. The time has come to explain to the people that the period of peaceful politics is over. It is necessary to prepare the people for the idea of the need for war, moreover, an offensive war. The further aims of the Soviet Union can only be achieved by the use of arms. He proposes a toast to this new stage in the development of the Soviet Union and the expansion of its frontiers. Germany as the "object" [of the attack. - K. A.] Stalin did not call.

According to Malyshkin, the offensive should have followed immediately after the harvest in the fall of 1941.

When asked where the offensive was to come from, Malyshkin did not answer, while other senior Soviet officers confidently stated that through Romania. Malyshkin's statement about the banquet completely coincides with the testimony of Major General Naumov, and Malyshkin does not even know that Naumov is in captivity¹⁸, while he knows him as a student of the Military Academy"¹⁹.

"Malyshkin gives the impression of an intellectual a man above average, he speaks thoughtfully and confidently. His hatred of Bolshevism, given his experience, makes a deep and honest impression.

An earlier dated message by Major General A. Z. Naumov exists as an appendix to the report of the head of the "Foreign armies of the East" (Fremde Heere Ost) department of the General Staff of the OKH, Colonel R. Gehlen, dated October 18, 1942. Here is the one of interest us a fragment that was commented differently by I. Hoffmann and O. V. Vishlev.

"One speech given by someone in the audience contained a toast: "Long live the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union!" Stalin got up and said: "This slogan is outdated, that is, in the development of the Soviet state and in the expansion of its borders, an epoch has come when it has become necessary to achieve this not with the help of a peace-loving policy, but by force of arms. Our country today has all the prerequisites to achieve [the goals] of its policy in a different way. I raise a glass to a new era of development and expansion of the Soviet state." Further, Stalin pointed out the need to propagate this new slogan among the population of the Soviet Union and that it was necessary to keep the whole country in constant mobilization readiness.

So, let's compare Naumov's message and the discovered Hilger's report with the now published brief typewritten note, which was received in 1948 by the Central Party Archive (CPA) signed by a certain K. V. Semenov, allegedly one of the employees of the Ministry of Defense Neither the speech nor the speeches (remarks) of Stalin at the banquet were officially stenographed, and the origin of the typescript remains undetermined. Before us, most likely, is also the text of someone else's manuscript, later reprinted. After all, it is difficult to imagine that one of the commanders invited to the Kremlin would bring a typewriter to the banquet. About Semenov himself so far

there is no clear information. Here is the content of the typescript from the CPA, the authenticity of which is not known to be questioned:

"Major General of Tank Troops is speaking. Transportation proclaims a toast to the peaceful Stalinist foreign policy. *Comrade Stalin*: "Permit me to make an amendment. A peaceful policy provides peace to our country. Peace politics is a good thing. For the time being, we carried out a defensive line until we re-equipped our army and supplied the army with modern means of combat. And now that we have reconstructed our army, saturated it with equipment for modern combat, when we have become strong, now we must move from defense to offensive. While defending our country, we must act aggressively. From defense to move on to a military policy of offensive operations. We need to restructure our education, our propaganda, agitation, our press .

Obviously, the "Semenov version" (let's call it that) is quite close in meaning to the first part of the "Naumov-Malyshkin version" (including the phrase: *"We need prepare the people for the idea of the need for war, and offensive war"*). Private discrepancies can be easily explained by the fact that Naumov, Malyshkin, Krupennikov and Mazanov freely recounted to their German interlocutors Stalin's banquet speech and remarks after a long time (the last two generals also did this from other people's words). But in essence, in our opinion, they did not distort the meaning. And then one trifle caught the author's eye, which he drew attention to thanks to a long creative communication with the remarkable St. Petersburg machine builder E. M. Vasyushkin. Here the author even allows himself to slightly change the dry style of narration.

"Semenov's version" from the first words is definitely opi

gives a completely concrete and understandable stage scene to the reader in the midst of a solemn feast: *"Major General of the tank troops is speaking. Proclaims toast"*. Imagine how everyone, including Comrade Stalin, filled their glasses and glasses. Focused attention. Tune in. Someone, perhaps, has already prepared a cucumber. I pricked it on a fork.

... But the pathetic toast "for a peaceful Stalinist foreign policy" was unexpectedly disliked by Comrade Stalin himself. Comrade Stalin introduced a substantive amendment. And, according to the accepted "version of Semenov", he substantiated it. What different historians do not doubt, including O. V. Vishlev.

So what is next? What happened next?..

Nothing happened, because "Semenov's version" suddenly ends here. End of typescript from CPA.

Well, Comrade Stalin, convincingly explaining to the guests that *"now we must move from defense to offensive,"* with a filled glass, just sat down in his place? And the other guests, whose glasses were also filled before, easily returned to the noisy conversations at the table?

It's illogical and therefore unbelievable.

It seems to the author that Comrade Stalin, having corrected the major general unknown to us, naturally made a toast to which all the listeners were seriously tuned in. The indispensable culture for solya demanded that. Moreover, the major general initially offered to raise glasses to the "Stalinist foreign policy" after all. It was impossible to miss such a toast, since it sounded. And all those present filled glasses and glasses with the enthusiasm of the wasp

sewed, and then ate, most likely already hot. Only during the preparation of typescript, which in 1948 entered the TsPA, *someone* did not include the ill-fated toast in the final text. Most likely, even with the knowledge or

at the direction of Comrade Stalin. This is quite possible, considering that the banquet speech and speeches-cues were first supposed to be published in his lifetime Complete Works²³. But then, for unknown reasons, the compilers refused to publish any texts related to the events of May 5, 1941.

The typescript published in 1998 signed by K. V. Semenov is true. But the reader does not tell the whole truth. Therefore, one gets the impression that "Semenov's version" (in the collection of documents "1941" - "3rd speech of I.V. Stalin at the reception") is cut off in the middle. Unsaid. Since in the first part the "Naumov-Malyshkin version" does not contradict the "Semenov version", it is difficult to assume that both generals, independently of each other, further distorted the meaning of Stalin's frank toast: *"For this new stage in the development of the Soviet Union and the expansion its borders."* Then it becomes completely clear what exactly Comrade Stalin offered to drink to his guests on May 5, 1941, and why the content of his toast in post-war years, it was not worth trusting the typescript received by the archive. Thus, the testimonies of the captured Soviet generals Naumov, Krupennikov, Malyshkin, Mazanov *do not contradict* the published typescript from the former Central Party Archive, as O.V. Vishlev is convinced, but essentially *supplement* it in the part that the unknown compiler omitted. In this regard, one cannot fail to recognize the conclusions of the Moscow researcher V. A. Nevezhin as justified: "The anti-German orientation of Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941, combined with the apology of the Red Army, left no doubt that the Wehrmacht would become the closest military adversary. It is no coincidence that everything said by the leader on May 5, 1941 at a solemn meeting and at a reception (banquet) on the occasion of the release of the hearing

military academies was a guide to action”²⁴.

Did the quoted Stalinist words (as interpreted by Malyshkin) reflect the realities of the time? Let us turn to the testimonies of other Vlasovites. In the spring of 1941, the approach of war was felt by many of them.

Associate Professor of the Moscow Institute of National Economy named after V.I. G. V. Plekhanov M. M. Samygin (later - A. Chaikin, in exile - M. Kitaev) with the rank of junior lieutenant was appointed head of the chemical service of the 436th rifle regiment of the 155th rifle division (1st formation) included in the 10th Army. In early May, he left Moscow for ZOVO²⁵. In the 1950s, this is what Kitaev wrote to the famous historian B. I. Nikolaevsky, who lived in the United States:

“At the end of April, I and many of my friends and acquaintances, also reserve officers, received summons calling us for the next 90-day training camp. As a rule, we always went through such training camps with the same division, not far from our place of residence. This time we were sent to the west, to completely unfamiliar parts. The political situation, that is, the imminent threat of external invasion, was clear to everyone. Leaving and saying goodbye to loved ones, we did this in anticipation of the close development of events. Such were the situation and moods in Western [ad naya] Belorussia. Baranovich²⁷, Bialystok, Volkovsk, Brest, where I had to visit in the first half of May, were an armed camp, ready to offer resistance at any moment. In the area of Brest and Lomzha, part of the quartered troops spent the night in the trenches. Holidays have been canceled

They were engaged in continuous exercises, and very rarely did we manage to spend the night in the barracks. Most of the time we spent in the field, sleeping under the wagons. During this time, I had to become intimately acquainted with the people entrusted to me. Everyone knew per

tomorrow we will have to start a completely new life - a war, and looked closely at each other. The soldiers were in the vast majority newly drafted contingents, poorly trained and not yet fired upon. Among them, however, were interspersed with divisions and regiments transferred from Finland, which went through the harsh "winter war" there. They seemed to cement a huge mass of poorly trained troops. I was lucky enough to get into just such a personnel division. The command sought in a short time to create combat-ready troops from the semi-trained masses. Almost every exercise, in one form or another, was associated with live firing, and movement behind the barrage was often practiced. In this case, there were losses, however, small ones. It was taken lightly: the end justifies the means. They did not economize on cartridges and shells: it was felt that the game was over and it was necessary to take the matter seriously. Looking closely at my subordinates, I noted two main points in their moods:

1) fear of a possible war and lack of confidence in one's own strength. I wouldn't say it was disbelief, but uncertainty. The successes of the German troops spoke for themselves;

2) complaints about the severity of the service. The service was hard, food was not enough. Most of the soldiers suffered not only from hunger, but from malnutrition. Many reserve officers gave their dry rations to the soldiers in order to slightly improve their diet. Only a few who were in a good position in the civil service could afford this, since it was not cheap to eat at the commander's canteen at their own expense. Regular officers, especially family officers, barely made ends meet. The inadequate provision of career officers forced them to embark on all sorts of economic combinations, abusing their official position, which immediately affected the supply of soldiers.

Despite all this, the so-called political morale was good. The reason for this would not be political or ideological considerations, but a simple and clear thought: we will have to fight, and soon. Learn! The soldiers literally besieged us with questions relating to combat training, demanded more cartridges, more live firing. Never before have I seen anything like it. At other training camps, people usually lived by letters from home.

Thus passed May and the first week of June. I find it difficult to determine the exact date, but somewhere before June 10, a turning point occurred. Someone high above loosened the tightly coiled spring. Everyone immediately felt it. Special units were seconded from the regiments for special training. 30% of the officers received holidays and left. Teachings about were supposed to, but it was felt that this was done only for the sake of discipline, and not out of necessity. Headquarters officers no longer sat up at night on the so-called mobilization work, a volleyball bounced on the sports grounds and the cheerful laughter of officer wives was heard, to which their husbands returned. The tension subsided - re came

an action expressed for some in drunkenness, for others in women, and, in general, for all in those modest entertainments that were available. We, reserve officers, were waiting for the end of the collection and were already writing home to rent dachas and get settled for the summer. And to be honest, very many felt a sense of gratitude to the government in Moscow, which managed to once again avoid the war. Europe is at war, and we are playing volleyball! But a vague, anxious feeling was born right there: would they be able to keep the peace even further up

The regiments were left without special forces: machine gunners were collected for a special collection, sappers - for their own special classes, anti-tank artillery left

Riya, not today, tomorrow we, chemists, had to go to our training camp in the Volkovysk area.

It was in this situation that the day came June 22, 1941, expected and at the same time so unexpected.

Military technician of the 2nd rank B.P. Georgievsky (in exile - B. Kolb)³⁰, after graduating from the Tambov Artillery and Weapons Technical School, in the first half of June 1941, he arrived to serve in the position of junior artillery technician at 14 -th Rifle Regiment of the 72nd Mountain Rifle Turk Stanskaya Red Banner Division, which was part of the 8th Rifle Corps of the 26th Army (KOVO). On June 17, he sent his parents to Moscow the last pre-war letter, preserved in the family archive. The scanned copy is stored in the author's archive (*style and spelling preserved by the publisher*):

"Hello dear Parents! I received both letters from you even before my departure, at the station. These letters were brought to the station by a friend. Did they receive my letter from Kyiv, where I was passing through? Now I am at the address: U.S.S.R., Drogobych region, Ustriki Dolnyaya, post office. Box 701/25. Ustriki is a small station in the northern spurs of the Carpathians on the border with our "friend" - Germany. The border passes at the foot of the mountain, which is in front of the window. From the mountain you can see how the Germans are digging; dig probably in honor of friendship. There is an anecdote going on here. Ours asked the German: "Why did you gather so many troops at our borders?" To which the German replied: "They came to rest. They are calm here," and in turn asked: "Why did you gather so many troops at our borders?" And the German received the following answer: "So that your troops can rest in peace." Goodbye, Boris."

In 2004, sending a copy to the author of these lines, Georgievsky made a note in the margin: "Only Stalin did not know that the war was on the nose, but this is a lie."

Almost a quarter of a century after the appearance of Samygin's notes in Leningrad, in the late 1970s, another officer of the Vlasov army, L.A. Samutin, began to write his memoirs, whose fate was dramatic. In April 1941, junior lieutenant of the reserve³¹

L. A. Samutin, a teacher of geophysics and astronomy at the Ufa Pedagogical Institute, arrived at a three-month training camp at the 238th Infantry Regiment of the 186th Infantry Division (1st formation), stationed in the Ural Military District. The following month, in the field camp of the unit, he unexpectedly received an appointment as head of the infantry and mortar assembly of the newly formed training company. We emphasize that Samu Tin, who was under vigilant surveillance until his death in 1987, wrote his memoirs, as they say, "on the table." The last peaceful month was remembered by the former reserve commander as follows:

"In mid-May, new people suddenly began to arrive in large groups, replenishment. It turned out to be for the reserve assigned staff. We learned from them that these reserve 15 ages were called up, it was announced to everyone that the rank and file was called up to go through a 45-day training camp.

On June 14, two weeks before the end of the muster, all commanders, including those called up from the reserve, received an urgent order to report immediately to the headquarters of the 238th Infantry Regiment.

"I move quickly to the headquarters. There are gathered in groups of summoned commanders. I don't see anyone worried, and yesterday there was just another refutation of TASS, all sorts of conversations are going on, it's getting restless around ... And the call of these henchmen in such a large number, and early, two months ahead of schedule, the release of lieutenants from the military teach

lish - everything is probably not without reason, something is being prepared ...

Something is brewing, it becomes anxious in the soul when compare everything.

The commander of the regiment, the commissar, and the chief of staff came out onto the porch of the headquarters. We stretched out, made under the visors.

- Well, is everyone here? asked the major, regimental commander. "Here you are, comrade commanders. An order was received from the district immediately for our division to leave the camp and go to large corps, and possibly army maneuvers. Now start preparing for loading into trains. Today is the fourteenth, we will load on the sixteenth in the morning. Remove people from classes, feed them lunch, and after dinner, proceed to wind down the entire economy. Tents, beds, mattresses - we take everything with us. The chiefs of the gatherings should disband their people into divisions. Do it.

Captain Nikitin, the commander of the second battalion, leaned in and asked where we were going, but immediately bit his tongue. The major did not get angry, but only, leaving the porch, waved his hand - and no one in the d

On June 19, the train arrived at Velikie Luki station.

"The whole station of Velikiye Luki was packed with military trains. Echelons with people, military equipment: guns, tanks, cars, trains with sealed freight cars, long trains of fuel tanks - some arrived, others departed at very short intervals. We were waiting for our turn.

Here, in Velikiye Luki, our carefree mood came to an end. Now we no longer had a premonition - we saw with our own eyes that something serious was being prepared, and we would have to participate in this.

On the evening of June 21, the division, which was part of the 62nd Rifle Corps of the 22nd Army (1st formation), unloaded at the Idritsa station (Sebezhsy district of the Pskov region).

“Surprisingly quickly - by platoon - completely new sets of uniforms were issued to everyone, right down to underwear, and, most importantly, the disgusting boots with windings were also replaced with boots. The Red Army soldiers received tarpaulin boots, and we, the command staff, received beautiful ash-grass boots with thick leather soles. If I had been told then that in these boots I would walk almost a thousand kilometers on foot and we would endure it - both I and the boots - I would never have believed it.

We also replaced light small arms. Instead of the old loose rifles that we brought with us, we were given brand new rifles and light machine guns. Machine guns and mortars remained old.

But what surprised us the most was the receipt of ammunition. And this turned out not only to surprise, but also to displeasure, since we set out in no more than an hour, and ammunition significantly increased the weight of the carried loads. It was ordered to explain to the personnel that the ammunition was issued because the maneuvers would take place in the area of the state border, and any military unit located in the border area should be supplied with ammunition”³² .

The next day, the war began, and junior lieutenant L.A. Samutin received his last position in the Red Army - the commander of the transport company of the 238th rifle regiment of the 186th rifle division³³. The author did not wait for the lifetime publication of his memoirs, partly due to the constant attention to himself from the employees of a well-known department. The book was published by her daughter 15 years after her father's death in a tiny edition of 300 copies.

One of the senior officers of the Vlasov army, formerly

the most repressed commander of the Red Army V. V. Pozdnyakov³⁴ in June 1941 he served as chief of the chemical service of the 67th rifle corps of the 21st army with the rank of lieutenant colonel. A few months before his death in exile, he published in a Russian foreign printing interesting evidence:

"In May 1941, I attended a completely secret meeting of the senior command staff of the Poltava garrison³⁵ (from regimental commanders and above). A reporter from the Central Committee of the party analyzed this thesis of Stalin in detail and argued that war with Germany was inevitable. (Stalin

On May 1 or 5, the 41st said: it is time to move from defense in a tactical sense to the concept of defense in a strategic sense.) When the Soviet Union prepared for such a war, it would itself attack Germany .

But not everyone saw the situation that way. Post-war memoirs of M. M. Samygin and V. V. Pozdnyakov, who, by the way, were imprisoned in the same military camp in the winter of 1941/42 prisoners, it is appropriate to compare with estimates of the state of the Red Army in the last pre-war months, with belonging to two other Vlasovites who played a significant role in the movement: S. T. Koide³⁷ and F. I. Trukhin. The commander of the 184th Infantry Division (IV Formation)³⁸ Colonel S. T. Koida wrote his memoirs in the FRG in the late 1940s and early 1950s, at the suggestion of Pozdnyakov. The short notes "The Causes of the Initial Defeat of the Soviet Army" were not intended for publication. In May 1941, Koida served in Tomsk and served as commander of the 735th Infantry Regiment of the 166th Infantry Division (1st formation) with the rank of lieutenant colonel. At the end of June, the division, as part of the 53rd Rifle Corps of the 24th Army, arrived from Siberia to the West and advanced to the Vyazma region. Here is what Colonel Koida wrote a few years after the war:

“The Germans took the Soviet army by surprise, with its carelessness and overestimation of its propaganda, which lulled the army and inspired it that it was invincible, the border was locked and that they would fight on foreign territory, they would fly above all and farthest, etc. It should be noted that during these years fraud was widely introduced in the army. It followed both command and political lines and was deliberately covered up even by such bodies as the political departments of the districts, which they concealed from the political administration of the Red Army and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR .

Where did the castles on the borders come from? At first they were hung on the borders of the Far East. They got picked up and on the western borders, continuing to repeat like a scare, without realizing it, at rallies, meetings,

political studies, etc.

The results of inspections, the preparation of protocols for combat training, etc., were completed in the offices of headquarters to an excellent, good rating and were presented to the people's commissar. All this was done in pursuit of a good recommendation and certification in order to get promotion and position. All this was the stimulus of socialist competition, which pushed and suggested 100% fulfillment of the obligations undertaken, and the fate of those who led them depended on their result, and since it was not easy to fulfill the contract, a pencil was applied to this and erased with an eraser . If any units were subjected to a check in one discipline or another, then they chose the best of the best fighters of this unit or battalion, otherwise they put them in dugouts with revolvers and finished shooting so that they hit the targets. Such training methods took place not only in units, but also in the military

shchas and in academies, where teachers tried to characterize their students so as not to have a weak assessment of their students, because the responsibility of

gives to the teacher as if he failed to teach the listener. As a result, a number of graduates from the academy did not have a sufficient outlook on military operations in the big theater of war. All developments, all classes of the academies were held according to the template and oral instructions.

And at the beginning of the war, the commanders did not have the right to make maneuvers, to retreat, to regroup - they had to have permission for everything, and in war "slowness is like death." In addition to the unpreparedness of personnel, the army was armed with old equipment and entered into battle with first-class equipment of the Germans⁴⁰. The Soviet armies were not mobilized and manned according to wartime. The divisions had 6,000 members - at most 8. The German divisions had an advantage of 3 times⁴¹. The Soviet army was equal in number and old armament to the German corps, and sometimes inferior in armament. So it was near Moscow in 1941, so it was in the first years near Stalingrad.

The western military districts - Ukraine, Belarus and the border troops - were on the surface of the earth, and fortified areas with concrete and iron structures were not created due to the lack of materials. On the new frontiers of the West, simple earthworks with communication passages were built, and that was it! The frontier units took up defense on a wide front. The regiment took 12-14 km along the front instead of 2.5 km. The rear troops were located in tents, dugouts, the command staff in plywood houses. 3/4 of all the troops of Ukraine and Belarus were in the camps, there was a demobilization of the rank and file, who had served their military service, and they were called up for another year in the army.

In addition, it should be noted that the new state borders were separated from the old defensive areas by 500 km or more. Equipment, uniforms were delivered from there aviation, tanks, fuel, shells, which were under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense (warehouses of

command). All this work was carried out peacefully, although there were signals. The landing of German pilots with maps showing the old and new borders, the disposition of troops, etc. But this was not taken seriously.

The Germans began their invasion by destroying dawn 22 hangars, fuel depots and ammunition mi, and at the same time went on the offensive of the corps with mechanized infantry. There was an unequal battle for 3 days, and then it calmed down. There were no cartridges, the fuel ran out, there were no rows of shells, communication was broken everywhere and everywhere"42 .

On June 19-20, 1941, Major General F.I. Trukhin, Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of the Operations Department (Directorate) of the PribOVO (North-Western Front), made a field trip to the border zone together with the commander of the troops, Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov. Later, in captivity, Trukhin⁴³ bitterly said that Kuznetsov knew nothing about the imminence of the war and about the practical unpreparedness of the army for this war⁴⁴. During interrogation by the Germans, the future chief of staff of the Vlasov army provided basic autobiographical information about himself and questioned the possibility of the Wehrmacht achieving a quick victory over the Red Army. Then he was taken to the army collection point (Armee-Gefangenen-sammelstelle) in Ebenrode and later - to the flag⁴⁵

No. 62. Trukhin's surname did not appear in the list of the names of the commanders who provided the enemy with information about the USSR's preparations for an attack on Germany.

If we follow the logic of O. V. Vishlev - this is weird. It turns out that most of the generals who collaborated with A. A. Vlasov (I. A. Blagoveshchensky, D. E. Zakutny, F. I. Trukhin, M. M. Shapovalov) did not give evidence "favorable" to the enemy, having missed a sure chance to "please the Nazis." Although, for example, the commander of the 21st Rifle Corps of the 21st

missions (I formations) of the Western Front, Major General D. E. Zakutny⁴⁶, with a persistent desire, could tell something to Hilger or Gehlen's employees. At the beginning of June 1941, Zakutny was vacationing in Sochi. After June 14, he was unexpectedly recalled from vacation and June 20 arrived in Moscow. On June 21, Zakutny was received by Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, People's Commissar of Defense, and then by Lieutenant General V. D. Sokolovsky, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Then Zakutny immediately left Moscow for his duty station, Vitebsk. But about the content of the conversations that took place on the eve of the war with Timoshenko and Sokolovsky, Zakutny never spread. True, in a private conversation with a Russian émigré in Berlin, he somehow let slip for a cryptic phrase: "It was politics that lost the border battle, not us generals"⁴⁷.

In German captivity, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov and the commander of the 41st Rifle Division (P formation) of the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front, Colonel V. G. Baersky (pseudonym - V.I. . Boyarsky)⁴⁸. On August 7, 1942, they met in the Vinnitsa POW camp (offlag No. 83?) with G. Hilger, who had specially arrived from Berlin. May - June

1941 both held responsible positions in Zapadne.

Vlasov commanded in KOVO the 4th mechanized corps (deployment of control - Lvov) of the 6th army (I formation) with the rank of major general. On June 20, following the order of Commander Lieutenant General I. N. Muzychenko, Vlasov announced a combat alert in the corps, according to which he raised the 8th Panzer Division (military unit No. 5427) Colonel P. S. Fotchenkov and the 81st Motorized Kaluga Division (military unit No. 5454) of Colonel P. M. Varypaev, ordering them to start advancing to the established areas of concentration in the areas of Dubrovitsa and Yanov (Lvov region). 21st of June

ordered the formations of the corps to continue moving even to the west of the districts of concentration, established by the plan for covering the state border. The 32nd Panzer Division (military unit No. 9656) of Colonel E. G. Pushkin began to leave Lvov between two and three in the morning on June 22nd 1941 . Baersky served as chief of staff of the 31st Rifle Corps with the rank of lieutenant colonel. In the spring of 1941, the corps was part of the troops of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front (DVKF). As part of the measures taken by the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, on April 26, 1941, the Military Councils of the Far Eastern Front and the Far Eastern Federal District, as well as two airborne brigades. In the course of fulfilling the received order, by May 25, the department of the 31st Rifle Corps of Major General A.I. Lopatin arrived in Khabarovsk and became part of the 5th Army (I Formation) of Major General of Tank Forces M.I. Potapov⁵⁰ .

In a conversation with Hilger, both prisoners of war answered answering a diplomat's question about the likelihood of an attack by the Soviet Union on Germany:

Vlasov: "Such plans, no doubt, existed. The concentration of troops in the area of Lvov indicated that a strike was planned against Romania in the direction of oil fields. The formations drawn up in the Minsk region were intended to repel the inevitable German counterattack. The Red Army was not ready for the German attack. Despite all

rumors about relevant German measures, no one in the Soviet Union believed in such a possibility. The actions of the Soviet side were aimed at preparing their own offensive, defensive measures, on the contrary, lagged far behind. This fact, combined with the "idiotic" leadership, was the cause of the first major failures .

Interestingly, Vlasov, in his version of events, did not name any probable dates for the offensive operations.

Baersky: "Preparations for this in the summer of 1941 have advanced so far that the Kremlin, probably already in August-September 1941, or at the latest in the spring of 1942, could strike. The Red Army would then move in a "southwesterly direction," that is, against Rumania. Germany preempted the Soviet government, for which the military actions on the part of Germany were a complete surprise.

Finally, it is necessary to name one more participant in the Vlasov movement, who was convinced of the inevitability of an attack by the USSR on Germany, but not in 1941, but in the spring of 1942. In May-June 1941, Colonel M.A. chief of staff of the b-th army (I formation), whose control was in Lvov (KOVO). Meandrov presented his version of events at the end of November 1945, while he was in the American prisoner of war camp No. 26 in Landshut (Bavaria). The details of a private conversation between Meandrov and two captured Wehrmacht officers were recorded in his diary by a member of the White Movement, Major General S. K. Borodin, who also served in the Vlasov army in 1945. Only thanks to Borodin's notes, Meandrov's estimate has been preserved.

"20. 11. [1945. - K. A]. Tonight we⁵⁴ arranged a small dinner with the Germans⁵⁵. There was a Russian-speaking Colonel of the General Staff Lebel and Major Mele. They made a prison with canned meat, which Assberg gave, and biscuits and coffee for the second. The lids from the pots served as plates. We sat from 7 to half past ten in the evening. Colonel Lebel⁵⁶ wanted to find out whether the foundations were in fact

nor am I to Hitler's decision to attack the USSR before the USSR attacks. General Meandrov, as the former chief of staff of the corps⁵⁷ in the Kiev military district, cited a lot of data indicating that by the spring of 1942 the USSR would be ready to enter the war. The attack of the USSR on Germany was inevitable, and therefore Germany had real reasons to attack first. General Assberg said that Germany should not have attacked the USSR in 1941, and before 1942 England should have been defeated. However, Colonel Lebel argued that Germany in 1941 was not ready to attack England, and under these conditions he believed that Hitler was right to attack the USSR, but (Lebel and Mehle said) Hitler did not back the strategy with a reasonable policy,

without creating a Russian national government and from the prisoners - a Russian national army, but a repressive He set the entire Russian people against Germany with harsh measures against the population and cruelty against prisoners of war. This led to the death of the entire Hitler cause, to incalculable grave consequences for all Germans, as well as to the delay in the liberation of Russia from Bolshevism and to the posing of the big question: what will happen next? In this question and in the further course of the Anglo-American policy towards the USSR, and towards communism in general, the fate of mankind is hidden. The USSR seeks to win over all Germans and all Chinese to its side. General Meandrov said: "The Germans will make a colossal political mistake if, succumbing to the flattering plans of the USSR to restore Germany, they go along with communism. The Germans should at all costs remain in the majority opponents of Bolshevism, and it is better to be politically divided, how now than to turn into a united, but red Germany. "I tell my comrades about this all the time.

groves," Colonel Lebel replied, apparently thereby confirming the presence among the officers and generals of the General Staff of the views that General Meandrov was against. The family of Colonel Lebel, located in the Soviet zone [occupation of Germany. - K. A], wrote to him: "In no case should one strive to move here after release. It's very bad here. It's better to get us out of here."

So, on the basis of the revealed evidence and testimonies of the generals and officers of the Vlasov army, we are trying to compile a generalizing table.

	Rank, job title on 22.VL 1941 district	Date of, place activities	External conditions and character witness stava	Summary	Correl tion with others. witness with the help of
B. P. Georgievskii	military technician 2 r., ml. artillery technician (KOBO)	17.VI.1941, oysters	Liberty, private letter	end tradition troops by both sides of the border	meanders (?), Samu tin, Samygin
A A Vla owls	major general, commander of the 11th mk (KOBO)	7. VIII. 1942 offlag 83, Vinnitsa	German captivity, readiness for co labor, indications G. Hilger	USSR attack to Romania, no deadlines	Baersky, Baby kin, Mean firewood, Pozdnyakov (?)
V. G. Baersky	lieutenant colonel nickname, chief headquarters 31st sc (KOBO)	7. VIII. 1942 offlag 83, Vinnitsa	German captivity, readiness for cooperation, according to G. Hilger	USSR attack Rumykin, Meandrov (?), Niyu, August 1941— spring 1942	Vlasov, Kid on Meandrov (?), Late cove(?)
W. F. Ma lyshkin	brigade commander, senior teacher (MVO)	January 24, 1943 survey camp, Letzen	Liberty, cooperation with adversary, testimonies of G. Hilger	expansion of the borders of the USSR by force of arms words Stalin autumn 1941	Baersky, Vlasov, Meand ditch, Pozdnyakov

	Rank, job title on 22.VI. 1941 district	Date of, place activities	External conditions and character witness stava	Summary	Correlation with others witness with the help of
D. E. Za Kutny	major general, chief of staff ba 21st sc (ZOVO)	1943, Berlin	Liberty, cooperation with adversary, private conversation	indefinitely, evasion judgments	Georgievsky (?)
F.I. Trukhin	major general, deputy chief of staff ba PriboVO	1944, Berlin freedom,	collaborators with adversary, private conversation	Troops county not ready for war	Koida
M.A. Me and rov	colonel, deputy chief headquarters of the 6th armies (KOBO)	20.XI. 1945 american camp No. 26, Landshut	american captivity, free discussion, spring, talk	Attack USSR on Germa private for 1942	Baersky, Vlasov, Malyshkin, Late kov (?)
S. T. Koida	regiments nickname, commander of the 730th SP 166th SD (SibVO)	1947-1949 Munich district, Western zone occupation	Liberty, letters screenings private request	Red Army to no war ready	Trukhin
MM. Samygin	ml. pour nant, on chim 436th cn 155th sd (ZOVO)	1950s Germany or Ceylon	Liberty, letters so far knowledge on private request	concentration troops on border, readiness to reflection	Georgievsky, Samutin
V.V. Pozdnya kov	lieutenant colonel nickname, on chim sc (XBO— ZOVO)	1973, New York 67th	Liberty, publication in the newspaper	Get ready tovka to attack on Germany	Baersky (?), Vlasov (?), baby kin, Mean wood
L. A. Sa Mutin	ml. pour nantes, commander of the transport company of the 238th 186th division (PriboVO)	1977-1979 Leningrad 38th state	Liberty under on observance, memoirs in my own way initiation tive	moving to the west, concentration of troops, preparation for combat actions	Georgievsky, Samygin

Obviously, the picture that the Vlasovites painted, contrary to the opinion of O. V. Vishlev, looks quite eclectic. First, of the eleven testimonies, only 5 were made during the war period between June 22, 1941 and May 9, 1945. Others refer to pre-war or post-war times. Of the testimonies of five Vlasovites made during the war years, in one case there is no indication of preparations for an attack on Germany (*Trukhin*), and in the other, the general (*Zakutny*) gave an indefinite assessment, in fact avoiding discussion of the topic. Secondly, of the five reports that clearly confirm the readiness of the USSR to attack Romania or Germany (*Vlasov, Baersky, Malyshkin, Meandrov, Pozdnyakov*), only three were made in the conditional dependence of German captivity. And all five differ in their assessments of probable dates: uncertain (*Vlasov, Pozdnyakov*), autumn 1941 (*Malyshkin*), August 1941-spring 1942 (*Baersky*), spring 1942 (*Meandrov*). Thirdly, each of the reported messages is correlated with others. But none correlate with more than four. Some of the statements (*of Koida, Samygin, Trukhin*) can be regarded as contradictory to others. It is difficult to accuse Georgievsky, Zakutny, Trukhin, Meandrov, Koid and Samu of deliberate perjury.

Tina, although in no case can sincere errors in assessments be ruled out. Finally, six testimonies (*Georgievsky, Zakutny, Trukhin, Koida, Samygin, Samutin*) out of eleven, with skillful interpretation, can be used as evidence of *any version* of the possible development of events in May-June 1941.

The only explanation that eliminates apparent contradictions and brings all 11 testimonies to a common conclusion is the following: each of the eyewitnesses, to the best of his own abilities and abilities, tried to honestly describe his individual vision.

pre-war situation. The content and nature of all the testimonies cited were not determined by the subsequent cooperation of the Vlasovites with the enemy, especially someone's desire to "please the Nazis", and the official position of specific individuals in May-June 1941. Therefore, various testimonies of the participants in the Vlasov movement about the last pre-war months remain valuable and are still poorly understood as a source characterizing the true plans and intentions of the highest nomenklatura of the CPSU (b) on the eve of the war with Germany. The identification and systematization of such important materials continues.

NOTES

1 *Hoffmann J.* *Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941-1945.* Munchen, 1999; In Russian per. see: *Hoffman I.* *Stalin's war of annihilation. Planning, implementation, documents.* M., 2006. S. 35-36, 38-40, 42-43, 64-67, 80-85, etc.

2 *Hoffman I.* Decree. op. P. 40. For the full text, see: Translation of Major General Naumov's message about the banquet in Moscow on May 5, 1941 on the occasion of the graduation of students of the military academy // *Vishlev O. V.* On the eve of June 22, 1941. Documentary essays. M., 2001. S. 170-171.

3 *Ibid.* P. 84. Naturally, the publication of one's own works Oleg Viktorovich considers, most likely, exclusively as "events of scientific life". This does not prevent him from seriously defending the completely political thesis that, for example, in August-September 1939 "the threat of fascist aggression was quite real" as a result of the possible "exit of the Wehrmacht to the state border of the USSR" (*Ibid.*, p. 14) . Looking for answers to the obvious question of how

the Wehrmacht had real means, forces and resources in the summer - autumn of 1939 to attack and wage war against the USSR, O. V. Vishlev does not bother himself.

⁴ Cit. by: there. S. 96.

5 O.V. Vishlev names another post of Lieutenant General L. A. Mazanova: commander of the artillery of the 30th army (see: *ibid.* p. 100). However, the 30th Army did not exist from May 1, 1943. At the time of the capture, General Mazanov temporarily led the corps artillery group of the 16th Guards. sc 11th Guards. armies of the Western Front.

6 *Vishlev O.V.* *How Hoffmann took the Vlasovites as witnesses* // *Vishlev O.V.* Decree. op. pp. 99-100.

7 Report of President E. Weinert on the activities of the National Committee "Free Germany" (1943-1945) // *For Germany* -

against Hitler! Documents and materials on the creation and activities of the NKSG and SNO. M., 1993. S. 419-420.

8 Sverdlov F. D. Soviet generals in captivity. M., 1999. S. 120, 135, 211. One curious episode is connected with the fate of Lieutenant General L.A. Mazanov, about which the author considers it premature to write about. But the information known to the author in no way disavows his prosperous post-war life in the USSR and the awards he received.

9 Hoffman I. Decree. op. S. 39.

¹⁰ Cit. by: O. V. Vitely. Decree. op. S. 100.

— Cit. by: doc. No. 98. Protocol of interrogation by the Germans of a prisoner of war, senior lieutenant Ya. I. Dzhusgashvili, July 18, 1941 // Joseph Stalin in the arms of his family. From the personal archive / Comp. Yu. G. Murin. Berlin - Chicago - Tokyo - Moscow. M., 1993. S. 83-84.

12 Captured 24 Oct. 1941 on the Western Front in the Vyazma region. From Apr. 1942 cooperated with the enemy. From 27 Dec. 1942 - Secretary of the non-existent Russian Committee, one of the close associates of Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov. Signed the "Appeal of the Russian Committee to the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, to all the Russian people and other peoples of the Soviet Union" ("Smolensk Appeal"), in which for the first time openly and publicly formulated the political goals of the Vlasov movement. Since November 14, 1944 - Member of the KOHP Presidium, Deputy. (on the affairs of the Committee) General Vlasov. Major General of the Armed Forces KOHP. In 1945-1946. - in American captivity, forcibly repatriated to the USSR. Aug 1 1946 on the basis of the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 23, 1946, by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, chaired by Colonel-General of Justice V. V. Ulrich, deprived of his Soviet military rank and sentenced to death by hanging with confiscation property. For more information about him, see: Alexandrov K. M. Officer Corps of the Army of Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov 1944-1945 / Biographical Reference. II ed. M., 2009. S. 582-597.

13 So in the text. That's right: commanders. Perhaps it is about like a translation from German.

¹⁴ The figure coincides with the *estimates of* the Moscow researcher V.A. pp. 271).

15 This statement partly correlates with the testimony of Major General A. Z. Naumov, who stated that Stalin was "drunk" only "in subsequent speeches" after the toast we are interested in (see: Translation of Major General Naumov's message ... op. cit. p. 171).

16 According to G. Hilger, this was the head of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze, Lieutenant General M. S. Khozin, according to other versions - the head of the Artillery Academy of the Red Army, Lieutenant General of Artillery A. K. Sivkov. They also name an unidentified Major General of the Panzer Troops.

17 This was JV Stalin's third speech (remark) during the banquet.

18 In 1941-1942. major generals A. 3. Naumov and V. F. Malyshkin

were kept in various POW camps. Malyshkin was officially released from captivity in the fall of 1942. Naumov remained in the camp

in the position of a prisoner of war.

¹⁹ Major General A. Z. Naumov studied at the courses at the Military Academy demi them. M. V. Frunze.

²⁰ Cit. by: Central Archive of the Federal Service Safely sti (CA FSB) of the Russian Federation. Collection of archival and investigative materials H-18766. Volume 8. L. 58-62.

²¹ Cit. by: Translation of the message of Major General Naumov ... Decree. op. S. 171.

²² Cit. by: doc. No. 437 // 1941. In 2 books. / Comp.: L. E. Reshin, L. A. Bezymensky, V. K. Vinogradov, D. D. Vorobyov, Yu. A. Gorkov, V. P. Gusachenko, L. A. Dvoynikh and others. Scientific ed. V. P. Naumov. Book. 2. M., 1998. S. 162.

²³ Ibid. pp. 294-295.

²⁴ Cit. Quoted from: *Nevezhin V.A.* Decree. op. pp. 279-280.

²⁵ The last military rank in the Red Army was established from a photograph on a military ID card of 1941 and an entry in the service card (p / c). See: Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO) of the Russian Federation. XI department. Card file of officer records (KUOS). Press conference of Mikhail Mikhailovich Samygin, born in 1915 By appointment in p / c, he was called up for training in the 436th joint venture of the 155th division on May 5, 1941. He was taken prisoner on August 31. 1941 in the Pogara district of the Oryol region. In 1943-1944. - captain of the ROA, lit. gas employee. "Dawn" (Berlin - Dabendorf). He died in 1964(?) in Ceylon.

²⁶ Correct for 1941: commanders. Among the emigrants of the "second wave" who served in the Red Army (until 1942) and in the ROA, the use of the word "officer" was widespread even in relation to the period of Soviet military service.

²⁷ As of May 30, 1941, the headquarters of the 436th cn 155th sd.

The 28th 436th Rifle Regiment as part of the 155th Rifle Division took part in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. (1st sk of the 8th army, operating in the Petrozavodsk direction).

²⁹ Cit. Quoted from: Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University (HIA). Collection V. I. Nikolaevsky. Box 274. Folder 274-25; *Kitaev M.* Soviet defeatism in World War II. Typescript. L. 13-14.

³⁰ Captured Sept. 1941 on the Southwestern Front. In the winter of 1944 he entered the service in the ROA. Personal adjutant and translator of Major General M. A. Meandrov (1944-1945), second lieutenant of the ROA (AF KONR). After 1945 he received a medical education. Died in 2007 in the USA. For more information about him, see: *Alexandrov K. M.* Decree. op. pp. 335-338.

³¹ German officers who interrogated Senior Lieutenant Ya. I. Dzhugashvili on July 18, 1941, showed him a trophy letter written by one of the reserve commanders on I am passing tests as a junior lieutenant in the reserve and would like to go home in the autumn, but this will only succeed if a trip to Berlin is not undertaken this autumn. Interrogation protocol: *Dzhugashvili* ("Reads the letter and mutters to himself: "Damn it!")"). Cit. by: doc. No. 98. Protocol of interrogation

by the Germans, a prisoner of war, senior lieutenant Ya. I. Dzhugashvili // Decree. op. S. 83.

³² Cit. by: *Samutin L. A.* I was a Vlasovite ... St. Petersburg, 2002. S. 16, 18, 28-29.

33 Captured on July 10-11, 1941 after the encirclement and defeat of a unit 25 km west of Vitebsk, in one of the villages of the Beshenkovichi district of the Vitebsk region. In 1942-1943. - Member of the BSRN, Assistant Head of the Propaganda Department of the Staff of the "Druzhina I". Since May 1943 - in the ROA. Head of the Propaganda Department brigade (battalion) of the ROA in Stremutka, Pskov district, Pskov region. Permanent officer of the Dabendorf school of the ROA, propaganda officer of the Russian battalions in Denmark (1943-1944). In 1945 - head of the propaganda department of the headquarters of the Auxiliary Technical Troops of the KONR, captain of the Armed Forces of the KONR. In 1946 he was forcibly repatriated from Denmark to the USSR. Sentenced to 10 years in the camps and 5 years of disenfranchisement. He served his term in Vorkutla, an active participant in the Vorkuta strike of 1953. He was released in 1955. He worked as a geophysicist in Vorkuta, since 1970 he lived in Leningrad. A. I. Solzhenitsyn (1969-1973) custodian of the first copy of the Gulag Archipelago manuscript. He died in 1987 in Leningrad.

34 Captured in Oct. 1941 in the Bryansk (?) Direction. From the summer of 1942 he collaborated with the enemy. He served in combat positions in the Dabendorf school of the ROA (1943-1944). In 1944-1945. - Colonel of the ROA (AF KONR), head of the command department (personnel) of the central headquarters of the Vlasov army. He died in 1973 in the USA. See more about it there. pp. 679-688.

³⁵ Previous position V.V. Pozdnyakova (since December 26, 1939) - Senior Lecturer and Head of the Chemical Service of the Poltava Autotechnical (Automobile) School. The 67th sk in the spring of 1941 was formed in the KhVO.

³⁶ Cit. Quoted from: *Pozdnyakov V.V.* On the article by K. Kromiadi "From the Distant Past" // New Russian Word (New York). 1973. 13 Aug. C. 2.

37 Captured in battle on March 8-9, 1943 in the Kharkov region. In July 1943 filed a report on joining the service in the ROA. He served in the Dabendorf school of the ROA (1943-1944) with the rank of colonel. In 1945, he was the head of the 1st United Officers' School of the Armed Forces of the Peoples of Russia (Offizierschule der ROA), in March - May - the commander of the Reserve Brigade (Reservebrigade der ROA) of the Armed Forces of the KONR. Then in exile in West Germany. He died after 1960. For more details about him, see: *Alexandrov K. M.* Decree. op. pp. 483-490.

38th 184th Rifle Division (III Formation) was excluded from the general list of rifle divisions from 15 September. 1942 From the end of Feb. In 1943, the newly formed 184th SD was part of the Southern Group of Major General S. V. Sokolov, formed on February 24. in the strip of the 3rd Panzer Army of the Voronezh Front.

³⁹ That's right: Commissariat. At the time of writing these notes So all people's commissariats in the USSR have already been renamed ministries.

⁴⁰ A common stereotype.

41 On the directions of the main attacks.

⁴² By: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA). Militärgeschi Cited.

chtliche Sammlungen (MSg.) 149/56. Bl. 72-73. Maschinenschrift. It is possible that the text was not completely preserved.

43 Captured during a collision with enemy reconnaissance

June 27, 1941 in the Jekabpils region. From 1942 he collaborated with the enemy. Member of the NTS. Head of the Dabendorf school of the ROA (1943-1944). From November 14, 1944 - member of the Presidium of the KONR, deputy. (on the affairs of the Military Directorate) General Vlasov Major General of the Armed Forces KONR. In 1944-1945. - Chief of Staff of the KONR troops, practical organizer and creator of the Vlasov army (about 125 thousand people by April 22, 1945). Aug 1 1946 on the basis of the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 23, 1946, by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, chaired by Colonel General of Justice V. V. Ulrich, deprived of his Soviet military rank and sentenced to death by hanging with confiscation of his name creatures. For more information about him, see: *Alexandrov K. M.* Decree. op. pp. 800-824.

44 *Alexandrov K. M.* Decree. op. pp. 802, 820.

45 From him. *Offizierslager für Kriegsgefangene Offiziere* - officers' camp for prisoners of war officers.

46 Captured in a semi-conscious state as a result of a severe shell shock on July 26, 1941 in the area of the village. Bolshaya and Malaya Zimnitsa, Slavgorod district, Mogilev region Collaborated with the enemy since 1942. In 1943-1944 it. worked in propaganda agencies. Since November 14, 1944 - member of the Presidium of the KONR, head of the Main Civil Directorate of the KONR. Major General of the Armed Forces KONR. Aug 1 1946 on the basis of the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 23, 1946, by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, chaired by Colonel-General of Justice V. V. Ulrikh, deprived of his Soviet military rank and sentenced to death by hanging with confiscation property. For more details about him, see: *Alexandrov K. M.* Decree. op. pp. 420-430.

47 Cit. Quoted from: *Aleksandrov K. M.* Decree. op. S. 427.

48 Captured unconscious as a result of being wounded

May 25, 1942 in the Barvenkovo district of the Kharkov region. Collaborated with the enemy from Aug. 1942 In 1942-1944 - in the Eastern troops of the Wehrmacht and the ROA, including in combat positions. Member of KONR (1944-1945). From 28 Jan. 1945 - deputy. Chief of Staff of the KONR troops, Major General F. I. Trukhin. Major General of the Armed Forces of the KONR (February 27, 1945). During the stay of the Southern Group of Forces KONR in the Czech Republic, he went to the Prague region with a service assignment. May 5 captured by a group of Soviet partisans. In response to the insult, he gave the group commander a slap in the face and, by his order, was hanged.

49 *Alexandrov K. M.* Decree. op. S. 257.

50 Ibid. S. 177.

51 Cit. by: doc. No. 16. Note of the former. adviser to the German Embassy in the USSR, an employee of the Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs G. Hilger on August 8. 1942 // *Vis O. V.* Decree. op. pp. 194-195. For several other editions, see: TsA FSB RF. Col. H-18766. Volume 7. L. 45-47.

52 Cit. by: doc. No. 16. Decree op. S. 197.

53 Captured 6 Aug. 1941 while trying to break out of encirclement on a command tank in the Uman region. Collaborated with the enemy

1942 Member of the NTS. In the ROA since 1944. Member of the KONR (1944-1945). Head of the propaganda department of the headquarters of the Vlasov army (October 1944 - February 1945). From 27 Feb. 1945 - Major General of the Armed Forces of the KONR and head of the 1st United Officer School of the Armed Forces of the Peoples of Russia (Officierschule der ROA). In 1945-1946. - in American captivity, commander of the personnel of the Vlasov army (Combined Arms Group). He refused to run away and did not welcome the escapes of the officers. On the eve of repatriation, he tried to commit suicide. Feb 14 1946 forcibly extradited to the USSR. Aug 1 1946 on the basis of the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 23, 1946, by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, chaired by Colonel-General of Justice V. V. Ulrich, deprived of his Soviet military rank and sentenced to death by hanging with confiscation of property. For more information about him, see: *Alexandrov K. M.* Decree. op. pp. 616-631.

54 Together with M.A. Meandrov and S.K. Borodin, four more major generals of the Vlasov army were in Landshut : V.G. th Army of the South-Western Front for tank troops), A. N. Sevastyanov (hero of the First World War, holder of seven orders, including the Order of St. George IV class; in 1941 - commander of the Red Army for certification, served as chief of artillery 266th Rifle Division (I formation) of the 21st Army of the Southwestern Front), ranks of the White Armies, Major General V.I. Angileev and V.F. Belogortsev, who served in 1944 in the Russian Security Corps.

55 Perhaps on the occasion of the anniversary of the establishment of the KONR, the proclamation of the Prague Manifesto of 1944 in Prague and Berlin, and the beginning of the formation of the Vlasov army - the Armed Forces of the KONR. At that moment, Major General M. A. Meandrov was considered a senior officer of the Armed Forces of the KONR (ROA) in American captivity.

56 So in the diary.

57 From 27 Apr. 1940 and until the spring of 1941, Colonel M. A. Meandrov for he held the post of chief of staff of the 37th sk (KOVO).

⁵⁸ Cit. by: VA-MA. MSh. 149/3. Borodin Tagebuch Bl. 155-155 (Rückseite). Maschinenschrift.

Mark Solonin

IMPACT ON AERODROMES - MYTHS AND FACTS

Of all the myths about the beginning of the war, created by the Soviet "scientific-historical" propaganda, this one is the most absurd and the most tenacious. At dawn on June 22, 1941 German aviation dealt a crushing blow to the airfields of the Soviet Air Force ... 66 airfields were attacked ... On the first day of the war, 800 aircraft were destroyed on the ground... 1200 aircraft... More than 2000 aircraft... More before noon on June 22 at the airfields was destroyed 1200 aircraft ... Destroyed in the very first hours of the war the main forces of Soviet aviation, the enemy ... "

Everyone "knows" this. Hundreds of books and tens of thousands of newspaper articles have been written about it (literally in the same or similar words). In upholding this "truth", the party "historians from GlavPUR" and the author of "Icebreaker" turned out to be united. Each student, preparing for the final exam, had to learn these spells by heart.

As befits a real myth, this one lives according to its own laws, not only not needing any documentary confirmation, but also not weakening from the flow of new facts that have become available to everyone since the early 90s. Just a comparison of the sacramental number of "1200 aircraft" with the total strength of the Soviet aviation grouping in the Western Theater of Operations shows that 87% (six out of seven) aircraft from the "surprise attack" did not suffer at all. And the next day after the notorious "1200, of which 800 are on the ground", the Soviet Air Force should

We were many times outnumbered by our enemy. The losses of the flight crew - and this is the basis of the foundations of the combat capability of military aviation - were (in percentage terms) completely insignificant. What then led to the catastrophic defeat?

The myth of "peacefully sleeping airfields" was painstakingly fashioned by communist propagandists by no means by accident. Secondly, the story about a peacefully sleeping country that became the object of a vile treacherous attack was very useful - this legend filmed many "unnecessary" questions about Comrade Stalin's real plans and tasks. But even that was not the most important thing. First of all, it was necessary to drive into the minds of the contemporaries of the tragedy, their children and grandchildren, the idea of the objective inevitability, the inevitability of what happened in the summer of 1941. For which the myth of a certain "super-extra-efficiency" inherent in such a tactic as a strike on airfields was the best suited. The treacherous adversary, taking advantage of the naive credulity of Comrade Stalin, was able to use this miraculous trick - and this is where all the troubles began ...

In an effort to present a strike on airfields as a "magic wand" capable of turning the tide of a war in the air in a matter of hours, Soviet propagandist historians contrived to outdo even the most deceitful Dr. Goebbels in lies. Thus, for the entire campaign of May-June 1940, French aviation irretrievably lost 234 aircraft from attacks on airfields (which amounted to only 26% of its total losses). In the first six days of the May battles, the British aviation fighter units based in France lost only 4 (four) aircraft on the ground. Of course, Nazi propaganda did not suit such modest figures, so the German news agencies announced that already on May 11 and 12, 1940, 436 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground.

One of the many Soviet professors, an academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a doctor of military sciences and others, claims that “on May 10, as a result of strikes on 12 French airfields, several hundred aircraft were destroyed, and on May 11 and 12 repeated massive strikes took place, which took them out of building another 700-750 French aircraft ... ”.

Before proceeding to a discussion of a brief theory of the question, let us consider one specific actual example.

Exactly three days after the fateful morning of June 22, at dawn on June 25, 1941, the aviation of the Northern Front (Leningrad Military District), together with the Air Force of the Baltic and Northern Fleets, launched a massive attack on Finnish airfields. Without digressing for a second to a discussion of the political reasons that led to this event and its long-term strategic consequences (the author of this article has already written a 700-page book about this, which all those who are interested can read), we will immediately proceed to the analysis of purely military aspects of the operation. In the well-known monograph by Major General of Aviation, Doctor of Science, Professor M. N. Kozhevnikov (“Command and Headquarters of the Air Force of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War”) we read:

“... Early in the morning of June 25, 236 bombers and 224 fighters delivered the first massive strike on 19 airfields [hereinafter it is emphasized by me. — M. S.]. The enemy, not expecting such a strike, was in fact for taken by surprise and failed to organize counteractions. As a result, Soviet pilots successfully bombed aircraft stands, fuel and ammunition depots. At the airfields 41 enemy aircraft destroyed. Our aircraft had no losses. In the next five days on these

At the same time, several more effective strikes were delivered to airfields newly identified by aerial reconnaissance. According to aerial photographic control, the pilots, having attacked a total of 39 airfields, made about 1000 sorties, destroyed and disabled 130 enemy aircraft. Command of the Nazi troops in Finland and Northern Norway was forced to delay their aircraft to distant rear airfields ... "

Agree, this text largely coincides with the standard description of the first strike of the Luftwaffe on Soviet airfields. And the quantitative parameters (460 aircraft in the "first wave") are quite comparable with the actions of the most powerful, 2nd air fleet of the Luftwaffe in the skies over Western Belarus. The difference - and the difference is striking - is found only in the results. Even if we proceed from Kozhevnikov's version, it turns out that, having an overwhelming numerical superiority, the Soviet Air Force spent 1000 sorties in order to destroy 130 enemy aircraft in six days (and not at all in the first six hours!) On average, 7.7 sorties per destroyed enemy aircraft. Already this arithmetic is somehow weakly combined with the legend about "1200, of which 800 are on the ground."

The documents of the command of the Air Force of the Northern Front, stored in TsAMO, and the work of modern Russian historians paint a completely different picture. The only word of truth in Professor Kozhevnikov's work is the name of the month (June). Everything else - against the background of real facts - looks like an example of "black humor".

The operation lasted exactly two days, and already on the second day (June 26), the bomber units of the Air Force of the Northern Front carried out only a few reconnaissance flights over Finnish territory. The total number of real airfields fin

Russian aviation, which became the object of a bombing strike, is equal to seven. Only at one airfield (in the city of Turku) was a single aircraft of the Finnish Air Force put out of action. By a strange twist of fate, it turned out to be a captured Soviet SB bomber. All other "airfield strikes" were either completely ineffective, or led to heavy losses on the falling. In two days of operations, the Air Force of the Northern Front and the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet irrevocably lost 24 bombers. There was no relocation of Finnish aviation "to distant rear airfields" at all. Absolutely fantastic figures ("39 airfields", "130 enemy aircraft") cannot be even remotely connected with any real events.

ties.

Now let's "twist the sharpness" and consider one of the episodes of the operation on June 25 in more detail. At 11:45 a large group (14 or 15, according to various sources) of SB bombers from the 72nd BAP at a relatively low altitude (1000 m, according to Finnish data) approached the Joroinen airfield. The tactically competent actions of the regiment command, it would seem, were supplemented by an element of luck - scorers. The ships approached the airfield just at the moment when the 2nd squadron of the LLv-26 fighter group, after a long patrol in the air with empty tanks, landed on the airfield. It is this situation (an enemy raid on the airfield during the refueling of aircraft returning from patrol) that is often used in Russian historiography to explain the colossal "ground" losses of the Soviet Air Force: the Germans allegedly always arrived "at the wrong time". The 72nd BAP strike group flew in to bomb the Joroinen airfield, which was also completely "at the wrong time" (from the point of view of the Finns). Yes, but the reaction of the Finnish fighter pilots turned out to be completely timely and clear.

Two fighters on the last liters of gasoline did not slowly take to the air and attacked the enemy many times outnumbered. As a result, three bombers were shot down directly in the area of the airfield, and the rest, after randomly dropping bombs, turned back. A few minutes later, the 3rd Squadron LLv-26, called by radio, intercepted the bombers of the 72nd BAP in the area of the village of Kerisalo (12 km southeast of Yoroï Nen). In the ensuing air battle, the strike group 72 BAP was finally defeated. Judging by the report of the commander of the Finnish squadron, Lieutenant U. Nie Minen, only four SBs survived by the end of the battle, *“for*

one of which stretched a smoky plume. In fact, Finnish fighters shot down not 10 (as they claimed), but 9 bombers of 72 BAPs. The tenth SB was already shot down over Soviet territory by a Soviet fighter. Among the dead was the squadron commander of the 72nd BAP, Captain Polyakov. The Finnish fighter group LLv-26 did not lose a single aircraft that day either in the air or on the ground.

This example immediately reveals the main thing that determines all the "pluses and minuses" of a strike on airfields as one of the elements of a war in the air. War is an armed confrontation between two sides, two adversaries, each of which, in order to achieve victory, shows perseverance, courage and resourcefulness. "There are two wills in the field," says an old Russian proverb. And if we discuss strikes against airfields in terms and categories of war (i.e., taking into account the active counteraction of an armed enemy), then this tactic appears to be a very complex, costly, and risky undertaking.

First of all, because the main component of combat aviation is not aircraft, but pilots. Attack on airfields - even the most successful for the attacker

side - leads only to the destruction of the self

years. And aircraft in aviation are nothing more than consumables. The attacking side loses in the air spirit above the airfield, not only airplanes, but also pilots. Moreover, he loses it irrevocably - a pilot shot down over the airfield will either die (it is almost impossible to use a parachute at low altitude), or will be captured. Both that and another in military language is called "irretrievable loss".

Secondly, it is much more difficult to destroy an aircraft on the ground than in the air. The flying object is vulnerable in flight. One single hole in the radiator cooling of the engine, a single control rod broken by a fragment of an anti-aircraft shell, a piece of the elevator skin torn out by a shell rupture of the smallest caliber air gun will lead to a crash or, in the most favorable case, to an emergency landing, in which the aircraft will most likely finally destroyed. If this landing takes place on enemy territory (and during a flight to an enemy airfield, this is likely to happen), then the downed aircraft will go into the category of "no return losses." Again, together with an extremely scarce pilot in the war.

An aircraft standing on the ground can be irrevocably destroyed only if it is directly hit by aerial bombs. Shrapnel "wounds" from an aerial bomb that exploded to the side can disable the aircraft, but only for the duration of the repair. And this time, depending on the severity of the damage, the equipment and qualifications of the repair services, can be only a few days or even a few hours.

Is it easy to achieve a direct hit with a bomb on an aircraft? According to the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force, the crew of the SB bomber, when bombing from a height of 2 km, on average achieved 39% of the dropped bombs in a rectangle of 200 by 200 meters, and the average circular deviation from the aiming point is

to 140 meters. Simply put, there was no question of any targeted bombing on such a point target as an aircraft. Moreover, for targeted bombing, you need to see the target - but with this, in the event of a strike on airfields, big problems arise.

The simplest camouflage nets (or even a simple bunch of green branches) in combination with decoys (simple and cheap mock-ups of aircraft made of plywood, board and cardboard) make the task of visually detecting an aircraft on the ground almost unsolvable. This "almost" could be realized only by descending to extremely low altitudes (50-100 m), which is not at all simple (at that time there were no automatic machines for tracking the terrain) and very dangerous (at such a height, an aircraft can shoot down even with dense rifle fire). But that's not all - in order to exclude the destruction of the aircraft by fragments of the bomb dropped by it, the bombing had to be carried out either from a height of more than 300-500 meters, or using a delayed action fuse. However, the latter method turned out to be even less effective, since a horizontally flying bomb, after being dropped from an extremely low altitude, ricocheted and fell in a completely random direction.

point.

A high-explosive aerial bomb weighing 100 kg (the most massive ammunition of bomber aviation at the beginning of the war) left a funnel 10-15 meters in diameter in the ground. A hundred mobilized peasants from a neighboring village could fill it up in half an hour. Manually. With the use of technology, it was even easier to restore the unpaved runway destroyed by the raid. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that, for example, the I-16 fighter of the latest modifications (type 28, type 29) had a takeoff speed of 130 km / h, a takeoff run of 210 m, a run of 380 m.

The elk for fighters of this class could be a flat clearing, compacted with a skating rink or lined with easily removable metal panels. Poeto

Therefore, attempts to disable the airfield by destroying unpaved runways would be even more costly and extremely ineffective.

It is important to note that the legend about the super-effectiveness of strikes against airfields was invented by Soviet "historians" retroactively. It was invented when it was necessary to find relatively decent explanations for the terrible defeat of the Soviet Air Force in the summer of 1941. The very limited possibilities of this tactic were well known to military specialists even before June 22, 1941.

Already on the basis of studying the experience of the war in Ispa
The following conclusions were made in the scientific research institutes:

"... In the first period of the war, both sides carried out intensive operations on airfields in order to gain air supremacy. Subsequently, however, they almost completely abandoned (hereinafter, it is emphasized by me. - M.S.) from this. Experience has shown that airfield operations have very limited results.
tats.

Firstly, because aviation is located on airfields dispersed (no more than 12-15 aircraft per airfield) and well camouflaged;

secondly, airfields are covered by anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns, which forces attacking aircraft to drop bombs from high altitudes with a low probability of hitting;

*thirdly, the damage to the airfield by aerial bombs is so insignificant that it almost does not delay the departure of enemy aircraft;
minor damage to the airfield quickly repaired
lyalis, and the broken connection was restored.*

Very often bombers dropped bombs to an empty airfield, as enemy aircraft

managed to take to the air in advance. For example, in July 1937, the rebels carried out 70 raids to the airfield in Alcala in groups of up to 35 aircraft. As a result of these raids, 2 people were injured, two planes and a truck were destroyed..." (275).

Spain was followed by fighting in China and at Khalkhin Gol. New combat experience again showed that strikes against airfields remain an important, but by no means the only, component of the struggle for air supremacy. At a well-known meeting of the highest command staff of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940, combat experience was summarized as follows:

G. P. Kravchenko: *"The main one is air fight... I'm based on my experience. During the operations at Khalkhin Gol, in order to destroy only one airfield, I had to take off several times as part of a regiment. I took off with 50-60 aircraft, while while at this airfield there were only 17-18 aircraft*

Moletov.

S. M. Budyonny: *"You said about losses at airfields, but what is the ratio of losses at airfields and in the air?*

G. P. Kravchenko: *"I believe that the ratio between losses at airfields will be as follows: in particular, at Khalkhin Gol, I had this - 1/8 part I destroyed on the ground and 7/8 in the air."*

G. M. Stern: *"And about the same ratio and elsewhere." (276).*

Similar patterns emerged during the famous Battle of Britain. Thus, during the first four days of the German air offensive, from 12 to 15 August 1940, Luftwaffe pilots destroyed 47 British fighters at the cost of losing 122 of their own aircraft. And this despite the fact that the number of three Luftwaffe air fleets involved in the strike was greater than at the beginning of Barbarossa, and the only combat mission of this air

armada was the suppression of the Royal Air Force, while during the invasion of the USSR the Luftwaffe were forced to allocate a significant part of the forces for fire support of the ground forces, for the destruction of roads, crossings and warehouses in the rear of the Red Army, operational intelligence, etc.

The next "round" of combat in the skies over RAF airfields took place from 23 August to 7 September. The British then lost (mainly in the air, not on the ground) 277 fighters, for which the Luf Twaffe paid with the loss of 378 aircraft of all types. Taking into account the fact that many British pilots managed to safely use a parachute and land on their own territory, the ratio of losses of pilots (during different periods of the Battle of Britain) was 5 to 1 or even 7 to 1. Of course, not in favor of the attacker sides.

Returning to the history of the Great Patriotic war, we can also state very eloquent facts. Throughout the war, the losses of Soviet Air Force aircraft at airfields were the smallest category of losses. Specifically, in 1942, 1943, 1944. from enemy strikes on airfields, 204, 239, respectively, were irretrievably lost,

210 aircraft, which amounted to 2.47, 2.52, 2.68% of the total number of irretrievable losses. In other words, on a huge front, the huge number (at least 10 thousand combat aircraft) of Soviet military aviation lost less than one aircraft a day from strikes on airfields!

For all that, in certain situations, such a tactic as a strike on airfields based on enemy aircraft may turn out to be expedient (or even the only possible one). The meaning and task of strikes against airfields can be formulated as briefly as possible as follows: the irretrievable loss of aircraft and pilots in exchange for a short

rising in the air. The enemy airfields and air units based on them will quickly restore their combat capability, but there are

situations where winning a couple of hours decides the outcome of the operation. That is why, before the start of major offensive operations, massive raids on enemy airfields were often carried out. The temporary decrease in the activity of enemy aircraft achieved by this was a significant help to the ground troops at the most difficult stage for them to break through the defenses.

we are the enemy.

There were situations when attacks on airfields and during all became the only possible means of armed struggle. For example, at the beginning of 1941, both British and German bomber

went to the tactics of night raids on the cities and military bases of the enemy. Despite huge efforts (and not small successes) in the creation and development of means of radar detection of aircraft in combat units, night fighters turned out to be powerless at that time in the confrontation with bombers invisible in the darkness of the night. Nothing else but extremely ineffective and leading to huge losses of raids on bombardier-based airfields

enemy diggers, then it turned out to take almost impossible.

Turning now from these general considerations to the real events of June 22, 1941, we can unequivocally state that the decision of the Luftwaffe command to deliver a massive strike against Soviet airfields was fully justified. Moreover, the Germans simply had no other chance to seize at least temporary air supremacy with the balance of forces that existed on the morning of June 22. The situation in which the Luftwaffe entered the war on

Eastern front, could at first glance seem hopeless. There were very few forces. Small compared to the number of enemy aviation (i.e. Soviet Air Force), small compared to any theoretical standards, is small compared to the experience of previous campaigns.

In May 1940, the Germans succeeded in concentrating on the Western Front the largest grouping of Luf Twaffe forces in the entire period of the Second World War. The offensive of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands, Belgium and northern France, on a front of 300 km in a straight line (from Arnhem to Saarbrücken), was supported from the air by two air fleets (2nd and 3rd), which included 27 fighter and 40 bomber air groups, 9 groups of Ju-87 dive bombers and

9 groups of multipurpose twin-engine Me-110s. A total of 85 groups, 3641 combat aircraft (and this is without taking into account the obsolete Arado Ag-68 and Henschel Hs-123 biplanes, without taking into account reconnaissance, transport, and sanitary aviation). The operational density is 12 combat aircraft per kilometer of the offe

On June 22, 1941, 22 fighter and 29 bomber air groups, 8 groups of Ju-87 dive bombers and 4 groups of multipurpose twin-engine Me-110s were concentrated on the Eastern Front (including Luftwaffe units stationed in Northern Norway and Romania). A total of 63 groups, which were armed with about 2350 combat aircraft (including non-serviceable ones). In principle, it is impossible to give an exact figure - aircraft in the Air Force are expendable material that arrives, departs, breaks down, repairs, is transferred from the balance of one structure to the balance of another. Moreover, all this happens during a war, the very nature of which does not imply the possibility of keeping records similar to that adopted in modern times.

computerized warehouse...

After the previous many months of fighting in the sky

over the Balkans and the Mediterranean, the technical condition of the Luftwaffe fleet was deplorable. The average percentage of combat ready aircraft was 77%. Air groups such as II / JG-77, III / JG-27, I / StG-2, II / KG-53, III / KG-3, I / ZG-26 arrived on the Eastern Front, armed with less than half

we have a regular number of serviceable aircraft.

The minimum length of the offensive front, even on the very first day of the war, was 800 km in a straight line (from Klaipeda to Sambir). Within two weeks, the width of the front almost doubled (1,400 km in a straight line from Riga to Odessa). Even without taking into account the losses of the first days of the war, the average operational density of German aviation decreased to 2 aircraft.

per kilometer of the offensive front (again, including faulty ones). It only remains to add to this that, according to the pre-war ideas of Soviet military science, a front-line offensive operation required the creation of densities of 15-20 aircraft per kilometer. Even Hitler, although he is usually considered paranoid, understood the disproportion of forces and tasks: *"With such a huge space, the Luftwaffe is not able to process it in its entirety at the same time; at the beginning of a war, aviation can only dominate parts of a gigantic front..."*

On average, in terms of the number of fighter pilots (taking into account the Air Forces of the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets), the count Russian aviation had a fourfold superiority over the enemy (calculation based on the number of fighter aircraft leads to even higher figures, since in many fighter regiments of the Soviet Air Force there were 1.5-2 times more aircraft than pilots). On the northern and southern flanks of the huge front (i.e., in the Baltic states and Ukraine), the numerical superiority of Soviet fighter aircraft was simply overwhelming: 7 to 1 in the offensive zone of the German group

armies "North" and 5 to 1 in the offensive zone of Army Group "South".

A comparison with the number of aircraft of other opponents of Germany is also very indicative. In May 1940, the fighter force of French aviation in the combat zone consisted of 34 squadrons, i.e. about 400-450 fighters. Taking into account the fighter aircraft of Holland, Belgium and the expeditionary forces of the British Air Force, the strength of the grouping of the Western Allies increases to 50 squadrons, 600 - 650 pilots. The Soviet Air Force (fighter aviation of five western districts and two navies) had about 260 squadrons and 3,550 pilots (there were much more fighter planes). As for technical perfection, the latest modifications of the donkeys (I-16) were in no way inferior (and surpassed in all indicators of horizontal and vertical maneuverability) the main fighter of the French Air Force Moran-Saulnier MS-406. Soviet fighters of "new types" (MiG-3, Yak-1) were in no way inferior to the best (for May 1940) French Devua Tin fighter D-520, and if the French Air Force on May 10, 1940, there were only 36 "Devuatinov", then by June 22, 1941, the Soviet Air Force of the five western border districts already included 903 MiGs and 103 Yak-1s.

No less impressive were the potential capabilities of Soviet bomber aircraft. On June 22, 1941, the Soviet aviation grouping (including the DVA and naval aviation) included 1300 DB-Z / Zf, 1750 SB, 205 Pe-2, 140 Ar-2, 195 Su-2 and 50 Yak-2 / 4. The Luftwaffe grouping on the Eastern Front was armed with 520 Ju-88s, 300 He-111s, 340 Ju-87s and 130 Do-17s. The total "bomb salvo" (calculated by the maximum bomb load) of Soviet aviation was 2.5 times greater than that of the enemy (6480 and 2550 tons, respectively). It should also be noted

the fact that a significantly larger number of carrier aircraft made the Soviet grouping less vulnerable to enemy air defense and theoretically ensured a greater likelihood of regular "delivery" of these 6.5 kilotons to enemy targets.

In such a situation, the Luftwaffe command was forced to resort to such a risky and costly tactic as a massive attack on airfields based on the Soviet Air Force. We emphasize once again that this was a forced step, fraught with huge losses, and not at all a "magic wand" successfully found by the Germans and inaccessible to their opponents.

What are the results of this decision in practice?

Oddly enough, but a concrete and reasoned answer to this question is unknown to this day. More precisely, only one component of the answer is known - the losses of the Luftwaffe turned out to be quite tangible. Having completed about 4,000 sorties on June 22, 1941, German aviation lost irretrievably ("damage from 100 to 60%, leading to the decommissioning of the aircraft" according to the classification adopted by the Luftwaffe) 60 combat aircraft (fighters, bombers, attack aircraft and dive bombers). Another 54 vehicles received lesser damage. The total losses thus amounted to 114 aircraft (1st Air Fleet - 9, 2nd Air Fleet - 47, 4th Air Fleet - 58). All these figures do not include

losses associated with accidents during takeoff, collisions in the air and other causes that are clearly not related to enemy countermeasures.

Of course, a glass filled with 100 ml of water might as well be called "half empty" or "half full". Irrevocable by

ter 160 aircraft in one day was for the Germans "an unaffordable luxury." The German aviation industry in 1941 continued to work in one shift and produced an average of 10 bombers and 8 fighters per day. With such proportions of production and losses, the entire Luftwaffe grouping on the Eastern Front could "end" in two months.

On the other hand, on the first day of the war on the Western Front (May 10, 1940), the Germans irrevocably lost 147 aircraft (and this does not count the 157 Junkers transports shot down on May 10 during the airborne landing in Holland). Considering the ratio of Soviet and French fighters mentioned above, Luftwaffe losses on the Eastern Front seem implausibly low. Let's not forget about 1039 anti-aircraft batteries (namely, batteries, not anti-aircraft guns) that were in service with the troops of the western border districts of the USSR. And the losses of the 1st Air Fleet of the Luftwaffe look quite strange, which, having its enemy in the Air Force of the North-Western Front (Baltic Military District), which included 8 fighter regiments (418 fighter pilots), irrevocably lost only 3 (three) combat aircraft.

If the losses of the German side are known with an accuracy of units, then it remains only more or less plausible hypotheses about the losses of the Soviet Air Force. And in this case, the problem lies not even in the closeness of the archives, but in the absence of the primary documents themselves. The territory of the Bialystok ledge, in which the 11th, 9th and 10th air divisions were deployed, suffered the heaviest losses on June 22, 1941 (as is commonly believed, 654 aircraft, which is more than half of the sacramental figure "1200 aircraft"), was abandoned by the randomly retreating Red Army in the first 3-4 days of the war. During this unparalleled disaster, dozens of

generals, thousands of tanks and hundreds of thousands of soldiers. There is no "registry of aircraft" with an exact list of damage received by them during the strike on the "peace but sleeping airfields", indicating the time of the enemy air raid (which would make it possible to correlate it with the known and accessible documents of the Luftwaffe), simply never existed.

The commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Major General I. Kopets, died on June 22 under circumstances unknown to this day (he shot himself or was shot; the author outlined his version of events in the book "June 23: Day M"). Major General A. Tayursky, who temporarily performed his duties, was arrested on July 8, 1941 and shot. The commander of the 11th SAD, Colonel Ganichev, died on June 22 during the shelling of an airfield in the city of Lida by enemy aircraft. The commander of the 9th SAD, Major General S. Chernykh, was arrested in early July and shot. On June 26, 1941, the commander of the Air Force of the North-Western Front, Major General A. Ionov, was arrested on June 27, the commander of the Air Force of the South-Western Front, Lieutenant General E. Ptukhin, both were shot. On July 12, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the South-Western Front, Major General N. Laskin, was arrested, shot ...

In the Central Archive of the Moscow Region, the archives of the 9th SAD are declassified and accessible to everyone. It is a yellowed from time to time cardboard folder with many blue seals and stamps on the cover. Inside the folder is a piece of paper the size of a box of Kazbek cigarettes. The leaflet says that the division was destroyed in the first days of the war, but the staff documents were not preserved. And it's all! In the already mentioned academically solid monograph by Kozhevnikov, after the figures for the losses of aviation on the Western Front, there is a reference to the popular book *Aviation and Cosmonautics of the USSR*. This is as relevant as, for example, a reference to Jules Verne's novel in a monograph on submarine design. And this, mind you,

that in dozens of other, much less significant cases, Kozhevnikov gives, as is customary in a historical study of this magnitude, a reference to archival funds. Marshal G.V. Zimin, in his work "Tactics in Combat Examples" intended for the command staff of the Air Force, repeating the spell ("*the enemy managed to destroy up to 1200 aircraft, including 800 at airfields*"), gives a reference ... to propaganda pamphlet "Combat Glory of Soviet Aviation", issued in 1953! And this again despite the fact that at the end of Zimin's monograph there are several pages of continuous references to the TsAMO funds.

Nevertheless, some crumbs of information have been preserved. In 1962, the General Staff of the USSR Air Force prepared the collection "Soviet Aviation in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. in numbers". 26 people in ranks from Major General to Lieutenant Colonel are named as authors and compilers of the collection. By the way, Major General M.N. Kozhevnikov is also on this list. The collection was out produced on a rotaprint in a tiny edition and under the heading "Owls. secret." Declassified in 1992. In 2006, posted by Yu. Minkevich and P. Andriyanov on in [index.html](http://ilpilot.narod.ru/vvs_tsifra/)). (http://ilpilot.narod.ru/vvs_tsifra/ ternet site Much earlier, in 1964-1965, the multi-volume series "Collection of Combat Documents of the Great Patriotic War" was declassified. Volume No. 35 contains a report by the third commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Major General N. Naumenko, signed by him on December 31, 1941; Volume No. 36 contains a report, signed on August 21, 1941, by Lieutenant General F. Astakhov, the new commander of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front, on the combat operations of the front's aviation in the first days and weeks of the war. Neither Astakhov nor Naumenko were participants in the events of the first days of the war; on the one hand, this reduces the reliability of the facts and conclusions of

bettors are freer in their assessments (they are not personally responsible for the terrible defeat).

The first thing that catches the eye when working with these documents is that not a single figure agrees with another, which is already quite eloquent evidence of the absence of any reliable account of the number of aircraft and their losses in the first days of the war. Naumenko's report directly states that *"according to the surviving fragmentary data, to judge the full results of aviation work for this initial stage of the war is not possible, due to the departure of those units that did combat work in those days, and poor aviation records at that time.* So, for example, Naumenko's report says that *"on the day of June 22, 1941, enemy aircraft were destroyed at airfields and in air battles 538 aircraft.* The compilers of the collection "Soviet Aviation in the Second World War" cite a document presumably compiled in July 1941 signed by Colonel Khudyakov, Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the Western Front, from which it follows that 528 aircraft were lost on the ground alone, while the total combat losses of the day amounted to 732 aircraft.

The monograph by M.N. Kozhevnikov reports that *"the 9th SAD lost 347, 10th SAD - 180, 11th SAD - 127 aircraft ... In a day the enemy destroyed 387 fighters and 351 bombers of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District.* These wanderers from book to book are so called. The given "updated data" is categorically inconsistent with school arithmetic and the composition of the aircraft fleet of the air divisions of the Western Front. Namely: two bomber divisions of the Air Force of the Western Front (13th BAD and 12th BAD) lost on June 22, respectively, 61 and 2 bombers. The three "mixed" (according to the then accepted terminology) divisions of the first echelon of the Front Air Force (11th SAD, 9th SAD, 10th SAD) included only 172 bombers. Even if we assume that they were all destroyed in

the first day of the war, then even then the total losses of the Air Force of the front will amount to 235, but not 351 bombers. Further, if all 172 bombers that were part of these divisions were actually lost on the first day (a rather rash assumption), then the number of fighters lost should be 482 aircraft, but certainly not 387. If not all bombers 9, the 10th and 11th divisions were destroyed, then the number of fighter losses should arithmetically become even greater ...

And yet, in all this chaos, it is possible to identify

which are quite reliable facts, allowing then to formulate well-founded hypotheses.

The collection "Soviet Aviation in the Second World War" contains data on the size of the aircraft fleet of the air forces of the fronts as of June 22, 24, 30 and July 10. We summarize this information in the following two tables:

Table 1

Fighters	22nd of June	June 24	30 June	July 10
S-Z. front	664	391	98	89
Zap. front	939	203	125	105
SW front	1190	424	450	248
South front	676	no data	445	537
TOTAL:	3469	1463	1118	979

table 2

bombardi movers	22nd of June	June 24	30 June	July 10
S-Z. front	453	238	56	57
Zap. front	535	292	263	214
SW front	587	461	369	147
South front	309	no data	161	133
TOTAL:	1884	1152	849	551

Note: total number of aircraft on 24 June

It is calculated on the assumption that the number of aircraft of the Air Force of the Southern Front (Odessa Military District) as of June 24 was at least equal to the number on June 30.

The first and obvious conclusion from these facts is One hopes that no "complete annihilation" of the Soviet Air Force took place on the first day (or even in the first days) of the war. Both on June 24 and 30, the aviation of the four fronts (the former border military districts) was not inferior in numbers to the enemy. Taking into account the fact that behind this grouping there were units of long-range bomber aviation (more than 1000 aircraft), taking into account the fact that the Air Forces of the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets (about 700 fighters and 300 bombers, not counting seaplanes) suffered in the first days war, only single losses, Soviet aviation until the end of June 1941 had a significant numerical superiority over the enemy. TO

On July 10, the number of air forces of the four above-mentioned fronts becomes somewhat less than the number of Luftwaffe aircraft (although approximately equal forces are still maintained in terms of fighters), but by this moment the aviation of the Northern Front (Leningrad District) had entered the war with the Germans, and this is still about 800 fighters (including 163 MiG-3s and 20 Yak-1s) and 350 bombers.

One can discuss the question of how effective this huge air armada was actively used, more specifically, why it was used so badly. But to attribute everything to the consequences of the mythical "destructive strike on airfields at dawn on June 22", to put it mildly, is incorrect. On the other hand, the low (only low in comparison with the potential) efficiency of the

The view of Soviet aviation was quite tangible for the enemy. Not to mention the hundreds and thousands of sorties made against the mechanized columns of German troops (and in the first days of the war these air strikes became almost the only means that somewhat slowed down the pace of the Wehrmacht offensive!), We note only a few specific facts relating to the struggle for air supremacy.

Here we are waiting for "amazing" (against the background of the myths of Soviet historical propaganda familiar as trampled slippers) discoveries, namely: in all four years of the war on the Eastern Front, the Luftwaffe never lost as many aircraft in one week as was lost in June 1941. From June 22 to June 30, irretrievable losses "from enemy action and for unknown reasons" amounted to 212 combat aircraft (57 fighters, 115 bombers, 19 diving Ju-87s, 21 multi-purpose Me-110s). In two bomber squadrons (KG-51 and KG-55), irretrievable losses amounted to a third of the initial number of aircraft. It is worth noting that the KG-51 was armed with the latest Junkers of the latest modification (Ju-88 A-4), which our "hopelessly outdated" I-16 allegedly could not even catch up with. In the JG-53 fighter squadron, equipped with the latest Messers (Bf-109 F-2), the number of combat-ready aircraft decreased by 37 units by the end of June (from 102 to 65).

In July 1941, the Luftwaffe irretrievably lost 373 aircraft (116 fighters, 152 bombers, 61 Ju-87s, 44 Me-110s) "from enemy influence and for unknown reasons". In total (i.e., taking into account non-combat losses) in five weeks of fighting by July 26, 627 combat aircraft were irretrievably lost, 346 were damaged, and a total of 983 aircraft were out of order. The Germans suffered comparable losses only three years later, in the summer of 1944 (in July, 647 aircraft were irretrievably lost for all reasons, in August - 520). Average

the monthly irretrievable losses of 44 amounted to "only" 380 aircraft, i.e. one and a half times less than in July 41st.

The solution to these "miracles" is extremely clear: the initial strength of the Soviet Air Force was so great that even in an environment of general chaos and loss of control, even a small part of this "great armada", which survived the defeat of the first days, was capable of inflicting strong blows on the enemy .

Among these strikes were numerous massed strikes against enemy aviation base airfields (already at the end of June 1941, the former airfields of the Soviet Air Force, i.e. airfields, the location of which was known to our pilots, became these "base airfields" with the utmost precision). Carefully guarding the myth of a certain "super-efficiency" inherent in strikes against airfields, Soviet historiography tried as rarely as possible to recall that not only German, but

and Soviet aviation delivered such blows from the very first hours (!) of the war.

One of the very first raids took place at 4:50 June 22, when 25 SB bombers from the 9th BAP (Air Force of the North-Western Front) flew out to bomb the enemy airfield near Tilsit (East Prussia). The first raid was not the only one. The operational report of the headquarters of PriBOVO No. 03, signed at 22:00 on June 23, reports that *"the air force*

forces during the day fought against enemy aircraft, operated at the airfields of Insterburg, Koenigsberg, Priekule, Memel, Tilsit. In the report of the Commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Major General Nau, menko we read: *"Units of the Air Force of the Western Front entered the war on the morning of June 22, 1941. This day is characterized by ... the organization of retaliatory strikes against enemy airfields Sokolow, Sedlec, Lukow, Bya la Podlaska ... The first strikes on tank columns*

enemy 22-23.06.41 were inflicted in the area Suwalki, Dombrowa, Grodno with simultaneous impact on the airfield base of the enemy on the meridian of Avgustov, Sedlec ... "

On June 25, the 207th BAP from the 3rd long-range bomber air corps struck at the airfields based on German aviation in the Vilnius region. The former commander of the corps, Marshal N. Skripko, in his memoirs states that ***"as a result of a sudden strike, about 40 German fighters were destroyed."*** Enemy documents confirm the fact of the strike: in June 1941, the JG-27 fighter squadron based in that area irretrievably lost 2 (two) aircraft on the ground.

Active actions to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields were carried out by the Air Force of the Southwestern Front. The report of the Commander of the Air Force, Lieutenant General F. Astakhov, contains the following data: ***"For the period from 1.7 to 10.8.***

front destroyed at the airfields 172 aircraft enemy. This information is not enough

complete, since the losses inflicted on the enemy

during night raids, they were not completely taken into account ... " On July 8, by decision of the Headquarters

of the Civil Code, the Air Forces of five fronts and units of the Far Eastern Air Force launched a massive attack on the airfields based on the Luftwaffe (by that time they were all in the occupied territory of the USSR). In

Kozhevnikov's monograph we read: ***"At dawn on July***

8, the DBA formations attacked 14 airfields, and the air forces o 429 sorties were made. At airfields

many enemy planes were destroyed,

including the Air Force of the Western Front put out of action 54 German aircraft ... "

54 planes - that's just in one day. In total, during the period from 6 to 12 July, the Air Force of the Western Front allegedly destroyed 202 enemy aircraft on the ground. A

than in the report signed by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the front, Colonel Khudyakov, it is also specifically noted that *"enemy losses from night actions bombers are not taken into account."*

The enemy himself notes in his documents the irretrievable loss of 12 aircraft on the ground. Moreover, for the whole of July 1941 and on the entire front (and not just in the zone of Army Group Center).

The striking difference in numbers has two simple explanations. First, all flight crew reports on enemy planes destroyed on the ground are nothing more than a kind of "hunting stories". If a plane shot down in the air leaves a visible plume of smoke, and then a bright flash of an explosion when it falls to the ground, then it is impossible in principle to see holes from bomb fragments in the skin of an aircraft standing at the airfield. Moreover, flying at a low level over an enemy airfield at a speed of 100 m/sec (and this is a very modest speed for an aircraft of 360 km/h), the pilot does not even see the explosions of the bombs he dropped... Secondly, the thrifty Germans stubbornly "patched" damaged aircraft, and only aircraft that fell victim to a direct hit by an air bomb could fall into the category of irretrievable losses. Of course, there were very few of them. The harsh practice of war in the very first weeks confirmed what Lieutenant General G. Kravchenko spoke about at the December (1940) meeting of the top command staff of the Red Army: "The main thing *is air combat.*" It was in the air, and not on the ground, that 361 of the 373 aircraft lost by the Germans in July 1941 were destroyed.

A drowning man clutches at straws, and the pages of pseudo-historical literature devoted to the tragic events of June 22, 1941, have been simply littered with "devil's eggs" in recent years. For those who are not initiated into the mysteries of historical myth-making, it is clear: such bad words denote not

German 2.5-kg fragmentation bombs SD2. The shower of these bombs, falling on the "peacefully sleeping" Soviet airfields, predetermined the supposedly unprecedented effect intensity of the first blow.

If everything were so simple... The bomber aircraft of the Soviet Air Force were armed with a wide variety of ammunition with a total number of more than six ten types. There were also small-caliber fragmentation bombs designed to hit area targets - and unlike the Luftwaffe, in which the notorious "eggs" spilled over the target from an ordinary box, loudly called a "bomb cluster", a special one was developed for the Soviet Air Force rotary-scattering aerial bomb (RRAB), which dispersed 116 small AO-2.5 fragmentation bombs on the ground. In addition, there was a variant of equipping the RRAB with glass beads with an incendiary mixture KS -

in this case, the affected area reached one hectare. In addition, there were special "pourers" with which the enemy's airfield could be poured abundantly with a mixture of CS or a suspension of white phosphorus. In addition, there were also "simple" ABK-500 underwing cassettes that could hold 108 incendiary ZAB-1 or 67 fragmentation AO-2.5. And as a result of all efforts - 12 enemy aircraft, actually destroyed women at the airfields for a whole month ...

Now look at our "half-empty/half-full glass" from a different angle: how and why did the multiple numerical superiority of Soviet aviation in just one or two weeks reduce to a simple equality of forces? What was the reason for the gigantic losses of red-star aircraft in the first days of the war?

Let's start with the fact that, on the basis of the above tables No. 1 and No. 2, we will compile an approximate summary of the loss of Air Force aircraft of four fronts.

Table 3

Fighters	22-24 June	24-30 June	30 June - July 10	Total:
S-Z. front	273	293	9	575
Zap. front	736	78	20	834
SW front	766	+26	202	942
South. front	no data 231(22-30.6)		+92	139
TOTAL:				2490

Table 4

bombardi movers	22-24 June	24-30 June	30 June - July 10	Total:
S-Z. front	215	182	+1	396
Zap. front	243	29	49	321
SW front	126	92	222	440
South front no	data 148 (22-30.6)		28	176
TOTAL:				1333

The figures for the loss of aircraft given in tables No. 3 and No. 4 are significantly underestimated. Not to mention the fact that they do not reflect the losses of assault aviation regiments (by the beginning of the war, with the rarest exceptions, they were armed not with "silts", but with obsolete I-15bis fighters), this calculation does not take into account the supply of new aircraft, which flowed in a continuous stream from the depths of the vast country to the front. Accordingly, the total losses given in the tables should be arithmetically increased by the value of the number of new aircraft received in the specified period. And this number was very significant: for example, in the above-mentioned report of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the Western Front, it is said that *"709 aircraft were received for replenishment from June 2"*. This figure is little known even to specialists, therefore

we will also indicate the exact archive link: TsAMO, f. 35, op. 3802, d. 19, ll. 70-76. In other words, the losses of the Air Force of the Western Front from the "surprise attack on airfields" (based on the generally accepted figures of 550-600 aircraft) were completely replenished after 20 days and even covered by the supply of new equipment.

Despite all the inaccuracy of the above figures, they give rise to very significant conclusions.

First and foremost, the losses of the first three days of the war are so great that they can in no way be reduced to the notorious formula "1,200 aircraft, 800 of them on the ground." According to the data presented in the collection "Soviet Aviation in the Second World War", 1286 fighters and 521 bombers were lost on the ground. But not for one first day, but for the whole 1941, for six months and 9 days of the war. The tables testify to the loss of 1775 fighters and 584 bombers on three (out of five) fronts in the first three days!

Exceptionally indicative in this sense are the statistics on the Air Force of the Southwestern Front. The report of Astakhov, Commander of the Air Force of the Front, states that *"during 06/22/41 and in the next two days inflicted significant losses on our flying units, destroying and damaging at our airfields for 22, On June 23 and 24, 237 aircraft (emphasized by me. - M.S.), which is 68 percent of the loss of material units at their airfields as a result of raids enemy aviation for the entire period of the war, i.e. from 22.6 on 10.8.41.* As you can see, we are talking not only about "destroyed", but also about "damaged" machines. Damage is different. Many - especially if the aircraft received them on the ground and not in the air - can be corrected. All in the same report by Astakhov, one can read that in three weeks (from June 22 to July 13) 990 aircraft were restored, which is 4 times more pain

less than the total number of those damaged and destroyed at the airfields. But even if all 237 aircraft are "written off" as irretrievable losses, this does not explain the loss of 892 aircraft (766 fighters and 126 bombers) in three days. Once again, we repeat that tables 3 and 4 give only the most minimal estimate of the loss of aircraft. Many works of modern historians (in particular, those of Khazanov and Isaev) give a figure of 1,452 aircraft lost by the Air Force of the Southwestern Front during the first three days of the war.

Judging by our tables, the Air Force of the North-Western front lost from 22 to 24 June 488 combat aircraft.

In the well-known collective work of military historians of the General Staff (in 1992 it was called the General Staff of the "joined armed forces of the CIS") under the title "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" it is said that "The air forces of the front in the first three days *921 aircraft.*" Moreover, after this message, a link is given to the archive fund of TsAMO. And the combat reports of the first day of the war, drawn up in hot pursuit of the events, testify that only a few dozen aircraft were lost from the "sudden strike on peacefully sleeping airfields"!

In intelligence report No. 03, signed by Chief of Staff of the Front Klenov at 12:00 on June 22, we read: *"The enemy has not yet brought into action significant air forces, limited to the action of individual groups and single aircraft.* The evening operational summary of the headquarters of the North-Western Front (signed at 22:00 on June 22) reports: *"Losses - 56 aircraft destroyed, 32 damaged [emphasis mine. - M.S.] at airfields.* On the second day of the war, Operational Report No. 03 (22:00 June 23) noted the following losses: *"14 aircraft destroyed, 8 of them in Mitava, 15 damaged. Nika".* Judging by this document, the fight in the air is

almost on an equal footing, but only the 1st Air Fleet of the Luftwaffe from June 22 to 30 loses 41 aircraft irretrievably "from enemy action and for unknown reasons", and the Air Force of the North-Western Front - 10 or even 20 times more in the first three days!

Another notable feature of the dynamics of loss of Air Force aircraft of the Northwestern Front is the relative constancy of the level of losses. If the losses of the neighboring Western Front on June 24-30 are an order of magnitude less than the losses of the first three days, then the loss of fighters of the Air Force of the North-Western Front in the June 24-30 even surpasses the losses of June 22-24 (the loss of bombers is slightly less). This is more than strange - if you believe the myth of a "sudden" strike on airfields. On June 24, the reindeer herders of Chukotka already knew about the outbreak of war, especially in the Air Force units of the active front, but the "abnormally high" level of losses did not decrease, but even increased.

Quite obvious is the difference, inexplicable at first glance, in the figures for the loss of aircraft on the Southern Front and on the other three fronts. Not only in absolute figures, but also as a percentage of the initial number of aircraft of the Air Force of the Southern Front, they suffer much smaller losses. From June 22 to June 30, the Air Force of the North-Western Front loses at least 963 aircraft, the Air Force of the Western Front - 1086 aircraft, the Air Force of the South-Western Front - 958 aircraft, and the Air Force of the Southern Front - only 379 aircraft.

Of course, only telegraph poles are even and the same, but how could one cause common to the entire Red Army—the "surprise attack"—could lead to such different results? The southern front is the Odessa military district, these are the steppes of the Black Sea region, smooth as a table. Aerodrome we are visible from the air at a glance. Opportunities for camouflage aircraft are minimal - while

in the dense forests of Western Belarus and Lithuania, it takes half an hour to throw a plane with spruce branches. It would seem that it was in the zone of the Southern Front that the losses from the first strike on airfields should have been the greatest - however, in reality, everything happened exactly the opposite.

The number of airfields that were attacked in the early morning of June 22, 1941 is also noteworthy. According to the version generally accepted in Soviet historiography, *"66 airfields were subjected to air raids , including 26 airfields of the Western, 23 - Kiev, 11 - Baltic special military districts and 6 airfields of the Odessa military district.* Strictly speaking, only 868 German aircraft (637 bombers and 231 fighters) took part directly in the first attack on Soviet airfields, which attacked not 66, but 31 airfields. But let's not quibble over trifles. It is more important to compare the announced figure (66 airfields) with the real picture of the development of the airfield base of the air force of the western districts.

The figures for the number of airfields rarely coincide, even within the same book by the same author. This is primarily due to the fact that in the era of aircraft with a takeoff weight of a couple of tons and a landing speed of 130 km / h, the very concept of "operational airfield" was washed several times, because in summer any flat field after minimum preparation. The authors of the aforementioned collective monograph "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" report that *"in total, there were 477 airfields (95 permanent and 382 operational).* Table No. 5 is attached to these startling confessions, in a note to which it is indicated that these figures - 95 permanent and 382 operational - refer to January 1, 1941. And by the beginning of the war, another 278 airfields were in varying degrees of readiness. In particular, those who suffered the most from

"Sudden strike on 26 airfields" of the Air Force of the Western OVO had (according to table No. 5) 29 main, 141 operational and 55 airfields under construction. And this is also the data of January 1, 1941.

Owls. the secret collection of 1962 "Soviet Aviation in the Second World War" cites the following figures: on June 22, 1941, there were 528 airfields (not counting those under construction) in four western military districts (58 in the Baltic, 213 in Zapadny, 150 in Kiev and 107 in Odessa districts). In other words, on June 22, 1941, 88% of all airfields were not subjected to any enemy action. It is also worth recalling that not a single bomb fell on the morning of June 22 on any airfield of the Leningrad Military District and the Baltic Fleet Air Force. It is also worth noting that, judging by the documents of the headquarters of the Kyiv military district, already in December 1940, on the territory of the district "to the west of the Dnieper" there were not 150, but 167 airfields.

Rumors that some (not to mention all) airfields were at a distance of "a cannon shot from the border" are also extremely exaggerated. Only field operational airfields of fighter regiments were deployed in a strip of 20-30 km from the border - and this deployment mirrored the deployment of fighter and assault groups of the Luftwaffe. Moreover, in 1941-1942. quite a few orders were issued in which the commanders of the fighter units were categorically required to bring the airfields closer to exactly this (20-30 km) distance from the front line. Even in the Air Forces of the Western Front, which suffered the greatest losses, not a single airfield was - and could not be - subjected to artillery fire on the morning of June 22. The reason for this is extremely simple: the main field artillery systems of the Wehrmacht did not fire at such a range, and individual batteries and artillery divisions of high power were used to solve completely different tasks. Ba

The base airfields of the 9th SAD (it was this division that lost the largest number of aircraft) were located near the cities of Bialystok and Zabłudov (80 km from the border), Ross (170 km from the border) and Belsk (40 km from the border). As for the bomber divisions of the Western Front (12th BAD and 13th BAD), they were all based in the area of Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Bykhov, i.e. at a distance of 350-400 km from the border. The Germans, by the way, moved their bomber squadrons much closer ...

In our opinion, the above facts are more than enough to send a version about "sudden devastating strike on airfields" into the wastebasket. Or, to put it more delicately but - to the dustbin of history.

On the first day of the war, Luftwaffe pilots reported 322 Soviet aircraft shot down in the air. Proceeding from a rather modest overestimation of the number of declared victories for the air battles of the Second World War, these reports can be considered evidence of the actual destruction of 100-150 aircraft of the Soviet Air Force. By the way, Naumenko's report says that the pilots of the Air Force of the Western Front shot down 143 German aircraft on the first day of the war, 124 on the second, and in total, until the end of June, 442 enemy aircraft were allegedly shot down. In fact, the irretrievable losses of the 2nd Air Fleet of the Luftwaffe amounted to (as noted above) 23 aircraft on the first day and 87 aircraft until the end of June. Why should the reports of German pilots (and even "processed" in the department of Dr. Goebbels) be considered more reliable?

The number of Soviet aircraft actually and irretrievably destroyed in the course of German air raids on airfields of the western districts, it is impossible to establish. Relevant documents of air regiments and divisions

lost (or they did not even have time to compile), and the reports of German (as well as Soviet) pilots on this theme are "hunting stories" that do not even have a remote resemblance to reality. All, what is possible is, by analogy with all known operations, periods and campaigns of the Second World War, to assume that irretrievable losses on the ground were many times less than losses in the air.

Loss of two thousand aircraft in the first three days of the war (and a little less loss of subsequent days) took place not in the air, but on the ground. But these losses were caused not by enemy air strikes on airfields, but by a disorderly retreat of one's own troops, during which weapons (including combat aircraft) were abandoned/abandoned/to nothingness by the personnel of the aviation units themselves. Things got to the point that in the documents of the Soviet Air Force there appeared such a wildly sounding term in the military lexicon as "unaccounted for loss". According to a report compiled by an officer of the Red Army Air Force headquarters, Colonel Ivanov, by July 31, 1941, the "unaccounted for" amounted to 5240 aircraft. In hindsight, all this mass of equipment abandoned during the stampede was recorded as "destroyed by a sudden strike on airfields." With which no one began to argue - neither the German pilots and their commanders (which is understandable), nor the Soviet "historians" (which is even clearer).

This hypothesis immediately explains all the features of the dynamics and geography of the loss of Soviet aircraft. Tables No. 3 and No. 4 clearly and adequately reflect the reaping of the pace and routes of the advance of ground forces of the German army.

The airfields (together with combat aircraft thrown at them) of the three air divisions located in the Bialystok ledge (11th SAD, 9th SAD, 10th SAD) were abandoned by the retreating troops of the Western Front in disorder during the first 2-3 days of the war. This and a hundred

It was the cause of a huge "loss" (about a thousand aircraft in three days).

In the future, the daily losses of the Western Air Force fronts are reduced by an order of magnitude, since this is already the loss of air battles, and the Luftwaffe fighters of the 2nd Air Fleet did not succeed in shooting down hundreds of Soviet aircraft a day. *"They avoid engaging in battle with our fighters; when meeting an organized rebuff, they leave even with a quantitative superiority on his side. To Soviet airfields, where fighter units are based, leading active actions and who gave at least once a rebuff [you are divided by me. - M.S.] of the Nazi aviation, the enemy stopped mass raids.* These are the lines from the report on the combat operations of the Air Force of the Western Front, signed on July 10, 1941 by the commander of the aviation of the front (at that time - Colonel) N. Naumenko.

In the offensive zone of the Army Group "North" there were no large "boilers" of encirclement, and the German troops, continuously advancing from the borders of East Prussia to Pskov and Ostrov, successively occupied Lithuania, then Latvia, then the Pskov region of Russia. Accordingly, the airfields of the 8th SAD and the 57th SAD in Lithuania turned out to be abandoned first, then the 7th SAD and the 6th SAD in Latvia. As a result, the loss of Air Force aircraft of the Northwestern Front was relatively even, without such a pronounced "peak" in the first two or three days, as it was on the Western Front.

In June 1941, in Moldova, the pace of enemy advance was almost zero (the large-scale offensive of the Romanian and German troops began there only on July 2), there were simply no airfields abandoned during the retreat in the Southern Front in the first days of the war - as a result, the loss of aviation were minimal. The fighter regiments of the Air Force of the Southern Front lost everything on the first day of the war.

2-3 aircraft each, and the 69th IAP did not lose a single one. Subsequently, this regiment under the command of the outstanding Soviet pilot and commander L. L. Shestakov, without "relocating" anywhere, fought for 115 days in the sky over Chisinau and Odessa.

The Murmansk group of Soviet aviation (1st SAD, Air Force of the Northern Fleet) did not "relocate" anywhere either.

As a result, the effectiveness of German air strikes against the airfields based on the Soviet Air Force turned out to be normal on this sector of the front, i.e., very and very low. And no "devil's eggs" helped. The fiercest battles took place in July 1941 - the Germans desperately rushed to the port of Murmansk and the railway connecting the Arctic with the mainland. The total losses of the Soviet aviation group in July amounted to 80 aircraft (from all causes, including accidents), of which 21 aircraft (7% of

the initial strength of the group) was lost on earth.

Here is another, geographically very distant from the Bialystok ledge, but an extremely indicative example. The 13th IAP from the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet was based ... in Finland, on the Hanko Peninsula (after the first Soviet-Finnish war, the naval and air base of the Baltic Fleet was deployed there). After the start of the second Soviet-Finnish war (June 25, 1941), the Hanko airfield was in the zone of action of the Finnish artillery and was constantly fired upon. According to the "logic" in which it is customary for us to describe the thunder of the aviation of the Western Front, the 13th IAP was supposed to be destroyed in a few hours. In fact, the 13th IAP fought until the late autumn of 1941, and was withdrawn from the peninsula only after the general evacuation of Hanko. In March 1942 the regiment was renamed the 4th Guards. More than a year and a half (until January 1943) the regiment successfully fought on "obsolete, not going

in no comparison with German aircraft" I-16 fighters.

The author of this article in no way claims to be the author of the hypothesis that most of the aviation of the western districts was abandoned during disorderly "relocation", and was not at all destroyed by enemy strikes on airfields. Already at the end of the third day of the war, on the evening of June 24, 1941, Colonel-General F. Halder, **Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces**, writes in his famous diary : *relocated to the rear.*" Halder at that time was not familiar with any documents of the command of the Soviet Air Force and judged what was happening according to the reports of his subordinates. Those, in turn, saw with their own eyes how Soviet aviation disappears from the sky of war. But was this the result of a spontaneous retreat, or was the order

about the redeployment to the rear of the aviation of the first echelon of the Air Force of the western districts really existed?

This is another "mystery of the summer of 41". But if there was such an order, then it is difficult to characterize it otherwise as "wrecking". Moreover, such an assessment has nothing to do with the endless dispute about the "offensive" and "defensive" armies, about the pre-war plans of the Soviet command and the first wartime directives. Even if a general withdrawal (not a stampede, but a systematic, organized withdrawal) in the situation that developed on the evening of June 22, 1941, was the optimal solution, then in order to implement this decision, the fighter units had to perform the function of the rearguard of the retreat. Roads, bridges, crossings, columns of marching people and equipment, command and control posts and communications must be covered from the air during any meaningful action - be it an offensive, retreat,

transition to positional defense. This is always true, but in June 1941 it was especially important, since it was precisely the German aviation that was rampant in the sky with impunity (which is confirmed by thousands of testimonies) the most important factor in the demoralization of the Red Army.

The redeployment (flight? withdrawal?) of aviation, and fighter aviation (namely, fighter aviation regiments, were closest to the border), allowed the enemy to bombard parts of the ground forces of the Red Army almost without hindrance, which became one of the reasons for their disorderly panic retreat - what retreat, in turn, more more prompted aviation commanders to make a decision on immediate "relocation". Thus, a "positive feedback system" was formed at lightning speed, the operation of which for several days led to the fact that most of the aircraft fleet was abandoned at border airfields.

Here it is probably worth interrupting the protracted presentation of common truths and look at how this "relocation" happened in practice. A detailed review of the events of June 22-24 is undoubtedly beyond the scope of this article (the far from complete account of the "relocation" of several air regiments occupies 113 pages in the book *On Peaceful Sleeping Airfields*). Nevertheless, let us cite one tragic and highly illustrative example.

S. F. Dolgushin met the beginning of the war as a young pilot in the 122nd IAP (11th Garden, Air Force of the Western Front), received the title Hero of the Soviet Union after the battle for Moscow, during the war years made more than 500 sorties, personally shot down 17 German aircraft and 11 more in the group. From the lieutenants he became a lieutenant general, for many years he was the head of the department of tactics at the VVIA

Several fragments from his memoirs (recorded by a historian from Grodno V. Bardov) allow you to see the events of the first days of the war with an unexpected read.

tel, reliably trained by Soviet writers

mi, sides:

"... I-16 aircraft, which we received in the regiment, there were 27th and 24th series - with M-62 and M-63 engines.

Literally all of them were new cars, and

each pilot: 72 aircraft - 72 pilots per regiment.

Everyone has their own car, so everyone has a flying time in hours was large, and the flight training of the pilots was

strong. I started the war with 240 flight hours [emphasis mine here and below. — M. S.]. ... We flew almost

not every day, well, Sunday was a day off, but on

Saturday - they flew ... After all, the I-16, when you master it,

car was good! He caught up with the Junkers-88, and

"Heinkel-111", and "Ju-87", of course, shot everything.

Fighting, of course, was more difficult with the Messerschmitt mi", but still, due to maneuverability, you can ...

... On Sunday, June 22, at 2-2:30, there was a siren: alert! Well, we gathered on alarm: we grabbed suitcases, helmets, raglans. came running on

airfield: technicians are trying motors, and we started

carry guns, machine guns, ammunition. And the gun

insert into the wing - it's not wide! And there

insert a 20 kg cannon - you will rip off all hands [based 17 km from

the border of the 122nd IAP met the beginning of the war in the

most unfavorable circumstances, no mouths and instructions

provided by you

military authorities: the day before, by order of the district air force

command, weapons were dismantled from the fighters. A

discussion of the possible causes of this incredible event is

devoted to several pages in my book June 23: M-Day, but this topic

will be redundant for the purposes of this article. — M. S.].

... I reported to the squadron commander: "The link is ready!"

He called the squadron commanders. Gathered, we sit

and suddenly we see: from the direction of Bialystok there is a flight of planes ("eight" 109s), but it was still far away when we saw them. They flew in and began to storm, but we had already sorted out the machines and dispersed ... The 1st squadron began to take off first, and when already took off, other squadrons of the lea began to take off - here the raids had already stopped.

That's it - the "fight" began, the Germans understood ... And then, they saw ... They are all spies on the radio they probably said that the regiment left the airfield ... For now I taxied and took off - they hit me with 16 holes. When I pulled off, removed the chassis and took off, "Messer" me already "dropped" - they didn't deal with me, but the "six" they were already over the airfield.

And this "six" - they are absolutely on me did not pay attention, they were preparing to land on the airfield ... "

The last paragraph looks very chaotic. It is not clear who, where, why? What exactly did "the Germans understand"? Then everything becomes clearer:

... I walked around in the air, looked and went to the border, and when I walked and looked over the border, I stumbled upon a German communications aircraft of the Fiesler Storch company. I gave one turn and he stuck in earth. Then he went to Skidel [the base airfield of the neighboring 127th IAP] - there was no one there, but he passed over Grod and returned to the airfield. The squadron commander says: "We are flying away, the regiment is flying to Cherneny [an airfield near the town of Mosty on the Neman, about 100 km from the border. — M. S.J. You go ahead and fly there ... "The regiment flew away. I flew almost what's the last..."

At this point, we will interrupt for a while the story of Dolgushin and try to understand at least something in the read.

The first thing to note is that the regiment was alerted at 2:30 in the night. Two hours before the appearance of the first enemy aircraft at the airfield of the 122nd

IAP no one slept. The personnel of the regiment, raised on alarm, managed to "destroy and disperse" the planes. The results of the first enemy raid Dolgu Shin (in another place of his story) assesses as "very insignificant." This opinion completely coincides with the surviving documents of the headquarters of the 3rd Army (in operational subordination of which was the 11th SAD) :

13-15 aircraft. Losses: 2 aircraft burned down, 6 disabled. 2 people are seriously injured, 6 - lightly ... "

In other words, the losses from the "destructive strike on airfields" in the 122nd IAP amounted to no more than 5-10% of the original number. However, after a few hours (judging by Dolgushin's story, even before noon on June 22), the commander of the 122nd IAP decides to fly to the rear (albeit still to the close operational rear of the 3rd Army). At the same time, the enemy does not lose time either and "relocates", but not back, but forward: without even getting involved in a battle with Dolgushin's lone fighter, the Germans begin to develop their first airfield on Soviet territory ...

Let us now continue reading the memoirs of S.F. Dolgoose:

"... I flew to Lida [this is already 100 km east of Grodno. - M.S.] somewhere around 11:30-12:00... Two "nine" planes also landed in front of me on this airfield, because if they bombed Cherleny, you can't land. And so, when ours were taxiing, Me-110s swooped down and, finding ours there taxiing, they began to hit everyone who was taxiing on the airfield runway. And there were many more planes on the taxiway. As a result of this raid, they did nothing to the vehicles, but the division commander Ganichev was wounded in the stomach, and he died after 2 hours, his deputy Colonel Mikhailov was wounded in the leg and one was killed from pilots...

... After this attack in Lida, we flew to

Cherlen to the regiment , the regiment is there ... But I will frankly say: those who had wives went to their wives, and we, bachelors have flown away. Division after the death of Ganichev no one commanded: the division was left "without a rudder, without sails." The commander died, Mikhailov was wounded, and I did not even know the chief of staff ...

... We flew in and sat down in Cherlena, where we stood on armed with I-153 fighters, armed only with ShKAS machine guns, and we have a squadron with I-16 cannons. And in Cherleny there are no shells for cannons, because our technicians got from Novy Dvor with their move and by that time were still on the way ... We started we are working on bridges in Grodno - cover bridges and cover the withdrawal of our troops across the bridges. It was there - above the bridges - that I shot down my first the Yu-88 bomber [in addition to the two guns left without shells, the I-16 also had two machine guns. — M. S.]. While we were fighting, the bridges in Grodno were intact, and troops moved. We saw how our troops crossed these bridges - retreated to the right bank

R. Neman, and until the end of the day the bridges remained intact ...

... When it got dark and the night came, she entered command: "Fly to Lida!" And here's your answer - to those who say that we had unprepared pilots: the regiment lost 5 or 6 vehicles, and more than 60 vehicles in the regiment were still "alive" ... They came to sit down, a the airfield in Lida has been dug up: they built a be a ton runway, in connection with which a narrow landing strip remained, on which it was possible to sit down even during the nowhere in particular. So, the training of the pilots was so strong that when we landed not a single aircraft didn't break ... More than a hundred machines: our I-16s from the 122nd IAP and I-153 from the 127th IAP...

... We landed in Lida without technical staff, without everything. The vehicles are empty - the ammunition is empty, the ba

sat down, there is gasoline, but it is in tanks underground, there is nothing to get it. And with canisters and buckets - try in fill the plane with a bucket of 300 kg! And not a single tanker - everything at the airfield was left in Novy Dvor and in Cherlenakh. The flight crew did not eat anything all day, each made 5-6 sorties, tired and exhausted so that neither the arms nor the legs do not work - already barely we move our legs, and then, what kind of morale -

lower yourself...

... Early in the morning on June 23, when it was still dark, we raised the alarm. We ran to the airfield, and our cars - empty tanks. No fly, nothing. And Me-110 destroyed everything that was on earth. Two The regiments were destroyed and ceased to exist. We were put into cars and taken to Moscow via Minsk to get new equipment. Leaving Lida all together - pilots of the 122nd and 121st regiments, got into cars, and that's all left ... And I'm sure that 50% of the "live" aircraft of both regiments remained there, or even more! Here so the existence of two regiments ceased ... "

S. F. Dolgushin's short story contains almost all the most significant moments of the so-called "relocation" (i.e., disorderly, unorganized retreat) and its inevitable consequences. Already a few hours after such a "relocation", the air regiment comes to a state of complete helplessness: there are no ammunition, no tankers, the batteries are dead, the flight crew has " no

arms and legs don't work," and all the technical services that are supposed to refuel, load, mask, repair, are hopelessly stuck on the roads of retreat clogged with refugees.

The claw is stuck - the whole bird is abyss. After the first phase of "relocation" quickly (in the case of the 122nd IAP - in less than a day), the second comes - the pilots "got into cars and everyone left." But also to get "through Minsk to Moscow" (i.e. a thousand kilometers from

collapsing front) in a situation where enemy aircraft dominates the sky, not everyone and not always succeeds. Perhaps not everyone tried to get there. *"From 248 people of flight and technical personnel who were in service on the morning of June 22, a week later in The eagle arrived to receive new planes only 110 Red Army soldiers and commanders [a strange phrase: "Red Army soldiers" are not included in the number of "flight-technical personnel". — M. S.]. ...Against most of the names in the list of losses, it was indicated "lagged behind when relocating"".* These words from the archival documents of the 129th IAP (9th SAD), although not directly related to the fate of the defeated 122nd IAP, are quite characteristic of the events of the first days of the war.

Further more. More precisely, less. The panicked redeployment of fighter regiments of the first echelon of the Air Force of the border districts forced the high command to use the bomber aircraft that had survived on the rear airfields as strike aircraft of the battlefield, and even without any fighter cover. This inevitably led to huge losses and a rapid reduction in the number of bomber aircraft. As a result, already two weeks after the start of the war, the Soviet Air Force lost that huge quantitative advantage.

ascendancy over the enemy, which they had at the beginning of hostilities.

In conditions of numerical equality with the Soviet Air Force, German aviation gained a decisive advantage due to the higher training and morale of the flight personnel, due to the proven tactics of combat use and interaction with ground forces, due to the flawless operation of the communications and control system. Only a continuous build-up of forces due to the transfer of aviation units of the internal and far waste districts, only a continuous formation

new air regiments allowed the command of the Soviet

Air Force to strike back, provide minimal air cover for ground troops.

In the end, the “blitzkrieg” in the air was thwarted for the same reason that the “blitzkrieg” on the ground did not take place: the Germans simply did not have time to “keep silent” more and more parts of the enemy, did not have time (and did not have the necessary industrial and raw materials for this) to compensate for the growing losses.

On the other hand, with the restoration of discipline, order and controllability in the Soviet Air Force, with the accumulation of combat experience among the flight and command personnel, the actions of Soviet aviation became more and more effective. Probably already by the winter of 1941/42. there was a delicate balance of forces in

Petr Zaporozhets

BORDER BATTLE IN 1941 IN UKRAINE

Recently, it has become almost a rule of good taste to denigrate national history. At the same time, it is believed that in Soviet times, historical works were ideologized, were not of a critical nature, and did not reflect the real state of affairs. Av

tor does not agree with this and in the submitted to the court chi
The reader of the material makes an attempt to refute or at least shake
such a position. All invoices and figures are taken from Soviet sources.

Comprehensive objective and unbiased
the study of the military-historical events of the Second World War is
important from the point of view of establishing historical truth and is
determined by the modern needs of the development of domestic military-
historical science, the need to deepen knowledge about the heroic past of
our Motherland.

It would be wrong to assert that the events of the initial period of the
war were not properly analyzed by military and military history science.
However, the work is not propaganda, but really

of an analytical nature in Soviet times were, as a rule, of a closed nature.
Strategy, Operational Art and Tactics in World War II

received significant development and had a significant
influence on the subsequent development of military art. That is why the
fundamental military-theoretical
military and historical research for a long time

after the end of the war were inaccessible to a wide range of readers and even to professional historians.

Even during the war, the military and military-historical science of different states faced the task of comprehending the combat experience gained. In the postwar years, both national military practitioners and scientists of the USSR, the USA and other victorious countries, as well as captured Nazi generals, actively worked on solving this problem. This was necessary in order to draw appropriate conclusions for the post-military construction of the armed forces, followed by the strengthening of their combat power, the development of military art.

Decision on the preparation of analytical works on the problems of military art, involvement in work above them, theoreticians and practitioners of military affairs, military historians were accepted at the highest level of state administration, in particular, one can recall the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of March 26, 1946, number 664. Significant creative teams developed fundamental scientific works on the theory and history of military art of a closed plan. A characteristic feature of these works is that they reflect the real historical reality more fully than general publications, analyze the causes of the difficulties and shortcomings of hostilities, and provide practical recommendations to military personnel regarding their prevention in the future.

One of the most important works in this direction was the Strategic Outline of the Great Patriotic War, which was prepared in the period from 1958 to 1961 by a large team of military practitioners, theoreticians and military historians under the leadership of S.P. Platonov. At the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, an analytical work on the operations of the Great Patriotic War was published. They carefully analyzed

strategic and frontline operations of the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War, methods of conducting armed struggle, the issues of determining the directions of the main attacks, preparing and conducting an offensive, choosing the forms of operations, using types of armed forces and combat arms, the issue of achieving surprise and effectiveness of military actions, a system of strategic management and interaction, comprehensive support. These works have a large number of additions, filled with significant information material. According to the author, in terms of the degree of processing of the material, the involvement of sources, the scale of generalizations, the depth of the validity of the conclusions in Soviet historiography, such works have not been created any more.

Undoubtedly useful for researchers are collections of documents of the Soviet top military and political leadership, which, until recently, also had a closed character. It should be noted that publications in the post-Soviet period of documentary materials in the Russian Archive series are of a secondary nature.

About the border battle in 1941 in Ukraine

you can read:

Collection of documents of the Supreme Command for the period of the Great Patriotic War. Issue. 1 (June-December 1941). - M.: Military Publishing House, 1968. - 507 p. (S. 5-47); *Collection* of military documents of the Great Patriotic War. Issue. 36 (June 22 - July 11, 1941). - M.: Military Publishing House, 1958. - 362 p.; *Strategic* essay on the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1961. - 984 p. (S. 171-225); *Anfilov V.A.* The beginning of the Great Patriotic War (June 22 - mid-July 1941). Military-historical essay. - M.: Military Publishing, 1962. - 222 p.; *Bagra myan I.Kh.* Thus the war began. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1971. - 512 p. (S. 87-165); *Irinarkhov R.S.* Kyiv

special M.: ACT; Minsk: Harvest, 2006. - 624 p.; *Popel N.K.* At a difficult time. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1959. - 335 p.; *Ryabyshev D.I.* The first year of the war. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1990. - 253 p. (S. 3-63); *1941 - lessons and conclusions.* - M.: Military Publishing House, 1992; *Vladimirsky A.V.* On the Kiev direction. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1989. - 303 p. (S. 3-163); *Gurov A.A.* Combat actions of Soviet troops in the southwestern direction in the initial period of the war // *VIZH.* - 1 *M.D.* In the southwest direction. - M., 1965. - 398 p. (S. 3-106); *Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945: Voen.-ist. essays.* M., 1995. Book. 1: The ordeal. (S. 86-131); *Kiev Red Banner.* Brief essay on the history of the Red Banner Kyiv Military District: 1919-1969. - K: Political Administration, 1969. 543 p. (S. 183-220); *Mukovsky IT, Lisenko O.S.* Zvitiaga and Sacrifice: Ukrainians on the fronts of other svitovoi viyni. - K.: Poshukovo-view. Agency "Book of Memory of Ukraine" / 1996. - 568 p.

The issues of the beginning of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR, including the grouping of troops that was stationed in Ukraine, are proposed in the edition of the early 60s. Judge for yourself the objectivity of Soviet military historians.

In connection with the emergence of a direct threat of an attack by fascist Germany on the USSR, in the armed forces in May-June 1941, some measures began to be carried out for the strategic deployment and according to the plan for the defense of the state civil defense threads.

By June 1-10, 755,000 enlisted men were called up for military training camps. This was, in fact, a partial covert mobilization, which made it possible to replenish 21 rifle divisions up to 14 thousand, 72 divisions up to 12 thousand and 6 mountain divisions.

up to 11 thousand people, i.e. bring them to states close to wartime. Air Force units, artillery, engineering troops, communications and air defense troops, rear units and institutions, as well as headquarters were also partially replenished. However, the mobilization of only personnel did not solve the problem of bringing formations to full combat readiness. Vehicles and horse stock came from the national economy in very limited quantities. Many divisions, as before, could not ensure the normal supply of troops with the available transport, fully raise artillery and other military equipment. The divisions sent from the inner districts to the west found themselves in a particularly difficult situation. Having received the mobilized personnel and additional body armament, they, as before, remained with the transport assigned to them by the 6,000th staff. In case of full mobilization, these divisions left mobile units in the former areas of deployment, which were supposed to send everything missing to new areas. It is clear that this was difficult to implement even in peacetime, not to mention wartime. Thus, in these formations, combat units were artificially separated from their support means.

On June 4, a directive was issued to call up 38,550 men to man the fortified areas for western border districts.

In May-June 1941, the regrouping of troops within the border military districts began. Back in May 1941, the administration of the 2nd cavalry corps was redeployed from the Kievsky to the Odessa district. From May 19 to May 23, the administration of the 9th Rifle Corps and the 106th Rifle Division from the North Caucasian District and the 32nd Cavalry Division from the Kiev Military District were sent to the Odessa District for the defense of the Crimea in the period from May 19 to 23.

On June 15, the movement of troops began from the interior regions of the border districts closer to the state.

natural border, to the areas assigned to them according to the defense plan. Some of these formations were transferred by rail, and the bulk - marching order, night crossings. The divisions of the first echelons of the covering armies were ordered to remain in their former areas. In particular, on June 12, 1941, the Military Council of the Kiev Special Military District was sent a directive signed by the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff: transfer by empty units closer to the state border to new camps. Further, the directive stated: "Leave the border divisions in place, bearing in mind that their withdrawal to the state border, if necessary, can be carried out only on my special order" (NPO Directive No. 504205ss of 12.6.1941) . Altogether, before the war, 32 divisions began to move out of the interior regions of the border districts, of which 4-5 divisions managed to concentrate in the new regions, and the rest were on the way.

On the eve of the war, the redeployment of part of the forces of the internal military districts to the west began. On May 13, 1941, the General Staff issued a number of directives for the advancement of troops from the internal military districts: the Urals (22nd Army), the Volga (21st Army), Kharkov (25th Rifle Corps), the North Caucasus (19th army) to the line of the rivers Zap. Dvina and Dnieper, and on May 22 - June 1, the transportation of the 16th Army from the Trans-Baikal Military District to the Right-Bank Ukraine began (Following the directives of the General Staff, the following terms for concentrating troops in new areas were determined: 22nd Army - July 2-3, 21 -th Army - June 17 - July 2, 16th Army - June 15 - July 10, 25th Rifle Corps - June 11-13). According to In accordance with the plan of strategic deployment, the 22nd Army advanced to the western direction (to the area

Idritsa, Sebezh, Vitebsk), to the southwest - the 19th and 16th armies (the first - to the Cherkasy region, Belaya Tserkov, the second - to the Starokonstantinov, Berdichev, Proskurov region). The deployment plan did not mention the 21st Army. This army was advancing at the junction between the Western and Kyiv districts, in the region of Chernigov, Konotop. In total, 28 divisions, 9 corps directorates and 4 army directorates began to move out of the internal districts. This redeployment from the internal districts, in fact, was the beginning of the strategic concentration of Soviet troops in the theaters of military operations. The advance was carried out under the strictest camouflage measures, with great caution, gradually, without increasing the usual schedule of railways.

From Murmansk to the Black Sea, the state border was guarded by 53 border detachments (including 6 naval ones), 9 separate border commandant's offices, and 11 regiments of the NKVD operational troops with a total strength of 99.5 thousand people. Border detachments had from 1000 to 3000 people and guarded a section of the state border with a length of 140-160 km. The frontier detachment was usually armed with 60-90 light machine guns, 32-48 heavy machine guns, and 40-50 50-mm mortars. The border detachments had no artillery pieces.

The grouping of the Soviet Armed Forces by the end of 21.6.1941. As a result of the measures taken in May-June 1941 to increase the number of formations of the main branches of the armed forces, as well as to redeploy troops, directly in Ukraine, the grouping of troops by June 21st was next.

In the Kiev Special Military District - Commander Colonel General M.P. Kirponos, member of the Military Council, divisional commissar E.P. Rykov, chief of staff, Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev - all troops assigned to the first and second echelons of the armies

cover, were in places of permanent deployment. Rifle corps assigned to the reserve of the district according to the plan of cover, advanced to their districts and were located 100-250 km from the state border. On the move were: 31st Rifle Corps (193rd, 195th, 200th Rifle Divisions), 3rd Rifle Corps (140th, 146th, 228th Rifle Divisions), 37th Rifle Corps (80th, 139th, 141st Rifle Divisions), 55th Rifle Corps (130th, 169th, 189th Rifle Divisions). Instead of the destined 7th Rifle Corps, the 49th Rifle Corps arrived in the 12th Army both by rail (190th, 197th Rifle Divisions) and in marching order (199th Rifle Division).

In the Odessa Military District - Commander Colonel General Ya.T. Cherevichenko, member of the Military Council, Corps Commissar A.F. Kolobyakov, Chief of Staff, Major General M.V. Zakharov - all covering troops were in peacetime deployment points. On June 14, the 48th Rifle Corps (30th, 74th Rifle Divisions) arrived in the Floreshty area, Rybnitsa. By June 5, the administration of the 9th Rifle Corps, the 106th Rifle and 32nd Cavalry Divisions were concentrated in the Crimea.

Thus, the compounds included in western border districts and constituting the first strategic echelon of the Soviet armed forces, by the end of June 21 did not complete their deployment and were dispersed along the front up to 4.5 thousand km and in depth up to 400 km. Troops of the first echelon of armies the shelters were located in permanent quarters and in camps at a distance of 5 to 50 km from the state border. Directly on the state border were border troops, separate units of rifle divisions, advanced for defensive work and on

observations, as well as the garrisons of the border fortified areas.

Behind the divisions of the first echelons, 50-100 km from the state border, there were mechanized and rifle troops of the second echelons of the armies with covers.

The third operational echelon was made up of mechanics armored and rifle corps destined for the reserve of the districts. Most of the troops of this echelon were on the move, 150-400 km from the state border.

The existing grouping did not provide a solid defense of the state border and cover the mobilization and deployment of our armed forces. Moreover, such a grouping of troops predetermined the fragmentation of their combat operations. The enemy had the opportunity to first attack the divisions located near the border, then engage in battle with the second echelons of the covering armies, and after that, breaking through in depth, attack the reserves districts.

The second strategic echelon of the Soviet armed forces were the troops of the reserve of the High Command (16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th and 28th armies), a total of 77 divisions (sd - 58, td - 13, md - 6). By the start of the war, 9 divisions of this echelon had already concentrated in the areas designated for them (19th Army), 19 divisions were on the way (16th, 21st and 22nd armies), and the rest of the divisions remained at peacetime deployment points (20 , 24, 28th army).

Grouping of the Air Force. Of the 79 aviation divisions in the Air Force, 48 divisions, or 60%, were located in the western border districts. The aviation of the western border districts was based on permanent and operational airfields: army aviation - 100-150 km,

frontline - 300-500 km and aviation of the High Command - 600-900 km from the state border. Attention is drawn to the fact that the advanced units of army aviation were based too close to the border.

GROUPING OF NAVAL FORCES

Black Sea Fleet - Commander Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, member of the Military Council, divisional commissar N.M. Kulakov, Chief of Staff Rear Admiral I.D. Eliseev - in his main base - Sevastopol had a battleship, 5 cruisers, 2 leaders, 10 destroyers, 2 patrol ships, an underwater mine layer, 9 minesweepers, 14 small hunters, 40 torpedo boats, 21 submarines; 14 submarines were under repair there. Based on Odessa: a cruiser (obsolete, used as a training ship), 4 gunboats, 4 small hunters, 2 minesweepers; to the port of Ochakov - 28 torpedo boats; on Nikolaev - the leader, a destroyer and 4 submarines that were in the current repair; to Novorossiysk - 4 small hunters and 2 submarines; Batumi - 2 destroyers. A significant part of the coastal artillery was located on the approaches to Sevastopol and to the Odessa, Kerch, Novorossiysk, Poti naval bases. The air forces of the fleet were based mainly on airfields located on the Crimean peninsula, partly in the region of Odessa and Tavria. On the Caucasian coast, in the region of Gelendzhik, Poti, only two airfields were prepared, which were used by a limited number of aircraft (two air squadrons).

The Danube flotilla was almost entirely based at the main base of Izmail, as well as the bases located in the Izmail region - Reni, Kiliya, Vilkov. There were 5 monitors, a minefield

tel, 22 armored boats, 7 minesweepers, 6 gliders, a command ship.

Pinsk flotilla in its main base Pinsk to

At the beginning of the war, it had 5 monitors, 2 gunboats, 4 floating batteries, 14 armored boats, 6 gliders, and in the Kiev region - 2 monitors, 2 gunboats, 3 floating batteries, 6 armored boats.

In the works of historians of recent years, questions of a strategic defensive operation in Western Ukraine and Bessarabia (the Lvov-Chernivtsi defensive operation) are considered. In our opinion, from the point of view of military art, it is not correct to speak of a defensive operation. A much more precise term was used in the works of the 50s and 60s - battle (there is no analogue in translation into Ukrainian, the closest is battlefield, massacre).

The frontier battle took place on 22.6-9.7.41 at the beginning of the war after the invasion of the troops of the fascist coalition and was divided into two main stages. At the 1st stage, 22-30.6.41, put in front of the Soviet troops there were tasks regarding the defeat of groups about the enemy and going over to the offensive, at the second stage, on 30.6-9.7.41, the withdrawal of the troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts to the line of fortified areas (URs) of the old border was organized.

At the heart of the strategic plan "Barbarossa" lying was the idea of a sudden and powerful first strike with the aim of quickly defeating and destroying the main forces of the Soviet Army between the border and the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, followed by a rapid advance into the interior of the country. The main forces of the army of fascist Germany, as well as the large forces of the armies of its allies, were concentrated in three strategic groupings, designed to deliver massive blows to the most important strategic directions.

I. The main efforts were concentrated in the zone of Army Group Center. According to the plan of the fascist military-political leadership, the southern or Ukrainian direction in the initial period of the war was important, but not the main one. At the front from Vlodava to the mouth of the river. Danube was deployed Army Group "South" (General Feldm. K. Rundstedt) as part of the 6th, 17th, 11th armies and the 1st tank group of the Wehrmacht, the 3rd and 4th armies of the Romanians and the Hungarian army corps . The idea behind the operation of the Army Group "South" was that the main blow was delivered by a grouping consisting of the 1st Panzer Group and the 6th Army from the line of Helm, Toma Shuv with the task: to quickly reach the Kiev region, move the tank troops further south east, to the rear of the Soviet troops, to destroy the Soviet formations in Ukraine, to the west of the Dnieper, to capture the crossings in the Kiev region and to the south, and thereby create the prerequisites for continuing the operation east of the Dnieper. The 17th Army was to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops northwest of Lvov. The task of the 11th Army was to create the appearance of deploying large forces in northeastern Romania and thereby tie down Soviet troops, and, as events unfolded, prevent the withdrawal of Soviet formations from Moldova and Ukraine by striking in the direction of Mogilev-Podolsky, Vinnitsa. The 3rd Romanian Army acted together with the 11th German Army. On the sixth day of the war, the 4th Romanian Army had the task of starting demonstrative actions on the front south of Iasi and being ready to move east with the aim of occupying Bessarabia. The advance of Army Group South was supported by the German 4th Air Fleet and the Romanian Air Force. To build up efforts from the reserves of the high command of the ground forces, 4 infantry divisions were supposed to arrive by July 4, 1941 in A

Unlike the fascist command, the Soviet considered the southwestern direction to be the main one and concentrated the main strike groups here. The strategic views on the future war consisted in that after repulsing the enemy offensive, the enemy had to be defeated in the course of the strategic offensive of the Red Army on foreign territory with "little bloodshed". According to the plans of the Soviet command at the beginning of the war, the main forces of the Kiev Special Military District (South-Western Front; Colonel General M.P. Kirponos) consisting of 5A (gen.-m. tank, troops M.I. Potapov), 6A (gen.-l. I.N. Muzichenko), 26A (gen.-l. F.Ya. Kostenko), 12A (gen.-m. P.G. Ponedelin) from the Peremishlyansky ledge dealt the main blow to the flank German troops deployed in central Poland. The main strike force of the combined arms armies were mechanized corps (one per army and four more directly subordinate to the front). Every fur. the corps consisted of two armored and one motorized divisions. In addition to 4 mechanized in the reserve of the South-Western Front there were: 1 cavalry, 1 airborne and 5 rifle corps. Cro

In addition, 19A was deployed in the second strategic echelon (it was heading from the North Caucasian Military District to the Cherkasy region, Belaya Tserkov); 16A (from the Transbaikalian MD to the area of Starokonstantinov, Berdichev, Proskurov); 21A (from the Volga Military District to the Chernihiv, Konotop region). The directives for the regrouping of these armies were handed over by the General Staff on May 13, 1941;

July 10, 1941. On the basis of the administration and troops of the Odessa Military District, 9A was formed (gen.-l. Ya.T. Cherevichenko), which was supposed to defend the state border from Lipkan to the mouth of the Danube and the Black Sea coast. The 9th Rifle Corps was intended for the defense of the Crimea. The border was gu

detachments of the Ukrainian and Moldavian border districts.

As of June 21, 1941, the balance of forces and the means of the opposite sides, determined for the conduct of armed struggle in Ukraine, were as follows: 70 rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry divisions; 19 border detachments and 4 regiments of the NKVS; 14 UR; 2 airborne corps;

24 separate formations and artillery units of the RGK of the Soviet side were opposed by the enemy: 57 divisions and 13 brigades (1.7: 1); in the second strategic echelon, 21 divisions were deployed from the Soviet side with a final concentration deadline of July 10; until July 4, there was a planned allocation of 4 Wehrmacht divisions to reinforce Army Group South (5.2: 1); only in combat formations and units of the Red Army of the first strategic echelon in Ukraine there were 1,094,500 personnel, they were opposed by 992 thousand military personnel of the Nazi coalition (1.1:1); for guns and mortars 19,188 against 15,940 (1.2: 1); for tanks 5528 (including 761 T-34 and KV) against 725 (7.6: 1); for aircraft 3,472 serviceable aircraft in formations of the Soviet Air Forces and 801 Navy aircraft against 800 Luftwaffe aircraft and 500 from the Romanian Air Forces (3.3 : 1); for warships - 232 of the Black Sea Fleet and river fleets in Ukraine against 29 ships of the Romanian Navy (8: 1), at the beginning of the war there were no German ships in the Black Sea.

22 June, German troops invaded the borders of the USSR. On the first day of the war, in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On martial law", the legal regime of martial law was introduced throughout Ukraine. Since June 23, mobilization has been announced. The Southwestern Front was formed on the basis of the departments and troops of the Kiev Special Military District, and the 9th Army was formed on the basis of the Odessa District. Interesting fact! Order about this post

drank from Moscow on June 19th. On June 20, the KOVO management of the railway echelon and the automobile convoy on June 21 moved from the point of permanent deployment in the city of Kyiv to the command post in the city of Tarnopol. On June 25, by directive of the NPO, the Southern Front (SF) was created on the basis of the troops of the Od VO and part of the forces of the KOVO (27 divisions, (including 6 tanks, and 3 motorized vehicles), 4 Ur, 5 air div.; army general I.V. Tyulenev had the task of defending the 700-km section of the state border with Romania from Lipkan to the mouth of the Danube The Danube Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral

The Soviet troops turned out to be not fully prepared for the fulfillment of the assigned tasks. Most of the divisions called upon to cover the deployment of front groupings were located 8-20 km or more from the defense lines assigned to them, which took from 4 to 30 hours to occupy. To the pain In most sectors of the border, the enemy in the first hours of the attack met with opposition only from the border guards and advanced units of the covering troops. The advantage created by the enemy in forces on the rule of the main attack and the surprise of the attack allowed him to quickly overcome the lines of fortifications and advance deep into Soviet territory. Only in the middle of the day, units of the state cover began to arrive at the battlefields. frontiers that advanced to their lines of defense, although many of these lines were already occupied by the enemy. Soviet troops had to enter the battle on the move, often without the support of artillery and aviation. As a result of a sudden massive attack on Soviet airfields, the Air Force suffered significant losses. As a result, German aviation seized air supremacy. In addition, the control of the Soviet troops was violated.

As a result of an incorrect assessment of the situation, the Main Military Council issued Directives No. 2 on June 22

and No. 3, which demanded offensive actions from the troops with decisive goals. The troops of the Southwestern Front were ordered by the forces of the 5th and 6th armies, at least five mechanized corps and the entire aviation of the front, with the support of the aviation of the High Command, to strike, surround and destroy the enemy grouping advancing from the front of Vladimir- Volynsky, Krystynopol, and by the end of June 24, capture the Lublin region. 9th Army

The task was to cover the state border in its zone and prevent the enemy from invading Soviet territory. The mechanism of a strategic offensive operation of the Soviet troops was put into action, but the plan was not realized. The oncoming battle that unfolded in the border areas was lost by the Soviet side. However, the troops of the Southwestern Front, having the greatest numerical and qualitative advantage over the enemy on the entire Soviet-fascist front, carried out the greatest resistance. Encirclement and defeat of the main forces were not allowed here, as was the case on the Western Front. Counterattacks by the 15th and 8th mechanized corps in the Brody area stopped the enemy and facilitated the retreat of the 6th, 26th and 12th armies. On June 25, in the Rovno region, counterattacks were launched against the enemy by the 9th and 19th mechanized corps,

who detained the enemy in the Rovno direction until July 7. Given the more stable situation in the southwestern direction and the catastrophic situation in the western direction, the 19th and 16th armies of the second strategic echelon, which were completing their deployment in Ukraine, were transferred to Belarus.

Subsequently, it became clear to the High Command of the Soviet Armed Forces that the troops of the first strategic echelon would not be able to stop the advance of the enemy, much less deliver an appropriate blow and transfer combat operations to hostility

new territory. Life has set a new task - to bleed the enemy through defensive operations and create conditions for a counteroffensive. On June 30, combat orders were transmitted on the organized withdrawal of troops of the South-Western Front in order to prepare and carry out defense along the line of the URs of the old state border from 9.7. The intermediate line of withdrawal of Sarny, Ostrog, Chortkiv, Kolomyia, Berehomet was ordered to be held until 6.7. From the same time, the departure of the right wing of the YuF to the boundary of the river was to begin. Dniester.

At a time when on the direction of Ch. an enemy strike, the border battle ended; in the zone of the Southern Front, the Romanian troops, awaiting the completion of the deployment of the German 11A, conducted reconnaissance in force in order to increase bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the river. Rod. The absence of large-scale hostilities here in June enabled the Soviet command to prepare to repulse the invasion of the enemy's main forces and to meet his offensive, which began on July 1, in a more organized manner. The main blow of the enemy, advancing in the general direction on Mogilev-Podolsky, Zhmerinka, was taken up by the recently created 18th Army on the basis of the command of the Kharkov Military District. On July 3, the enemy managed to capture bridgeheads on the left bank of the Prut in the Yass region, from here he launched an offensive to the northeast and advanced up to 60 km in six days. The pace and depth of the offensive of the German and Rumanian troops in the Mogilev-Podolsky direction were low compared to other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

However, the situation of the troops of the South-Western Front and the Southern Front is significantly worsened. The lack of interaction between the troops of the 5th and 6th armies weakened the junction between them. The enemy threw two motorized corps towards Ostrog. An attempt by the command of the South-Western Front to cover this direction with forces

two divisions of the 7th Rifle Corps, transferred from the Southern Front, was late and became unsuccessful. The troops of the South-Western Front failed to fully realize the plan to withdraw and organize a defense operation along the line of the old border. German troops, continuing to strike the main blow in the direction of Rovno, Zhitomir, Kiev and the second blow in the direction of Tarnopol, Proskurov, Vinnitsa, from 1 to 9.07 overcame the resistance of the Soviet troops in Shepetovsky, Izyaslavsky, Staro-Konstantinovsky, Proskurovsky URs of the first lane and Novograd-Volynsky UR of the second lane. Until 09.07, formations and units of the South-Western Front retreated to the line: Korostensky UR, east of Zhitomir and Berdicheva, Ostropolsky, Letichevsky, Kamenetz-Podolsky URs. The troops of the right wing of the Southern Front by this time were conducting defensive operations on the front of Kamenetz-Podolsky, Mogilev-Podolsky, west of Chisinau. The left flank divisions of the 9th Army, interacting with the Danube military flotilla, continued to defend

During the border battle, Soviet troops fought in conditions where the German command for the initiative was enough, and enemy aviation dominated the air. This was the cause of an exceptionally tense struggle and difficulty in command and control. The result of the fighting in the border battle was the retreat of the troops of the South-Western Front to a depth of 250-300 km. The troops of the front, having a quantitative advantage over the enemy, were unable to stop the invasions, defeat the enemy's strike force and transfer military operations to its territory, they were defeated and left Western Ukraine. Advance detachments of German troops on 11.9 reached the approaches to Kyiv. Losses of the Soviet side in the border battle in Ukraine: irretrievable - more than 172 thousand people, sanitary - about 70 thousand people, as well as 4381 tanks, 5806 guns and mortars, 1218 combat

aircraft. In our opinion, the direct blame for one of the greatest catastrophes of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the war lies with the command of the Southwestern Front. It turned out to be incapable of properly managing large masses of troops. Colonel General M.P. Kirponos, who a year before, while still a colonel during the Finnish War, showed himself to be a successful division commander, did not have the appropriate theoretical training and practical experience in leading large masses of troops. Experienced leaders from the administration of the Kyiv district were repressed in the pre-war years by 80 percent. The lack of proper experience among the commanders became one of the reasons for the defeats of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the war.

A number of erroneous decisions of the High Command (Directives Nos. 1, 2, 3) negatively affected the combat activity of the troops at the beginning of the war. The first directive, with a warning about the likelihood of the German troops going on the offensive on June 22-23, was sent to the troops with a great delay. The second and third directives, which demanded decisive offensive actions from the troops, did not correspond to the prevailing situation. It would have been more expedient to issue instructions on going over to the defensive at advantageous lines in order to wear down and exhaust the advancing enemy. Decisions on the organization of defense and the creation of defensive lines in the depths, taken by the High Command after June 25, although based on the realities of a soberly assessed situation, were practically not implemented after a limited time.

The enemy, having data on the location of command posts, nodes and communication lines, managed to significantly put some of them out of action by air strikes, as well as by sabotage groups, the possibility of whose actions the Soviet command underestimated. Hopes placed on the permanent lines of the people's commissariat

connections did not work out. There was also an underestimation of radio as the main means of communication in conditions of mobile warfare. All this led to long communication failures and loss of command and control.

The course of the armed struggle was negatively affected by serious shortcomings in the actions of front and army commanders, commanders of formations and units in directing subordinate units. The failures of the Soviet troops became the reason for frequent, in many cases unjustified, changes in the command of formations and operational formations, and sometimes even repressions. This practice, which concerned a significant number of leading command cadres, undermined the confidence of the command staff in their abilities, caused great harm to the cause of command and control of the troops. This in turn ultimately had a severe impact on the entire course of the armed struggle in the first months of the war.

The difficult conditions in which the troops of the frontier districts found themselves were exacerbated by major shortcomings in the work of the operational and military rear and their actual unpreparedness to provide troops in a difficult situation.

Nevertheless, the enemy's plan to encircle and destroy the main forces of the SWF was thwarted. The tasks that were determined by the plan "Barbarossa" for Army Group "South" were not fully fulfilled.

Keystut Zakoretsky
ON THE
PERIODIZATION OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

To begin with, I would like to deviate a little from the stated topic and touch on the reason why I got carried away with it. This happened because of one "discovery" of Alexei Isaev in the history of the Battle of Stalingrad. On one of the sites on the Internet about this at wrote like this:

"By the evening of January 30, 1943, units of the 64th Army in during two days of fierce fighting approached Square of the Fallen Fighters. By the morning of January 31, the department store was completely surrounded, the headquarters of the Southern grouping of German troops after a short negotiations capitulated. It was the largest victory since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and, for sure, the most important. From that day on, Stalingrad department store became one of the symbols of the Red Victory Army.

But the well-known military historian A. V. Isaev casts doubt on the version about the location of the headquarters 6th army.

In his book "Stalingrad. Beyond the Volga for us land no" he writes that in the combat log Don Front states that the headquarters of Paulus was in the basement of the executive committee of Stalingrad, where he capitulated. "Perhaps, subsequently, they reported the capture of Paulus in the basement of a department store, so as not shadow on the building that houses the organs

additional power. Surely evil tongues immediately would have called the abode of the servants of the people "the House of Paulus" - the author writes. However, living eyewitnesses of the events of the winter of 1943 unequivocally state that the capture took place in the basements of the department store. Possibly, all this is connected with the issue of returning the department store building from private to federal ownership, which is now being resolved.

But Alexei Isaev continues to insist on his version. Among other things, he did not abandon it in the new reprint of his book on Stalingrad (which is being prepared for the end of 2010). He considers the text of one of the reports of the headquarters of the 64th Army, a facsimile of which he posted on his website, where clarifies:

"At one time I wrote in the book "Stalingrad" on documents of the Don Front that Paulus was captured in the executive committee, and not in a department store, as they usually wrote in Soviet time. This raises legitimate controversy. and doubt. I did not forget this file and found it dated January 31, 1943 "Report on the circumstances the capture of the commander of the 6th German Army Field Marshal Paulus "to Rokossovsky from the headquarters 64 A. Here's what it says, I'm giving a fax on purpose mile:

"From the morning of January 31, 1943, Field Marshal von PAU LUS was in the Executive Committee House (central part of the city of STALINGRAD) with the ranks of his headquarters and strong guards. During the battle, the building was surrounded by divisions of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade, under the direct supervision of the Deputy. brigade commander for political affairs - Lieutenant Colonel - VINOKU

After the encirclement of the building, the personal adjutant von Paulus arrived with a proposal to conduct a transfer dialects."

The document was signed by all members of the Military Council 64 A:

commander Shumilov, NSH Laskin and PMC Serdyuk. And from these three comrades. Laskin personally visited headquarters of Paulus and saw where he was with my own eyes in the daytime, see Samsonova: To the basement of the department store 40 minutes after the arrival of the delegation parliamentarians of the 64th Army, its head arrived Headquarters Major General I. A. Laskin. Also, the "Executive Committee" appears in the current reports 64 A, dated 19.00 01.31.43 and 22.00 01.31.43.

In general, the executive committee is more logical: there are more telephone wires on which communication can be connected to it than to the Department Store.

I can't say that the matter is over. But I have more confidence regarding the executive committee hovered."

And no other materials about the capture of Paulus in the basement of the department store Alexei Isaev convince. Neither the memoirs of the former adjutant of Field Marshal Colonel Adam (in which he explained in detail how the headquarters of the 6th German Army ended up there), nor the repeated memoirs of the former in 1943 Art. Lieutenant Ilchenko Fyodor Mikhailovich (who personally participated in the capture of Paulus in the basement of a department store), nor a detailed document dated September 25, 1943 from the headquarters of the 7th Guards Army (in which the 64th was transformed on May 1, 1943) entitled "A Brief Description the capture of the headquarters of the 6th German Army, led by its commander, Field Marshal Paulus, in Stalingrad by units of the 64th Army of the Don Front on January 31, 1943 "(again in the basement of a department store).

There are also German sites about the Battle of Stalingrad with the mention of "das Kaufhaus" - "Department store"¹ .

¹ http://www.entfernungspauschale.info/article/Schlacht_von_Stalingrad

For Aleksey Isaev, all these texts do not carry any useful information. I tried to talk to him on his LiveJournal website on this topic - to no avail¹.

So, Aleksei Isaev insists on his "discovery" about the "executive committee". But in general, in the central part of Stalingrad, there could be three "executive committees" (Soviets of Working People's Deputies):

- the central district of the city ("district executive committee"),
- city ("city executive committee"),
- regional ("regional executive committee").

And if the headquarters of Paulus really were in the basement of one of them, then it would be more correct to specify in which one. But during a military operation (when the document can still get to

¹ An example of a discussion with A. Isaev:

(I): And those staff officers in September 1943 DID NOT HAVE access to their own documents that had not yet been archived?

(Isaev): Why not surrendered? I won't give a damn that they didn't melt all the documents on the Battle of Stalingrad in Buzuluk (where there was a point for receiving documents of the future TsAMO) until the summer of 1943.

(I): "In hot pursuit" little could either confuse or, conversely, deliberately conceal. Sorry, war, however. But six months later, when this no longer affects the course of hostilities, is another matter.

(Isaev): On the contrary, during the battle they think about him, and not about peaceful life after. I expressed my opinion: the military was asked to correct the "details" so as not to confuse the building of the executive committee with the presence of the German headquarters there.

(Me): What's the point of lying to him? (Colonel Adam).

(Isaev): Nothing for him. He could:

a) forget, because the headquarters was in the executive committee (Department store) short time;

b) write in the manuscript "Executive Committee" or "Party Building", and when publishing, the scientific editor corrected it for "Department Store". Or do you not know what scientific editing is?

Note that you have nothing to say to my objections. Once again: in hot pursuit, it is clearly written: "The Executive Committee." Then the political officers could ask for some correction.

By the way, it doesn't occur to you: why is the headquarters of the 7th Guards already army to return to the affairs of January in September? Reports are usually written shortly after the operation. Especially at the front in the spring of 43rd there was a lull.

to the enemy and the enemy can (theoretically) take some kind of retaliatory measures) in combat documents it is supposed to use coded words. For example, it is a well-known fact that Comrade Stalin signed his orders to the commanders of the fronts shortly: "Ivanov." And let the enemies guess in case something happens, who is this - is it the chief of the General Staff, which deputy or Stalin himself?

But Alexei Isaev does not want to think in this direction. And I remembered this story here because he mentioned Samsonov's book about the Battle of Stalingrad in his comments. She is on the Internet. But no footnotes. And I have it in paper version (with all footnotes). It was in them that I found a link to an article in the VIZH magazine, 1959, No. 2, where the September 1943 report of the headquarters of the 7th Guards was published. army.

Chose the time, visited the library, found this magazine and copied that article.

But as it turned out, there were other things in that magazine. tedious materials.

In particular, the article by Major General E. Boltin "On the periodization of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union." She got me interested. For a long time, I kept it in the form of jpg files, until the topic of periodization of the war was touched upon on the Exler forum, where a participant with the nickname "Fruit" posted several interesting documents¹ (hereinafter, the emphasis in italics is mine) :

"Memoir of G. K. Zhukov

AND V. D. SOKOLOVSKY IN THE CPSU Central Committee

ABOUT CHANGE OF NAME

THE FIRST PERIOD

OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

¹ <http://forum.exler.ru/index.php?act=Post&CODE=06&f=113&t=157122&p=22282809>

May 23, 1955

In January this year, the Ministry of Defense

consideration of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU was submitted a petition to change the existing name of the first period of the Great Patriotic War.

At present, this period is called "Active Defense of the Soviet Armed Forces".

Strength."

Considering that such a name leads to misconception about the nature of the actions of the Soviet troops in 1941-42. and that it contradicts the concept of the content of active defense adopted by us, the Ministry asked the Central Committee of the CPSU to approve the following name for the first period: "Disruption of the plans of the "blitzkrieg" war of the fascist Germany against the Soviet Union and the creation of conditions for a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

Subsequently, the Ministry of Defense, having discussed this question at the board, it was concluded that the proposed name is also not valid scooping, because it does not reflect the nature of the events of the first period of the war and contains only its military-political outcome. This may give rise to misconceptions about the content. military events of that time and the difficult situation in which they took place.

In this regard, the collegium asks the Presidium of the Central Committee The CPSU to consider two new variants of definitions of the first period: The first variant - "The period of retreat and the disruption of the plan for a "blitzkrieg" war of fascist Germany against the Soviet Union"; Second option - "The period of retreat, accumulation of forces and disruption of the plan of "lightning" war of fascist Germany against the Soviet Union".

Zhukov, Sokolovsky

"Send to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU. May 24, 1955.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 34. D. 69. L. 14-15

From this document it becomes clear that until 1955 in the USSR the official explanation was that the Red Army in 1941-42. "actively defended." And in 1955 there was a suspicion that it was not entirely correct. act

Indeed, what kind of "activity" is this, as a result of which the army rolled back from the border for hundreds, and then for thousands of kilometers? That is, it turns out that in the summer of 1941, some conditions were not enough for a stable defense. But, on the other hand, if there is an "active" defense, then there must also be some other one? How does science differentiate them? "For the record" I open the TSB, 3rd ed., volume 1 and read:

"ACTIVE DEFENSE (military), a term that is falling into disuse; use ch. arr. in the military literature The concept of activity in defense is usually used. See Defense.

And all? So now this term can be forgotten? For control, I open the 18th volume of the TSB on the article "Defense". And I don't find anything about her "activity" at all. There is no such term! The power of defense is understood there *"in striking with all types of weapons, extensive fire maneuver, counterattacks and counterattacks.* And its organization should be based *"on the skillful use of favorable local conditions, its eng. equipment, the use of obstacles, the dispersed disposition of troops along the front and in depth.*

It's clear. They attack you - defend yourself with everything you have. But it is desirable for science. How does science distinguish types of defense? Can you find it somewhere? It turned out that it is possible. Strange, but a more or less detailed description of this topic was found in an article by M. Sergeev on the tactics of the American infantry, published in the journal Vo

enny messenger "No. 3 of February 1946. In particular, it says:

"According to American views, decisive results in battle are achieved only by offensive actions: defense alone can delay defeat, but never achieve victory. The offensive must begin suddenly, be carried out continuously and until the complete defeat of the enemy ...

While recommending a sudden attack on the enemy, the regulations of the US Army pay much attention to combat provision of own troops. In order to emphasize the inadmissibility of carelessness in combat situation, the Americans indicate that the commander sometimes defeat in battle can be forgiven, but the carelessness that results in his troops being taken by surprise by the enemy is never. Every fight comes with risk; commander duty units - to minimize this risk with appropriate combat support measures.

That's right, only an offensive leads to victory (if it is clear that your resources are breaking the enemy's resources). Or a negotiating table (if your forces are ruined in vain in useless attacks). But the opinion of the Americans that the commander's carelessness cannot be forgiven is interesting. And one can ask the question, in what form should this "unforgiveness" manifest itself? Put on trial by a military tribunal and sentenced to a long term? Or execution before formation according to military laws? But what if the most important commander of the whole country allowed carelessness? You can't shoot him before formation. And it is unlikely to be sent to court. But as the facts show, just such a story with "carelessness" happened in the USSR in June 1941. Comrade Stalin, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the country, spit on his own demand to maintain constant vigilance and allowed a sudden attack by a pre-deployed armada of the enem

I was "scientifically" not ready to conduct defense. Which led to a whole streak of very unfortunate events.

Reading further on the above article, I also found American considerations for types of defense:

"... Regardless of the reasons for the transition to the defensive, its characteristic feature is the holding of a broad front by relatively weak forces.

The Americans divide the defense into positional (defense in one position) and maneuverable (retreat defence). Depending on the set

Defense tasks can be passive or active.

Passive defense has the task of holding fortified positions with all types of fire without undertaking a counteroffensive. The enemy breaking through into the depths of the defense is destroyed by counterattacks from the reserves or driven back beyond the forward edge.

Active defense provides for a counteroffensive carried out at a critical moment. fight. Therefore, with active defense, it is recommended to have strong and mobile reserves intended chiefly for offensive operations.

Positional defense is built on the principle of defensive areas, within which strongholds and nodes of resistance. They are created in such a way as to ensure mutual support, all-round defense, the greatest range frontal fire, the possibility of shelling all approaches and areas of terrain adjacent to the nodes of resistance.

Defensive areas are recommended to be occupied entire divisions, as a result of which the districts commonly called platoon, company and battle onnym.

The defense is extended in depth due to its layer-by-layer construction. Counting from the front to the rear echelons are called: the first is the resistance echelon, the second is the support echelon, the third is the battle

coupon reserves and the fourth - regimental reserves. The purpose of organizing such a defense is to striving to "break the strength of the attacker in the same way that fragments of rocks thrown on the shore break the strength of the waves."

I ask you to pay attention to the phrase: "defense has the task of holding fixed positions with all types of fire. This is the main thing in defense - how to fight back. If there is nothing, there is little sense in sitting in a trench. But the enemy, for his part, can use a flurry of fire. Therefore, they came up with burrowing into the ground. At the same time, there will still not be a 100% guarantee of survival, but some probability will remain. Therefore, engineering support only makes it possible to increase the survivability of the defending troops. But they must have a defensive effect on the enemy with fire. That is, to have a sufficient amount of different ammunition. If there are not enough of them, then no trenches will help. Will have to retreat.

Moreover, the replenishment of stocks for fire action should be constant. Otherwise, any counterattacks will not stop the enemy for a long time. And the fact that the Germans were able to reach Moscow and Rostov in 1941 shows that the Red Army lacked something important. And digging trenches at that time did not help much. No matter how many civilian teams were sent to dig defenses thread strips.

But the theory of defense by the beginning of the war in the USSR was. Here is how it is written about this in the 18th volume of the TSB in an article about "defense":

"... In the 30s. O.'s theory was widely developed in the Red Army. In connection with the increased strike force of the advancing troops, it was believed that O. should was to be deep, multi-lane, anti-artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft.

To the beginning World War II 1939-45 and during its connection with the massive use of long-range artillery

leriya, tanks and aviation O. began to build even more deep. For example, the O. strip of the Red Army Corps had a depth of up to 15 km and consisted of 2 defensive, stripes deep 4-6 km each. Defend, the strip consisted of 2—3 trenches. O. received comprehensive development in Sov. Armed. Forces to the Great Fatherland, the war of 1941-1945, especially in the Moscow battle of 1941-42 and Leningrad the battle of 1941-1944, in the Battle of Kursk 1943, in the Balaton defensive operation in 1945, etc. ... "

The fact that the defense near Moscow is mentioned here in 1941 is understandable. The Germans could not break through it. But in order for them to be near Moscow, they had to go hundreds of kilometers from the border, on which the Soviet defense for some reason turned out to be ineffective, no matter how you call it - active or otherwise. In fact, it cannot be called completely inactive. From June to December 1941, the Red Army carried out many serious operations: these were counterattacks in the zone of the South-Western Front, and a blow to the corps of the brigade commander Petrovsky on the Western Front, and many months of defense of Kiev, and a counteroffensive near Smolensk, etc. But to stop the Germans ultimately they failed. The enemy continued and continued to push the Red Army further and further east.

Thus, the actions of the Red Army in that period can be called *"at times active maneuverable (retreating) defense in the face of a lack of some kind of forces and pre-prepared defensive*

districts". The main task turned out to be the need to gain more than a year of time, which was required to make up for the large losses of strategic reserves at the beginning of the war. A period of more than a year arose because of the need for an urgent evacuation of industry from threatened areas far to the east and the resumption of its work in new places.

Of course, the term "active defense" for the first period of the war did not explain all these details. And it would be quite unfair to call it *"the period from*

steps, disruption of the plans of a "blitzkrieg" war fascist Germany against the Soviet Union, the accumulation of forces and the creation of conditions for a radical change " (approximately as suggested by Marshal Zhukov in May 1955).

But in such a name there is still an inconsistency. For the question remains unanswered: why did this happen? Who is guilty? That is, in a more complete form in the title it would be useful to add: ***"due to the fact that ..."***.

That's when it would be logically complete.

But this part is the most difficult. Literally, but "a stumbling block." And so far. On the one hand, some researchers insist that at that time everything was done correctly and nothing could be done better and more efficiently, except for this ***" in places active maneuverable (retreat) defense."*** Allegedly, the blow of the enemy with forces deployed in advance and manned to the full eyeballs was incredibly strong. And to counter it with something better than and how it was done, it was hardly possible. And that thought is still going around.

But after Stalin's death, during the period of debunking his personality cult in the second half of the 1950s, there were attempts to get to the bottom of the specific reasons for the summer defeat of 1941. Other documents of that time were also cited at the Exler forum mentioned above. In particular, another letter from Marshal Zhukov:

"Memoir of G. K. Zhukov to the Central Committee of the CPSU

**ON PRESS COVERAGE OF THE
INITIAL PERIOD OF THE
GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR**

May 12, 1956

The editors of the journal "Military Bulletin" in the front article No. 4 shed some light on the failures of our troops in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War

war, arising from the consequences of the personality cult, as discussed at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

May 9 in an editorial dedicated to the Day

Victory, the editorial staff of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper subjected criticized this article by the Military Bulletin, accused magazine in that it makes "completely wrong, harmful judgments" when it states in the cited article that "our army had to retreat, to fight heavy defensive battles, allegedly because of the failure to put the troops on combat readiness."

The editorial staff of Krasnaya Zvezda considers very strange and unconvincing "the journal's judgments about some kind of disparate, ununited actions individual military formations - actions generated by the unpreparedness of the Armed Forces of the USSR, she also claims that in the article "Military Vestnik" grossly distorts the question of mobilization readiness and the possibilities of our industry. According to the editors of Krasnaya Zvezda, the authors articles of the "Military Bulletin" thereby belittled the significance of our victory in the last war, belittled the decisive role of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in winning victory.

This criticism, according to the information of the editor-in-chief of the newspaper, was given at the direction of comrade. Shepilova D. T. I think that the accusations leveled against the leading article in No. 4 of the Military Gazette are unfounded and incorrect.

In the article "Military Bulletin" the events of the initial period of the war and their causes are covered on the basis of real facts and in full accordance with their assessment given in the materials of the 20th Party Congress.

There is also no reason to blame the editors of the journal in belittling the role of the Soviet people, the party and the Armed Forces, especially since on the first pages of No. 4 magazine the decisive role of our people, party and Armed Forces in winning victory is shown vividly.

The unsubstantiated statement of the editors of the Krasnaya Zvezdy" with criticism of the leading article in No. 4 of the Military Bulletin brought obvious harm. It disorients our cadres in matters of restructuring lighting.

the initial period of the Great Patriotic War in accordance with the materials of the 20th Congress and, in essence, runs counter to the decision taken by the Congress on the question of the cult of personality.

At the same time, the ill-considered statement of the newspaper in The commemorative article gave grounds to the hostile press abroad to launch a slanderous campaign.

I believe that the employees of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU and The Main Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, which authorized the publication of an editorial article by Krasnaya Zvezda with unfounded criticism of the journal Voenny Vestnik, without a corresponding instruction from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, allowed serious mistake.

G. Zhukov»

Generally speaking, bearing in mind Zhukovsky 's later memoirs, it is surprising to read such a letter. It turns out that Marshal Zhukov quite specifically agreed in 1956 that the Red Army in June 1941 was not ready to conduct an effective defense. And that the greatest fault for this (if not the main one) lies with Comrade Stalin, without whose sanction they could not in any way carry out the preparation of the country for defense. On the one hand, it is commendable to observe such a statement from the lips of a top military specialist. But on the other hand, Comrade Stalin was not the only one who (didn't) touch upon questions on a military theme. Marshal Zhukov himself, being chief of the General Staff at that time, bore a considerable share of responsibility for the same matter. But in 1956 he did not admit his guilt. He put everything on the shoulders of the already deceased Stalin. So much so that the chiefs of the Red Star had to make excuses:

***"To the Head of the Main Political Directorate
Ministry of Defense of the USSR
Colonel-General comrade Zheltov A.S.***

With regard to the critical remarks addressed to the "Military Bulletin" contained in an article published by our newspaper on May 9, I report the following:

On April 29, I was summoned to the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU and acquainted with the erroneous statements contained in the leading article of the Military Gazette, No. 4, 1956.

Here, at the direction of the Secretary of the Central Committee Comrade. Shepilova, I was asked to point out to the "Military Bulletin" in the article that is being prepared for publication on Victory Day his incorrect statements, and point to those places of his advanced, which speak of the initial period of the war and which can be said in the open press.

This is what we have done.

Editor-in-Chief Colonel N. MAKEEV

***Head of the Main Political Department
Ministry of Defense of the USSR
Colonel-General comrade Zheltov A.S.***

I am reporting to you about the circumstances that forced the editors in the p. G. article "The Great Feat of the Soviet People" to criticize the leading article of the journal "Military Bulletin" No. 4, 1956.

***First, in its article, the magazine states, that the Soviet Army during the summer and autumn of 1941 had to retreat, to conduct heavy defensive battles "primarily because of the failure to take the necessary measures to bring the troops to combat readiness."
Moreover, the article categorically refers to his readiness to repulse the aggression of all the Armed Forces***

THE USSR. The journal writes bluntly: "It was precisely this unpreparedness of the Armed Forces that was the main reason for the disparate, uncombined actions of individual units of our military formations at the very beginning of the war.

Thus, the magazine takes one, and moreover, the shadow side of the difficult situation in the initial period of the war. He explains this situation mainly by the unpreparedness of the Armed Forces of the USSR and, consequently, all the blame for the failures of the initial period. dumps on the Armed Forces.

This is not true. This is a slander against our army. Many examples could be given to show that already in the first days of the war, for our troops as a whole, not scattered and uncombined actions were typical and inherent, but purposeful, organized actions, distinguished by unprecedented stamina and courage of the personnel of the army, many and many commanders, military leaders. After all, this is the fact that the German fascists paid for their advance into the depths of our country with the loss of hundreds of thousands of their troops, for they met on the Soviet front with such resistance,

Europe. Representatives of the fascist German command themselves have repeatedly stated this.

Consequently, in general, our Armed Forces were ready to resist the enemy. Despite the exceptionally difficult situation, our army and its generals did not lose their heads, but boldly entered the battle, smashing the enemy's manpower and equipment. Approve, that the main reason for our failures in the initial period of the war was the unpreparedness of the Armed Forces, means nullifying the tremendous organizational work that the party, the Central Committee, the government carried out on the eve of the war in educating and strengthening the army and navy, which means voluntarily or unwittingly, arouse in our people a feeling of distrust in their Armed Forces.

The authors of the article and the editors of the journal, when preparing the material for the editorial, obviously used the report of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. But this report does not allegations about the unpreparedness of the Armed Forces in general, just as there are no allegations about the scattered, ununited actions of our troops. On the contrary, the report says: "The merits of Soviet soldiers, our military commanders and political workers are immortal. of all degrees, which in the very first months of the war, having lost a significant part of the army, they were not at a loss, but managed to reorganize on the move, create and temper in the course of the war a powerful and heroic not only repel the onslaught of the strong and insidious the enemy, but also to defeat him. Obviously, "Military Vestnik, as an open press organ, should be based on that part of the article where speech is about the initial period of the war, this is precisely the position of the report.

Secondly. The magazine claims that "one of the most important reasons for our military failures in the first period of the Great Patriotic War is also the fact that Soviet industry did not was timely and truly mobilized for the production of the necessary weapons and equipment.

Indeed, such a situation took place. But speaking of this in the open press, one cannot confine oneself to this kind of assertion, one must to give a correct, sensible explanation of the root causes that have led to the unpreparedness of our industry for the mass production of armaments. The journal did not take this into account and therefore nullified the the struggle of the people and the party for the industrialization of the country, for the creation of a powerful heavy industry, for strengthening the technical equipment of the troops. After all, Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, speaking in his report about the insufficient reading

war, at the same time said that when during the war almost half of our entire industry was lost, the Soviet people managed to organize the production of military materials in the eastern regions country and provide our Armed Forces with all necessary to defeat the enemy. It is undeniable that the magazine should have taken this side first question.

Third. The editorial of the Military Gazette also contains other erroneous formulations, which could not be said in the newspaper as an open press organ. For example, the magazine writes that the German attack "could not be considered sudden for the top leadership of the country. But after all, everyone knows that the top leadership of our country belongs to the party as a whole, to its Central Committee. Journal statement that this upper management was concentrated in the hands Stalin, does not save the situation. Magazine hits on cult of personality, and at the same time immediately hits party, its Central Committee, according to the government, personifying top leadership of the country. And what does it mean in practice? This means sowing in the eyes of the people distrust in the leadership of the party and government, undermining their authority, belittling the role of the party, preparing the country to repulse the fascist aggressors.

Further. The article (7 pages) says that during the fighting "Often not taken into account is such an important pros, as losses and logistical costs. Readers of an open press organ may get the impression that no one, neither the Party nor the government, nor the command of the troops - was not interested in the lives of millions of people who fought on front, that many sacrifices were in vain, unjustified. It can hardly be recognized as correct to make such judgments in the open press.

All this taken together formed the basis for "Red Star" to make a critical remark to the "Military Bulletin". And to do

this remark was proposed by the Central Committee of the Party, in particular by the Secretary of the Central Committee Comrade Shepilov. The Krasnaya Zvezda article, after its final editing, was sent to the Central Committee. There Another wording was added, namely:

"Whether or not the authors of the above articles in the Military Bulletin, but they belittled the significance of our victory in the last war, belittled the decisive role of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces. Forces in the conquest of this victory.

From what has been said, the following conclusions can be made:

1) The editors of Krasnaya Zvezda did the right thing by criticizing the leading article of the magazine "War Bulletin".

2) Invite the editors of the "Military Bulletin" to come up with an article in which to correct their erroneous judgments about the initial period war.

Editor-in-Chief Colonel N. MAKEEV"

RGANI. F. 5. Op. 30. D. 184. L. 22-29

So, in 1956, the former first military chief of the General Staff, as if with complete knowledge of the matter, quite specifically agrees that the Red Army was not properly prepared for conducting active defense against a German attack. But "someone" in the Central Committee the confessions were not liked, and a proposal arose to urgently publish a refutation with a statement that everything was done as it should. They say they were preparing for defense. Of course, one can agree with such "afterknowledge". And you can also get acquainted with t

years. For example, take a closer look at the Field Charter of the Red Army (draft 1939), the text of which is posted on the Internet¹. Here are some quotes from his 1st chapter "GENERAL BASICS":

1. ... The Red Army is the bulwark of the world. She brought up in the spirit of love and devotion to his Motherland, the party of Lenin - Stalin and the Soviet government, in the spirit of international solidarity with the working people of the whole world. By virtue of historical conditions, the Red Army exists as an invincible, all-destroying force. That's how she is is, and always will be.

2. The defense of our Motherland is an active defense. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will respond to any enemy attack with crushing with the full force of their armed forces.

Our war against the attacking enemy will be the most fairest of all wars known to the history of man eternity.

If the enemy imposes war on us, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army will be the most attacking of all the armies that have ever attacked.

We will wage the war offensively, from the very the decisive goal of completely defeating the enemy on his territory...

4. Tasks of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army international; they have an international, all peaceful and historical significance.

The Red Army will enter the territory of the attacking enemy as the liberator of the oppressed and the temporally enslaved ...

9. The Red Army is armed with numerous and perfect technique. Her weapons are constantly multiplying and develop...

¹ <http://rkka.ru/docs/real/pu39/main.htm> (provided by Alexei Isaev).

**10. Constant readiness to engage in battle with the enemy
gom should form the basis of the preparation of the Red Army ...**

Offensive combat is the main type of action

Red Army...

**14. Defense will be needed whenever defeating the
enemy by offensive in a given
situation is impossible or impractical.**

**The defense must be invincible and irresistible for the
enemy, no matter how strong he may be in a given
direction. It must consist in stubborn resistance, exhausting
the physical and moral
enemy forces, and in a decisive counterattack, on which he
is completely defeated. Thus the defense
must achieve victory with small forces over a numerically
superior enemy ...**

**16. All actions of the troops must be carried out with
extreme stealth and speed.**

The surprise is amazing...

**Surprise will also be used by the enemy. Part of the Red
Army must never be caught
unawares and must respond with a decisive blow
to any surprise from the enemy.**

**Therefore, high vigilance and constant combat
readiness is a must...**

**18. Successful combat management requires constant
combat support of the troops. Vigilant guarding and
continuous reconnaissance protect troops from surprise
attacks by the enemy on the ground and air and ensure
their constant awareness of the location, grouping and
intentions of the enemy ...**

**20. The saturation of troops with artillery and automatic
weapons causes a large consumption of ammunition ...**

**21. Every battle must be provided with food,
necessary material resources ... Rear and
the supply must fully provide the combat nutrition of the
troops in any conditions of the situation.**

22. *The variety of combat conditions has no limit.*

... The Red Army must be equally prepared to swift actions in maneuvering clashes and to breaking through a fortified front when the enemy goes over to a positional struggle.

23. *... In any conditions and in all cases, powerful the strikes of the Red Army must lead to a complete destruction of the enemy and the rapid achievement of a decisive victory with little bloodshed.*

All these words are correct. The army should ALWAYS be ready, at least for defense. To organize an offensive is the second question. And the army is obliged to create strong obstacles for the enemy that has arisen. But the result of the summer of 1941 shows that for some reason this task turned out to be impossible for the Red Army. Moreover, the Supreme Commander himself announced (including in the TASS Report of June 13, 1941) that there is no need to be vigilant regarding the situation on the western borders! Incredible and very strange! But then what surprises can there be at the fact of the retreat of the Soviet troops in the summer of 1941? What was the Red Army preparing for before June 1941?

If you read different books and magazines before the war long period, one can see the picture that at that time the topic of a possible German attack on the USSR was not considered. At all! On the contrary, the main attention was paid to questions of all-round preparation for offensive actions. Moreover, on various theaters of operations (and not only on the western border). Marshal Timoshenko, in his concluding remarks at the December 1940 meeting, said just that: *"we have several theaters of a possible war, besides the Western one, such as: the Middle East, the Middle East, the Far East, the Baltic-Scandinavian, and on each of them the actions of the troops in the tactical and operational context will have their own special differences body features."*

Accordingly, our theory on operational-tactical questions, in addition to general provisions, should cover the specifics in the actions troops in various theaters, in various geographic conditions. (Document "Robins" - No. 222. From the closing speech of the People's Commissar of Defense USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko at a military conference on December 31, 1940)

Increased attention to the organization of defense in the open press arose only after the German attack. That is why the problem of explaining the causes of the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 has been relevant for a long time and still does not find a uniform agreed version.

The need to discuss the periodization of the past war did not end with Marshal Zhukov's appeals to the Central Committee of the CPSU. A few years later, it reappeared. Articles in the first two issues of the Military Historical Journal for 1959 were devoted to this topic. In particular, Major General E. Boltin's article "On the periodization of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union" was published in the second issue.

At the very beginning it is said so directly that among problems of studying the history of 1941-1945, which require a scientifically based solution, is the creation of a correct periodization of that period. This formulation of the question immediately hints at the fact that for almost 15 years after the end of the war, historians have not agreed on an unambiguous understanding of its stages. And different researchers have to raise this topic once again.

But instead of jumping right into the topic, General Boltin decided to devote a lot of attention to the (so to speak) "general" ("scientific") theory of the periodization of any war. And not like Marshal Zhukov - *"this is not*

suitable, we offer ... ". It turns out that not everything is so simple. We must start from afar.

"... When periodizing a war, it is necessary to take into account various elements, most notably the following:

— political conditions for conducting armed struggle (the political nature of the war, the attitude towards her popular masses, the formation or collapse of coalitions, changes in the international and domestic situation of the belligerent states, etc.);

- economic prerequisites for conducting armed struggle, especially the war economy of the belligerents parties and changes taking place in this area;

- the state of the armed forces of the parties (weapons, organization, combat experience, etc.) and the possibilities of their actions at various stages of the war.

On the whole, all these elements eventually find their common expression in the course of armed struggle, i.e. in the conduct of hostilities on land, in the air and on the sea. The development of armed struggle is influenced by economic, political, moral and other factors. factors; the influence of these factors either directly or indirectly affects military operations and determines their content, forms and scale.

A very important sign of the division of a war into periods can be a change in its political character (of course, if such a change had place during this war) ...

However, the political nature of the war is not the only sign of the periodization of any war, because its character is not always subject to change. In particular, this feature cannot serve as a criterion for the periodization of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, the political nature of which remained unchanged: for the Soviet people, from the first to the last day, it was a just, liberation, Patriotic war.

What should be taken as the main criteria for periodization of war, political the character of which throughout its length remains unchanged? We believe that this criterion is the development of armed struggle and, in particular, a change in the methods of military operations. Thus, at the beginning of the war, our Armed Forces conducted a strategic defense and retreated into the depths of the country; Later they switched from defense and retreat to an offensive in the most important directions and completed war with a common victorious offensive. The scale and scope of hostilities, which developed in accordance with changes in the situation and conditions for conducting armed struggle, were also not the same.

And in the course of the war, the significance of the actions of various branches of the armed forces also changed. If the decisive war as a whole belonged to ground operations troops, then fighting in the air, at sea, partisan fighting behind enemy lines at different stages of the war had different meaning.

Major changes in the course of the armed struggle serve as an important sign of the dismemberment of any war for periods; for the periodization of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945, this feature should be the main one. This means that, in establishing the scientific periodization of war, it is necessary first of all to find the main turning points.

moments during the war. Such moments are determined achievement of intermediate goals of the war and is connected major changes in the military-political situation with them ... "

Before turning to his proposals, General Boltin briefly explained why the periodization problem had not been solved by 1959.

It turns out that in the early 1950s one version of it was already in use (adopted in 1950-1951). But he didn't quite get it right. Since it is based

there were "only" *"statements by I. V. Stalin, which did not have the direct goal of establishing a periodization of the war, but were timed to coincide with significant calendar dates (for example, the anniversaries of the October Revolution). Giving an assessment of the situation, I. V. Stalin proceeded from the situation that was developing towards these*

Yes, there. His speeches contain a number of thoughts, relating to the periodization of the war, and characteristic names are given to its individual important stages ("the year of a radical change", etc.). According to this periodization, the war was divided into four periods.

The 1st period (06/22/1941-11/18/1942) was first called the period of "active defense". But then (after the death of Comrade Stalin), for some reason, his *"obvious groundlessness"* arose. And in 1954, someone suggested calling it *"the period of failure of the German fascist plan for a blitzkrieg and the creation*

conditions for a radical change in the course of the war.

2nd (11/19/1942-12/31/1943) - "the period of a radical change in the course of the war."

3rd (1944) - "the period of decisive victories, the Soviet Russian Armed Forces".

4th (1945) - "the period of the final victories of the Soviet Armed Forces" (including taking into account the hostilities both in Europe and in the Far East against Japan).

By 1959, this periodization for some reason *"caused legitimate objections of historians*. There were several complaints. But basically they concerned the time after the autumn of 1943. And also *"they are not quite successful and the names of the periods of the war (except for the second)*. In particular, the first period did not receive a final version by 1959. In addition, the ideas of Soviet authors were *"not sufficiently linked to the periodization of the Second World War as a whole."*

And then, on several more pages, various general theoretical considerations are given, especially about

the place and significance of the war with Japan (and in general, how she reached her great-power ambitions).

And only on the 18th page of the magazine (7th page of the article) did the conversation reach the stated topic:

"...Based on the foregoing, it seems appropriate to divide the war of the USSR against Nazi Germany and its satellites in Europe into three major periods.

The first period - from June 22, 1941 to November 1942. In this period, the armed struggle was characterized mainly by the defense of the Soviet Armed Forces and their forced retreat inland. Germany in this period twice launched a general offensive against the Soviet Union, but both times it was stopped without reaching the end goals. Soviet Armed Forces in the first period of the war pursued the main goal is to stop the fascist invasion in order to complete the mobilization of human and material resources, achieve a change in the balance of power on front and the subsequent turning point in the course of the war. At the same time, they tried to master the strategic initiative and go on the offensive. This is evidenced by the counteroffensive of the Soviet Army. near Moscow in December 1941, which led to the first major defeat of the German fascist troops and which was of great importance for the subsequent fate of the war. However, the objective prerequisites for a radical there was no change in the course of the armed struggle in the winter of 1941/42, and the Soviet Armed Forces did not were then able to achieve a decisive turning point in military operations. Therefore, in general, the first period The war is taking place under the sign of the defense and withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces.

And then General Boltin comes to the most interesting thing - to the reasons why everything happened in 1941? Which, in his opinion, is still "wrong

eloquently stated." "In essence, the difficulties were blurred, the whole complexity of the situation was not shown, hushed up mistakes and shortcomings in the preparation countries to the defense and leadership of military operations. The retreat of the Soviet troops inland in the first period of the war was not deliberate, stemming from an "active defense plan". Soviet The army was forced to retreat in very difficult conditions, under continuous blows from huge enemy forces. At the same time, they took over the first strike, the vast majority of regular Soviet troops fought heroically, putting emphasis on the enemy no resistance."

In other words, there was no pre-prepared defense plan in the country. And the troops were forced to retreat, depending on the prevailing situation. Strange statement! It has already been said above that by the summer of 1941 Comrade Stalin did not consider it necessary to maintain heightened vigilance at the western borders. It turns out that there was no "defense plan" either! What was the army doing then? What were you preparing for? Or is everyone on vacation? Is there a list of reasons? General Boltin suggests the following:

"Severe failures of the Soviet troops at the beginning of the war were the result of an extremely unfavorable us the situation. At that time the Soviet Army was not still mobilized, did not have experience in conducting a large war, while the fascist German army had experience, was fully mobilized and prepared for a surprise attack on the USSR. It should also be borne in mind that the Soviet Army only at the end of 1940 did it enter a period of rearmament, which was not completed by the start of hostilities. In addition, in the first months of the war we had large losses in weapons, to make up for which our industry, which has suffered serious damage from Nazi occupation, could not immediately.

One of the reasons for the failures of the Soviet troops in the summer and in the fall of 1941, I. V. Stalin had an incorrect assessment of the military-political situation on the eve of Great Patriotic War. Stalin believed that fascist Germany will not dare to attack the USSR in the near future, and therefore was against urgent defensive measures, to prevent the Nazis from starting a war against the Soviet Union. One week before the war, June 14 1941, a TASS report was published in the Soviet press, which refuted, as groundless, the statement of the Western press about the imminence of war between the USSR and Germany. The message said: "According to Soviet circles, rumors about the intention Germany to break the pact and launch an attack on The USSR are deprived of any soil ... "This wrong assessment of the current situation disoriented our people and its Armed Forces, weakened the vigilance of the Soviet people, engendered in them a feeling complacency."

That is, the leader of the party and the country, Comrade Stalin, made grave mistakes. But the same party, under his own leadership, "in the difficult conditions of the first months of the war, did not succumb to difficulties, did not lose heart under the onslaught of a cruel and but managed to raise the whole people to the defense of the socialist Fatherland. As a result, already in the first period, the necessary conditions and prerequisites were created to achieve a radical change in the course of war."

And then General Boltin explains why it took such a long period of time to correct the resulting nightmare situation: "It is known that loss of territory and a number of important economic districts in 1941 caused a sharp decline in economic resources and a fall in industrial and agricultural production. Thanks to the organization

Shor activities of the Communist Party, mobilized all the resources of the country for the needs of the war, and to the heroic labor of the Soviet people the military the economy of the USSR, starting from February-March 1942, embarked on the path of steady strengthening and development. At the end of the first period of the war, our military economy already provided the necessary conditions for transfer of the initiative into the hands of the Soviet Army, which predetermined the subsequent turning point in the course of military actions in favor of the Soviet Union ...

Based on the foregoing, it seems to us appropriate to give the first period of the Great Patriotic War the following name: "Reflection treacherous attack by fascist Germany and the struggle for a turning point in the course of the war.

And again, without specifying the reason for such actions ("in connection with the fact that ...").

And 6 years later (in 1965) the Military Publishing House published a thick volume of "A Brief History" of "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union". He had the following sections:

- On the eve of the war.**
- In a difficult time (1941 - November 1942).**
- A radical change (November 1942 - the end of 1943).**
- The crushing of Nazi Germany (January 1944 -**

May 1945).

- Defeat of militaristic Japan.**
- Results of the war.**

"IN HARD TIME"!!!!

And that's it!

And no "active" (or any other) defense and no "preconditioning" was mentioned. But after all, they couldn't help touching on the causes of what had happened? Touched. However, reading them "just like that" is not entirely interesting. The fact is that this book is two more

reprinted times. The third time was in 1984. And although the title of the section about the first period remained the same - "In a difficult time", various changes were made to the text. Personally, I have the first edition of 1965 in paper form. An electronic version of 1984 was found on the Internet. Therefore, it is possible to read a fragment about the reasons for the retreat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 in the "dynamics" of the changes made (pp. 67-68 of the 1965 edition and pp. 63-64 of the 1984 edition [Bold text in square brackets] - new text 1984, underlined - text 1965, deleted in 1984).

"... The Red Army, fighting in exceptionally unfavorable conditions, suffered much greater damage [both in people and in military equipment and weapons. Of the 170 divisions, 28 were out of action, and more than 70 divisions lost half of their strength in men and military equipment. Almost 200 warehouses with fuel, ammunition and weapons ended up in the occupied territory]. The bitterness of the loss of wonderful people devoted to the Motherland was aggravated by the huge losses of military equipment and weapons. Suffice it to say that the Western Front [besides other losses] lost almost all the artillery depots, in which more than 2,000 wagons of ammunition were stored. The correlation of forces changed sharply in favor of the enemy. [To everyone this largely explains the fact that] quantitative superiority in the means of armed struggle for a long time passed to the fascist German troops [remained with the fascist German troops].

Causes of the failures of the Soviet Armed Forces in beginning of the Great Patriotic War are complex and diverse. They lie in a number of political, economic and military factors, both international and domestic. As a result of the defeat that the Western European states suffered in the first period of the Second World War, in the hands of the

Schist Germany, as already noted, turned out to have the economic and military resources of almost all of Western Europe. [The struggle of the Soviet government, aimed at creating a system of collective security and providing a collective rebuff to the fascist aggressor, did not meet with the support of the ruling circles of the Western states. Their short-sighted policy allowed the fascists, who had been preparing for a war of conquest for a long time, to defeat a number of European states in turn, significantly

to strengthen its strategic and economic position, to create a temporary economic and military superiority over the Soviet Union.] By June 1941, the Nazi army had advanced military equipment for that time and had rich experience in armed struggle. [Germany already had the economic and military resources of almost all of Western Europe. Taking advantage of the absence of active hostilities in the West, it was able to concentrate for the attack on the USSR the overwhelming majority of its armed forces, equipped with advanced military equipment for that time and with extensive experience in conducting offensive operations on a huge scale.] The Red Army did not have such experience. Its commanding staff, which had been significantly renewed on the eve of the war, had not yet mastered the practical skills of managing large formations and operational formations. The new, most advanced military equipment that came into service with the Soviet troops had not yet been truly mastered by the personnel. The cessation of hostilities in Western and Southeastern Europe allowed Germany to concentrate the largest part of its military forces to attack the USSR.

feminine forces.

All these circumstances, favorable for Germany and unfavorable for the Soviet Union, were aggravated by the suddenness of the blow inflicted by the fascist

army. [The attack and force of the first massed blow of the German fascist troops.] The attack was sudden for the Soviet people, for their Armed Forces. It was also sudden for Stalin and his inner circle, because until the eve of the fateful day - June 22 - they, without any reason, ruled out the possibility of a German attack on the USSR in the summer of 1941. This gross political miscalculation had very serious consequences. In particular, it entailed wrong decisions on the part of those directly in charge of defense issues. People's Commissar of Defense Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko (who became People's Commissar of Defense in May 1940) and Chief of the General Staff (until February 1941 K. A. Meretskov, after him - G. K. Zhukov) developed a plan for covering the borders too late, and most importantly, belatedly put it into effect. In addition, the plan was permeated with outdated ideas that required a lot of time to mobilize and deploy the Armed Forces. But there was no time. Our reserve formations were late to the places of concentration and entered into combat operations on the move and in parts.

Attempts by some border commanders districts to strengthen the foreground of our defense along the state border on the eve of the war were categorically suppressed by the Chief of the General Staff. So, for example, on June 10, 1941, he telegraphed to the commander of the Kiev Special Military District: *[Zakoretsky: document of the 2nd volume of Malinovka - No. 537]* "The chief of the border troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR reported that the chiefs of the fortified regions were instructed to occupy the field ... Such actions can immediately provoke the Germans into an armed clash and are fraught with all sorts of consequences ... C cancel and report who exactly gave such a self-imposed order. *[Zakoretsky: text in the document: "Report to the people's commissar of defense for a report ,*

on which basis, parts of the fortified areas of the KOVO received an order to occupy the foreground. Such an action can provoke the Germans into an armed clash and is fraught with all sorts of consequences. Cancel this order immediately and report who specifically gave such an unauthorized order.]

Unfortunately, there are many such examples. All this led to the fact that the grouping of Soviet troops at the time of the attack by the fascist German army did not meet the requirements of the situation, and the border districts were deprived of the opportunity to take effective measures to repel the first blows of the enemy.

[The miscalculations made in assessment of the possible time of an attack on our country by Hitlerite Germany and the related omissions in preparation for repelling the first blows of the aggressor. I. V. Stalin was afraid to give the German fa Shistam a pretext for an attack, hoping to delay clash through diplomatic negotiations. Even in the last days before the invasion of fascist hordes on Soviet soil, The Soviet government tried by diplomatic means to delay the start of the war. miscalculation in assessment of the possible time of the attack by the Nazi Germany was also allowed in by persons from among the top military leadership. From the reports of Soviet intelligence officers, in particular R. Sorge, about the impending Fascist Germany did not always draw correct conclusions. All this led to the fact that the Armed Forces of the USSR as a whole were not promptly brought to full combat readiness.]

The difficult conditions in which the western border military districts found themselves in themselves predetermined the failures of the Red Army at the beginning of the war. The situation worsened even more when the enemy inflicted heavy losses on the Soviet troops. [Tr strategic echelon at the beginning of the war, and suffered

the heavy losses they suffered further worsened the position of the Red Army.] The disruption of permanent communications with the troops and subordinate headquarters deprived the commanders and staffs of all levels, up to the Headquarters of the High Command and the General Staff, [the Soviet command] the opportunity to receive regular [and reliable] information about events on the fronts.

Mistakes in the leadership of troops, which commanders of all levels inevitably made in this difficult situation, served Stalin as a pretext for frequent, in many cases unjustified changes in commanders of formations and commanders of operational formations and bringing them to severe responsibility. Thus, the commander of the Western Front, General D. G. Pavlov, and the chief of staff of the front, General V. E. Klimov, were undeservedly accused and shot.

ski and others.

The combat activity of the Soviet troops in the initial the period of the war unfolded in the absence of a continuous front of defense. The high pace of the enemy offensive [and the weak motorization of the Red Army] more than once deprived our troops of [their] opportunities [in time get out from under the blows of the enemy] in advance to occupy lines favorable for defense and gain a foothold on them [positions for counterattacks. As a result, they often found themselves surrounded.]. The headquarters demanded to hold the occupied lines at all costs, even in conditions when the enemy carried out deep flank bypasses and envelopments. As a result, the enemy, who had compact groupings on the axes of the main attacks, as a rule, achieved superiority over the Soviet troops and often encircled

pity them.

The weak motorization of the Red Army sharply reduced the maneuverability of its units and formations. They were belatedly advancing to the lines of deployment,

temporarily left positions when it was necessary to escape from the blows of the enemy. Meanwhile, the enemy, having many vehicles, had great maneuverability.

Due to the lack of a sufficient number of radio technical means, the notification of the appearance of enemy aircraft was poorly organized. Therefore, fighters usually took to the air to cover their troops and military installations with a delay. Bombers (most of them were aircraft of obsolete models - SB, TB-3 and others) flew out on combat missions in small groups and without the necessary fighter cover, which naturally led to heavy losses.

[Soviet aviation did not yet have sufficient forces to change the air situation in your favor. There were shortcomings in organization of military operations of aviation units and connections.

There was also the fact that in the pre-war period, the combat training of the Soviet troops was mainly was subordinated to mastering the techniques and methods of attack. At the beginning of the war, they had to do everything on the Soviet-German front to conduct a strategic defense.

The retreat of the Red Army disrupted the planned mobilization of material resources for the needs of the war. funds and human contingents in the border areas. The question of evacuation arose with all its urgency. from here in the shortest possible time a huge mass of people and material values in the eastern regions. Only under the Soviet system, the socialist system of the economy, an economic operation of such magnitude was possible.]

These are the basic facts, these are the conditions that negatively influenced the course of the armed struggle of the Red Army and the Navy in the initial period of the war.

The Soviet Armed Forces and the border military districts turned out to be unprepared to repulse sudden and strong enemy attacks. But the great party of the Bolsheviks, created and fostered by V. I. Lenin, found in itself enough strength and skill to overcome the consequences of the mistakes made and mobilize the Soviet people for an organized rebuff to the enemy.

[The Great Party of the Bolsheviks, created and nurtured by V. I. Lenin, found in itself enough strength and wisdom in order to overcome the unfavorable consequences of the first weeks of the war and mobilize the Soviet people for an organized rebuff to the fascist invaders.]..."

So, in 1965, to the reasons for the failures in the conduct of defense we attributed:

- Huge losses of military equipment and weapons (due to which the Germans for a long time passed the quantitative superiority).**

- The Germans somehow, imperceptibly for the USSR, were able to deploy the most most of their armed forces and carry out a surprise strike.**

- The powerful blow of the German army turned out to be sudden for Stalin, who "without any reason" ruled out the possibility of a German attack on the USSR in the summer of 1941. It was a "gross political miscalculation" that led to very serious consequences for the country.**

- In addition, the wrong decisions were made by the top military leaders - People's Commissar Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, who practically did not work out defensive measures. Including there was no defense plan. In this connection, the western military districts turned out to be unprepared for an enemy attack and were unable to organize effective response measures.**

- All this led to an increase in losses, which further aggravated the situation and did not allow for a long time to create an insurmountable defense. German troops continued to advance deep into the USSR to the east.

Ultimately, a general conclusion emerges that the Soviet troops of the border military districts turned out to be unprepared to repel a surprise attack. However, the great Bolshevik Party found the strength and skill to overcome the "consequences of the mistakes made."

But in 1984 this list was shortened, and the sharpness of the wording was "smoothed out." The specific responsibility of Comrades Stalin, Timoshenko and Zhukov was no longer mentioned. Facts have also been removed.

initiative attempts by some commanders to prepare for a possible attack. Stalin's responsibility was changed to his attempt to "put off" the war for some future. And in general, the wise party of the Bolsheviks was able to "overcome the unfavorable consequences" of the outbreak of the war. But the question remains "behind the scenes": where was her wisdom before 06/22/1941? This

The question is not raised and the answer is not given.

Moreover, 4 years after the first edition "Brief History" published the famous memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (which withstood additional circulations and 12 reprints), in which he not only did not insist on the conclusions of his own letters to the Central Committee of the CPSU in the mid-50s, but, on the contrary, "overflowed like a nightingale" about the greatest role of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - this real "brain of the army". One may wonder why Marshal Zhukov, in his letters to the Central Committee, was not afraid to admit that the Red Army in the summer of 1941 was not ready for defense? True, in his letters he first of all hints at the fact that Comrade Stalin was the main culprit of such a disgrace. But you can go to the archive of the Ministry of De

of that time and see whose signatures appear there in these same orders not to prepare defense. And it turns out that the second one there is the signature of General of the Army Zhukov. Perhaps, in such a case, he was preparing to answer that he personally carried out the order? And if he hadn't done it, could he have gone "to Beria's basement"? Maybe.

But in his memoirs, he did not once again draw attention to "gross mistakes" and blacken the wise image of the real "brain of the army" (the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks), who allegedly did everything possible for defense. And as you know, only those who do nothing do not make "some" mistakes. The German attack on 06/22/1941 only showed them. From that moment on, they began to correct them, finding b

So, over the past decades, among historians, unequivocal agreement was found only in the terms of the first period of the war - from 06/22/41 to 11/19/1942. As for the causes, there is a desire for their poppy Simally shorten and do not focus on them. Especially "in the fog" the question remains, how did this manage to spit on Comrade Stalin's own demand for the country to be in constant vigilance? And how did he "fail to notice" the preparation of a multi-million army of a possible enemy near his borders? Official historians were in no hurry to discuss this issue. But unofficial ones from time to time try to find an adequate solution. Versions are offered different.

For example, the writer Vladimir Dmitrievich Uspensky, who spent 30 years working on his confessional novel The Leader's Privy Counselor, hypothesizes that Stalin suffered from a mental illness, which he called "incomplete schizophrenia."

"... For many years I have both practically and theoretically studied his illness, its symptoms and course. Different It manifests itself differently in people. The doctors know at least three options. One of them, after all

it is more severe when the disease is continuous and hopeless. This is stable schizophrenia. Second: the attacks are more or less periodic, in any case they can be foreseen, sometimes even stopped. And finally the most common option: the disease proceeds weakly, secretly, a person is no different from healthy people, forgets, or even does not know about the cross that bears. Seizures or "splash"

skis, as experts call them, happen

very rarely, under the influence of extraordinary mental shocks. Iosif Vissarionovich just had something similar..." ("Book 3, parts 5 and 6", published in "Roman-gazeta" No. 8-9, 1992).

But this version was not widely used. Otherwise, one would have to remember the slogan that powerful fascist Germany was defeated by the USSR under the leadership of the wise Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, headed by an unfinished schizophrenic! (??)... And at the same time, "wisdom" also arose "sometimes"? And by chance, there were more "wisdom" than "flights"? Is that why you won in the end?

But there are other versions. For example, the well-known author of "200 Myths..." Arsen Benikovich Martirosyan insists that Stalin saw and acted correctly. In particular, on June 18, 1941, he allegedly issued an order to put the troops on alert. But he was "lowered on the brakes" by the "traitors" -generals.

Strange hypothesis. In the first place, Comrade Stalin, over the head of the People's Commissar for Defense, could not order anything to the commanders at the western borders. In the sense - why did he keep the people's commissar? To call yourself "on a turntable-HF"? Was there nothing more for him to do? Secondly, frankly speaking, on June 18 for a number of defensive measures the remaining few days of "something" is simply not in time to sing purely technically. For example, urgently unload

warehouses in the border area. If for months echelons of various good rolled in them, then in five days you can't carry it back in any way. Before I had to think!

And no orders of June 18 will radically save the situation. It is still possible to raise soldiers and issue ammunition (which are in neighboring warehouses). And it's urgent to dig some trenches, it's not entirely clear where. But it will not be possible to urgently flood pillboxes in strong points in the depths of the defense. Concrete, unfortunately, gains full strength in 28 days. Therefore, at construction sites, they "pour" no more than two floors a matter of days.

Besides, why did Comrade Stalin suddenly "awake" on June 18? Did the Germans behave "quietly and calmly" until that day? And Stalin did not have any conversations with the top military for hours, day after day, long before June 18, 1941?

By the way, everything is known in comparison. It turns out that there is a specific example of the real preparation of defense in advance. You can read about this in the little-known book of Colonel Starinov "White Finnish mines and traps and the fight against them" (which was urgently published in January 1940. On January 4, it was "put into production", and on January 8 it was already "signed for printing"). The urgency was due to the very high relevance - at that time there was a war with Finland and the Red Army needed instructions for demining. Here Colonel Starinov urgently wrote them.

In his book, in addition to a lot of drawings and diagrams of installations of Finnish mines and traps and methods for their removal, there are translations of three Finnish documents. It is interesting that they were written in October 1939. The real war on the USSR began on November 30, but a month and a half before that, the Finns began to actively set mines and traps in threatened areas. At the s

or tragedy, which necessitated additional instructions. They were signed by the commander of the 4th Jaeger Battalion, Colonel-Lieutenant M. Nurmi, and the senior officer, Captain Karhonen. The first document is dated October 17, 1939, a few days after mobilization was announced in Finland on October 13-14. And although the war did not last long - about three and a half months, until March 13, 1940, the Soviet troops suffered serious losses in it, and some of them fell precisely on the operation of mines and traps. The soldier opens the door to the village house, and her pen is tied to a grenade pin. A soldier passes along a snowy path, and on it a tension cable to a box of mines is sprinkled with snow. And many Soviet tanks were blown up by mines. Moreover, one of the Finnish instructions says:

"4. For each real mine, always 6-10 false mines should be planted. For this you can use piles of pine branches, straw, hay, cart heaps, earth, etc. The first duty, therefore, is to mine the roads along their entire length. In some places you can install traps that will have to explode when setting false mines" (p. 26).

What might such a tactic lead to? Back to main in defense in motorized warfare: to the loss of pace of the attacker. So that he does not drive columns along the road at maximum speed, but drags himself like a turtle after sappers-deminers. It's one thing to go straight road, and the other is to see here and there dung chi, from which some wires stick out, and there is a sign by the road with the inscription "Mines!". And you can also use Latin letters to make it more intelligible - "Minen!" And then the question is, on which day the Germans would have reached Borisov in June 1941 or in July t

Moreover, for the defender, the installation of such an or

living does not require large expenditures. It is enough to build soldiers and give each a package of chalk, a set of "empty" wires, coils of twine, a sapper's shovel and instructions on how to imitate solid minefields. And then there are real sappers who add real mines / traps. And let the attacker decide for himself whether to drive him with Formula 1 or constantly

"stumble" and call your sapper teams.

This is what is called - "preparation of defense." And brigade commander Lyubarsky wrote about this back in 1939 in the book "Some operational-tactical conclusions from the experience of the war in Spain". And suddenly in the USSR by June 1941 they completely forgot about all this!

"Wrong"? "It happens to everyone"? By the way, because of this "mistake" they still cannot even calculate how many Soviet citizens died in that war (plus or minus millions). And it is not really known who is to blame the most.

Judging by the hints - Comrade Stalin. That is, the name of the first period could be written as follows: *"The period of retreat, the disruption of the plans for a "blitzkrieg" war of fascist Germany against the Soviet Union, the accumulation of forces and the creation of conditions for a radical change in connection with the fact that Comrade Stalin ... "*

Well...?

So what did Comrade Stalin do?
what?

Can't you even say it out loud?

Viktor Suvorov, in a number of his books, hypothesized that Comrade Stalin was in fact carefully preparing an offensive against Germany. Immediately there was a roar of many voices:

- No-o-o!!!!

— It wasn't! Did not have! Did not have!

Okay, let's say. The offensive was not prepared. Obo rona was not prepared either (fact). What was being prepared?

Nothing? Did the army do anything? Into a throwaway fool how did the general-marshals play for hours at receptions with comrade Stalin? And almost 200 fuel depots, combat supplies and weapons were in the way of the enemy purely by chance? On your own? "Traitors"-generals packed them in echelons by criminal conspiracy? And Comrade Kaganovich, in the position of People's Commissar of Railways, was at the same time with them? And where did the NKV

These are the themes that can be explored by touching upon the seemingly simple question of the periodization of war. But within the framework of one article, it will not be possible to disassemble it completely. Until you have to stop.

Rudolf Voltere

9 DIARY 1 49 12.1

Among the Germans who visited Russia in the 1930s and 1940s and left memoirs about it, one of the most interesting figures is the architect Rudolf Voltere (1903-1983). In 1932-33, he worked as a foreign specialist for a year in Novosibirsk, and upon completion of the contract he traveled around the Soviet Union. Returning to Germany in the spring of 1933, Voltaire wrote an extraordinarily interesting book, *A Specialist in Siberia*. It came out in two editions in Berlin in 1933 and 1936.¹ In the book Voltaire describes all the aspects of Soviet life that he had to face. In the USSR, Voltaire tried to quickly learn, as far as possible, the Russian language and delve as deeply as possible into a life that was absolutely unknown to him. Intellectual

insight, insight, propensity to analyze and from the absence of prejudice allowed him to do it brilliantly. Wolters's book is one of the most important, though still little known, sources of information about the Soviet Union in the early thirties.

Shortly after returning to Germany, Wolteres became the closest collaborator of his close friend and classmate at the Technical University of Berlin, Albert Speer. Until 1942, Speer held

¹ The Russian edition of the book by Rudolf Wolters "Specialist in Siberia", translated by the author of this text, was published in Novosibirsk in 2007 by the Svinin and Sons publishing house.

the post of head of the "General Building Inspectorate of the Capital of the Reich" (Generalbauinspektor), and then the post of Minister of Armaments of the Reich. Among other things, Speer headed the Organization Todt during the war, which was engaged in construction in the territories occupied by Germany. In 1942-43. Voltaire, as a high-ranking official of the Todt organization, made several inspection trips to the Soviet territories occupied by the Germans. In 1980, Rudolf Wolter wrote a memoir about his life¹. He illustrated the story of his travels in Russia during the war with diary entries that he kept during his trips. These notes are especially curious because Russia was not an unfamiliar country for Wolters, he knew it well from the inside in the early thirties and now, ten years later, he could compare his new impressions with old experience.

For a Russian reader interested in military history, the diary entries of Wolters from 1942-43 published below, made during his travels in the German-occupied Soviet territories, should be of undoubted interest.

The diary of State Security Major I.S., who was killed in October 1941, is of particular documentary value. Shabalin, head of the Special Department of the 50th Army. The German translation of the diary found on the body of the murdered major Voltere received during a trip to Russia in September 1943.²

Dmitry Khmelnitsky

¹ The unpublished memoirs of Rudolf Wolters are stored in the German Federal Archives in Koblenz.

² Shabalin's diary was first published by Pavel Polyakov <http://www.strana-oz.ru/?numid=31&article=1323> in the journal "Domestic Notes" No. 4 (30), 2006. The basis was the waters of the German trophy pen document: GARF, f. 7021, op. 148, d. 419, l. 19-46. The published text coincides with the text from Wolters' notes.

**EXTRACT FROM THE
MEMOIRS OF RUDOLF WOLTERS "SECTIONS OF LIFE1"**

From my diary:

"OT2 division Russia-South.

May/ June 1942

May 28, 1942 - departure from Berlin ...

I am traveling in the same car with Dr. Frank, Deputy Head of the OT Central Bureau. We are going through Breslau, Krakau, through the Beskydy to Krynitsa, further through Yaroslavl and

Przemysl - along the transit road IV (DG IV3), which is in good condition in the first sections. The towns and villages here are full of Jews, who are easily recognizable thanks to the yellow patches sewn on the back and chest. Their figures produce an exceptionally dismal impression.

31 May 1942

At 10 am departure from Lemberg. Through Tarnopol transit road IV past Volochek on the Russian border. The landscape here is strikingly beautiful, slightly hilly, the land is exceptionally fertile. DG IV, which is now going to Dnepropetrovsk, will extended through Stalino to Taganrog. Although on the road a lot of damage due to severe frosts of the past winter, but you can ride on it. The track is old, framed by large trees on both sides: huge elms, sometimes oaks with low, very high and dense crowns. Like all Russian highways,

1 Rudolf Wolters. "Lebensabschnitte", 1981. Nachlass Rudolf Wolters, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.

2 Here and below: OT stands for the Todt organization.

3 Hereinafter: DG (DG - Durchgangsstrasse) - transit road.

it was made 50 meters wide, marked at first by trees, and then only by telegraph poles. Often the entire roadbed reaches 100-150 meters wide, but only the middle is reinforced for the passage of cars. Summer stretches on both sides roads, sometimes in many rows, due to the fact that the old become impassable. Large road width Prevents snow build-up: The snow guard must be well away from the roadway to be effective.

A soil as fertile as the rest Europe has not heard. Chernozem is up to two meters on the loess layer. Loess (glacial deposits) is 20 to 30 meters thick. Under him in Ukraine, reddish granite is everywhere. Here, as we were told, the peasant does not need to fertilize the land for years. Arable lands and fields for the most processed. Bread stands well, in some places the fields are under ferry. There are not enough tractors, silos, outbuildings; here you can only do business with machines.

On our road, DG IV, work is going on with great intensity everywhere. Under the command of the German employees of the Organization Todt are non-German brigades. Ranked first in terms of quality Jewish teams. As we were informed, they work, partly voluntarily, two shifts in a row. They know what they are talking about... Among the Russian prisoners of war you can see the most diverse groups: good-looking men of Ukrainian or Russian origin, but much more (and much) - ne mixed variants of all Asian races, such as as they can be seen in the weekly chronicle. These teams are guarded by the Ukrainian police or Lithuanian and Latvian police. But the main contingent of workers is represented by Ukrainian women and girls. Work managers character

call them as very executive, diligent and accustomed to work. In terms of working qualities, they are worth above men. Even outwardly, the women's teams make a very encouraging impression: pure colored scarves and dresses, often snow-white headscarves! Almost all women are barefoot, and it is surprising with what with their energy they press the shovels with their bare feet into dense earth. Passing German columns everywhere are joyfully welcomed. And the people who offer eggs, flowers and radishes on the sides of the road, seems very friendly.

Trees are only found in villages; the terrain is leaner over even small patches of forest. If on the horizon a ragged silhouette of greenery emerges, which means ahead village or village. Villages and cities are located freely and widely, permeated with greenery and flowers.

Clay houses, very small, with high thatched roofs. They're all freshly painted white lime. These settlements are very different are in character from the German villages, which built much more compactly. And not everywhere there are enough dominants well known to us in the homeland church towers. Small wooden churches with their bulbous domes barely rise above the greenery around them.

At 20.30 in Vinnitsa, at the line manager of DG IV.

In the morning we drive to the nearby construction site "Eichenhain" (intended for the headquarters of the Fuhrer!), which is isolated, in a rectangular area of the forest. Teams of Russian prisoners of war work here. We succeed to see only part of the construction site, since the Vermacht has already occupied it. The landscapes here are even more spacious. Lots of grazing cows. Surprisingly many horses with foals.

From Vinnitsa further through Uman and Novoarkhangelsk to Novoukrainka, where we spend the night. Small place.

In the construction department of the site, we get a primitive room with three beds. The straw bags, however, are fresh and clean, while we, on the contrary, after riding in an open car, are completely dirty, our faces and hair are completely black. Primitive

opportunities for washing allow only very surface cleaning.

June 2, 1942

Departure from Novoukrainka at seven in the morning. We have a long way to Dnepropetrovsk. Through Kirovograd to Krivoy Rog. Again a good summer season. I am traveling with the group leader professor Brugmann, city building councilor from Nuremberg, who explains in detail me about my tasks and my work.

At the end of last year, the Führer entrusted the "construction headquarters" of Speer with the commissioning of roads in the region of Ukraine. Speer appointed Brugmann on-site unit manager, while how Dr. Frank was entrusted with organizing supplies and coordinating work in Berlin.

In January, Brugman arrived in Dnepropetrovsk, where equipped the headquarters in his car. Right after the beginning of work, Mr. Speer personally arrived in Dnepropetrovsk to set everything in motion.

The position on the railroad was then simple catastrophic. On the main sections moved then sometimes only four trains a day, which posed an ever-increasing threat to the army. The tracks at the railway stations were covered with ice from time to time and failed. Water supply for hauls were by no means sufficient for German locomotives. Water intake per locomotive

tiv on the few available points sometimes lasted up to one hour. German locomotives were in

Russian climate is too complex and capricious.

Equipment for loading coal and unloading slag was not enough. Turntables and hangars there were no locomotives, or they were destroyed. Likewise, all service equipment and workshops were destroyed.

Necessary work began immediately collapsible hangars for locomotives, water towers and columns were installed, the designs of which in the main details, Speer designed it himself. Luckily, an underground storehouse of large gasoline containers was discovered that could be used as water towers. There were all the time big and small difficulties. Water softening for locomotives turned out to be a particular problem...

To this we must add the alteration of the paths, which, like all other tasks, could be completed on time, despite all the winter problems. Instead of of the then four trains today forty run daily along the entire transit route through Ukraine.

Railway bridges are among the most important and difficult tasks of the construction staff. Here, too, the Russians have done an exceptionally thorough destructive job. Steel structures of large Dnieper bridges after explosions were in the water and blocked the passage of ships. These barriers could become an even greater threat during the time of the expected spring ice drift. For elimination of twisted metal, divers were sent from the Atlantic coast, who, under the ice, cut structures into pieces with underwater cutting torches, to eliminate underwater obstacles ... On bridges across the tributaries of the Dnieper, Samara and Volkhov, these working under a thick layer of ice was especially dangerous.

The construction of large bridges was handed over

everywhere to German firms, while numerous small bridges were built under the own direction of the Organization Todt. chain problems and after the winter there was no end. As soon as in During the thaw, hope arose that the hardest part was behind us, that a flood had come. So some bridges that withstood a terrible ice drift were swept away by the flood.

In Poltava, the station was two meters under water. All railway embankments in the Dnieper region were washed up and demolished. At the same time, new problems arose. So, the Fuhrer determined that the construction of railway repair plants is also included within the scope of Organization Todt. Two large factories are already being built today. They will be completed, at the latest, in the fall. To move forward, special advanced units were created, equipped with tools, rails, sleepers, water towers, pumps, locomotive hangars.

The leadership proceeds, just in case, on the assumption that the retreating Russians will continue to leave bare ground to the invader.

Of particular importance was the restoration of supplies energy. The main of the large power plants, located in Zaporozhye, was completely put out of action by the Russians. By autumn, this power plant, after hard work, will be launched. Two out of nine generators are already in operation. Another big the station will be restored in Stalino. In addition, a number of small power plants should be launched. OT is also involved in construction factories Ammunition factories, ironworks, foundries, rolling mills, repair shops for tanks and trucks are under construction or will soon be launched. Recently, rural areas have also been included in the construction program

outbuildings - silos, hangars, sugar refineries and canning factories.

Brugman was already finishing his story when we at about 2 pm, completely covered with dust, they arrived in Krivoy Rog. Krivoy Rog, a large Russian mining city, stretches for almost 45 km.

It stretches far through valleys and lowlands. Built on the high bank of the Ingulets River, the city can be seen from afar.

After lunch - further along the road DG IV. Suddenly on We were hit by a thunderstorm with a heavy downpour. A few minutes later we were stuck in the mud. Ford is stalling the road is slippery like soap. For a while we trying to move on a few flat areas along the edge of the road; but soon we will get stuck. It is now known that during the rain, military operations in these regions are impossible. When it starts to rain, no car can move.

Only Russian carts with horses remain on the move. Thunderstorm delays us for almost two hours. Soon after the rain everything is already dry again, we can go further. Ford pulled out of the mud.

At 22:00 we arrive in Dnepropetrovsk. A simple dinner is prepared at the Brugman Casino. Soon, around midnight, we are tired, lying in bed.

June 3, 1942

Brugman is taking us around the city. With its typical Russian monotony, it reminds me of Novosibirsk, although it is larger and seems more civilized. Dnepropetrovsk used to have 900,000 inhabitants, today about 250,000. They are also almost without a trace got involved in work for the army and other German institutions, as well as the entire population of the districts we occupied, if they lived in the city and did not want to starve. As a reward, Ukrainian workers

*receive in addition to breakfast and lunch from 12 to 18 pfen
nigs per hour.*

*Brugman proudly shows us his new
administrative building, hastily converted for
these purposes from the Russian service building. House,
seems to be good. Here at last the chief of OT "Russia-South"
will be able to get for himself a decent, albeit modest,
apartment. The house in which he now lives and works is
primitive Russian. small bedroom
modest sizes. Brugman is not a fan of convenience.
He does not like them for his retinue either - yes, he
has, so to speak, a rare talent to create
maximum inconvenience to yourself. So, for his casino,
which is otherwise tip-top, he ordered to make three-legged
stools without backs. His people
here they should rest with a straight back after a day's work.
To my timid question - why not chairs
with backs, if they had to be specially ordered anyway, he
replied: there is not a single shift
should not be located with amenities; backrests for
chairs serve to corrupt discipline. Only one decoration
hangs in the casino - you say Frederick the Great, ..*

*Everyone sits at small tables. Sam Brugman
behind a semblance of a chairman's table at the end of the hall. Behind
a banner with a swastika is stretched out on the wall. chief
sits with his back to the wall, and I strongly suspect that he,
also sitting on a stool, sometimes leaning on the wall. In
any case, the banner behind him looks
slightly darkened. Reconciles with the Brugman Casino
service: unusually beautiful Ukrainian
girls care about people. To the Dnieper, outside
sprawling city, the so-called park emerges,
a cluster of wretched trees on the high bank of the river,
which, in Russian style, rolls widely through the spacious
landscape. From here you can see beautiful bridges over
the river, the subject of Brugman's concerns. In the center so call*

My Vostochny Bridge: reinforced concrete arches with a destroyed central part. As we were told, the Italians allied to us at one time in a hot moment, the frame structure of the central span was blown up. The two-story Western Bridge has been restored and is in use: the lower level is iron expensive, the upper one - by the rest of the transport.

In order to have a closer look at the work on the iron-concrete bridge, we go to a small island; we asked an Italian officer to send us there on a military boat. Italian sappers train on the banks of the Dnieper. The water is dark brown and the current is quite strong. High on the other bank of the Dnieper, steel mills are visible.

Intense heat, we get hot in an unfamiliar uniform. After eating we drive from there first to Samara, a tributary of the Dnieper, where we swim. Although the water is warm, it refreshes us to some extent. Then - to large steel mills on this bank of the Dnieper, Petrovsky and Leninsky, both mostly built before the First World War.

Speer water pumps are being built on Leninsky towers, on Petrovsky - railway arrows. For the rest, large plants stand. Until they are going to launch. Along the way, we see a recently built OT hangar where tanks are being repaired.

4 June 1942

We are going to Zaporozhye, formerly Dneprostroy. Again good sunny weather, wide landscapes. Rarely do we see wild animals, only sometimes hares; Very often gophers darting across the road at lightning speed.

About 2 hours in Zaporozhye. The dam is magnificent looks in the landscape. Thanks to the Dnieper dam in the upper course is unusually wide ...

Downstream in the distance, a railway station is visible.

bridge crossing the stream... On the other side of the new the city of Zaporozhye. Big metallurgical plant is also located on the opposite bank of the Dnieper, not far from the city, which is temporarily from ONE wide luxurious street, in due time designed by Ernst May.

The chief engineer of the gigantic construction site of the dam guides us and tells us about the destruction and restoration work. During the retreat, the Russians blew up the dam in the middle of width 175 m.

3,000 refugees who were at that time on dam, were carried away by the current. water masses 5-6 meters thick fall from a height of 15 meters through a breach and lower the water level so that the pier in the upper reaches turned out to be on land, and not enough pressure to turn the turbines. The locks are also dry after the explosion, so that shipping is paralyzed. Not only a dam, but also mechanisms mostly destroyed. The Russians turned off the central lubrication system during the retreat, so that the machines instantly overheated and caught fire. What thereafter were machinery spaces, turbines, and generators was a masterful piece of demolition. And visible today cracked reinforced concrete walls, melted down iron parts; everything has been rendered useless.

However, one unit has already been operating since the end of April, the second one was launched a little later, so the station can already generate 20,000 kilowatts. Most of the nine turbines will be put into operation in autumn. Previously, the maximum power of the station reached 500,000 kilowatts, minimum, at low water - 100,000. The rest of the Dnieper power plants up to retreats had a total capacity of four times more than Zaporozhye.

A particularly difficult task for building managers

bodies - restoration of the destroyed dam, through a hole in which flows out under great pressure a body of water 5 meters high . In a strange way, the Russians did not make a release for water, such as all dams; therefore, it should have been built first to drain the dam for restoration work.

To do this, in the side, whole parts of the dam were pierced several adits approx. 5 by 5 meters and 35 m long, up to the outer lining of the dam on the upper side. The difficulty lies in overcoming the last two meters of concrete. For this time, the following procedure has been worked out: where the galleries later they will go to the water, the shutters will be lowered from above, which will then be pressed by water pressure to the holes in the dam and block them. closures consist of spherical segments 5 by 5 meters with a shell 20 cm thick, assembled from metal frames. Before the holes in the concrete are finally blasted, smaller holes are made in it to allow water to escape to

there was pressure on the segments. When all ten adits will be thus closed from the top side of the dam, the concrete gates will slowly pull up and thus drain the water.

The water level will fall, the base of the breach in the dam becomes visible and can be concreted.

Lead engineer Dr. Smólnig who guides us on the construction site, completely captured by his work. And here transport problems; everything needs to be brought here, not only machines of German firms, but also stone and dam cement. Cement is shipped by barge from Romania across the Black Sea and the Dnieper and delivered directly to the power plant. Gravel and crushed stone for reinforced concrete are mined in a nearby large career, which we are reviewing and which was developed by Krupp-Gruson. There are also huge granite blocks in the quarry...

The entire complex, the dam and the power plant, was designed by the Germans, equipped in part by the Americans, and built with their advice and Russian leadership. The details are bad. Reinforced concrete already outwardly makes a bad impression; fittings in some places it hangs from concrete, on the untreated surface of which pieces of wooden formwork have been holding here and there for 10 years. Control panels and others electrical devices, as the leading electrical engineer tells us, are such that in Germany they would be rated as the worst student work.

In the evening we take the ferry across the river, to see the city of Zaporozhye. Here, too, there is a hopeless picture of a new Russian city made of cement. The difference between the works of May and the works of the Russians is clearly visible. From "substantiality" Russian refused and turned to homegrown classicism, which here gave very strange shoots. Ancient forms are often mutilated beyond recognition or applied without any understanding...

5 June 1942

Return trip from Dnepropetrovsk in the direction of Kharkov to Krasnograd, the westernmost point a large cauldron in which the Russians were these days broken. Further to Poltava. A delightful city with a classic representative center. Spacious round square surrounded by freely alternating, high and low, painted white with old provincial buildings, adorned here and there with columnar porches. In one of these buildings, the residence of General Field Marshal von Bock and the headquarters of Army C. On the square, on a stepped stone pedestal there is a column of victory, almost hidden by greenery, crowned with an eagle. From here the main streets diverge in all directions, one of which leads to the old monastery lying in the distance.

7 June 1942

Rain. It is not known whether we will get to Kyiv. Deep dirt. Behind Pereslavl we go through a swamp covered with bedrock. Again moving towards us columns, this time pilots, and again working service on bicycles, transport columns OKH1 and mountain rangers with their machines. As we heard later, this month 70,000 vehicles head east on transit road V.

At 18 o'clock, still in good light, we arrive to Kyiv. The city is located high near the wide Dnieper. The straight road from the east leads directly to castle hill. We have to make a many-kilometer detour before the Dnieper, as the main bridge across the river has been destroyed. The new so-called OT-bridge, a huge wooden structure, protected by anti-aircraft guns at all supports. Upstream third bridge under restoration. The buildings on the mountain dominate the city, the tower of the laurel is the highest, surrounded by countless onion churches. The main street of Kyiv is completely destroyed. During the retreat, the Russians blew up everything with bombs with a seismic mechanism. Some remnants of the walls were blown up by our sappers to avert the danger of collapse.

Despite this, the city still makes a good impression thanks to its civilized and attractive appearance. Lots of greenery for streets. New Soviet buildings, some with great taste and more solid than in other cities. Not many beautiful old Russian churches. From the high steep bank of the Dnieper, a stunning view of the current across the river.

1 OKH (German - OKN) - Oberkommando des Heers, Higher command of the ground forces.

One railway bridge can already be used, although the Russians have diligently carried out the blasting work here as well. Diverse structures rest on the old surviving supports. Before I was ready this bridge, it was possible to drive only on ice dam. On the ice of the river, a railway embankment (!) was built from ice blocks, which functioned perfectly for more than one month and helped a lot ...

June 9, 1942

Through Rovno, in good, albeit cool, sunny weather, to Lutsk. Old lock. 24 km beyond Lutsk, near the village of Torcherin, the first serious damage occurred during our trip. The petrol pump is not working. The car is towed to Torche Rina, where we are friendly received by the Kreislandwirt...

There are about 4500 inhabitants in the town, among them 200 Reev, the rest of the Poles and a few Ukrainians.

In the evening we go to the work camp where the Ukrainian women are. Chryslandwirt asks us to calm the saddened women. They are without any for this reason they are afraid that they will be sent to Germany as forced laborers. He in a good way tried to recruit them for work in agriculture, and since they were clearly unwilling, he exerted some pressure. "And now the poor women are sure that they will be taken away, that absolutely not like that..." There are about two hundred Ukrainian girls in the camp. Kreislandwirt took care of the music. Several Ukrainians sing folk songs; but this did not have the expected effect. A great lamentation begins, so that we do not know how to behave. Frank tries in vain to stroke the head of this or that girl, for a moment this causes loud laughter - but then the crying continues.

1 In the text - Torczeryn.

At the kreislandwirt, we also meet an employee of the Berlin-Brandenburg state labor exchange, who has been touring the region for many months and recruiting workers and workers for the German industry laziness..."

.. .

In October 1942 I again visited the Russia-South OT group, part of the way as an escort of OT chief Albert Speer. This time the route went far beyond Zaporozhye, through Stalino and Rostov to the northwestern Caucasus and Crimea.

"October 13, 1942

At 7.30 in the morning departure from Tempelkhov to Yu-52. In the car are Secretary of State Ganzmüller, City Councilor Schieber and Human Resources Chief OT Bohr, with whom I am traveling further. Intermediate landing at Writsen, where we are waiting for Speer. Ganzmüller talks about the difficulties with the roads in the Rossiya-Centre OT division while we wait. If in 1941 there were six partisan attacks in month on the main railway lines in this area, now there are about 600 of them. Many people were killed. Losses of telegraph parts up to 75%. Since the entire forest region cannot be controlled, it has long been it is necessary to build bunkers along the lines. The partisans are well armed. They are constantly supplied with with the help of aircraft.

Speer appears. Good mood. In the car, he does not immediately sit at the helm, calling me to him forward and shows different figures. On high 1800 m fog disappears. Sun... South of Warsaw flying over the steppe. Long villages along the roads. The pilot puts the plane on its wing and draws our attention to the burning estates scattered across the vast

my landscape. Probably partisan work. At 1 p.m. we land at the Fuhrer's headquarters, where we Borom say goodbye to the boss.

In the morning at 7 o'clock, other participants appear travel: Ministerial Director at the Ministry of Labour, Dr. Schmelter, at the same time curator of the work of the central office of OT; director of IMM, responsible in OT for relations with enterprises.

October 17, 1942

Professor Bonvetch, Brugmann's deputy, accompanies us. Brugman gives us his open horch; four people can sit closely huddled in the back seat, one next to the driver . Only very small items are taken from luggage. Also, guns, submachine guns...

First, according to DG IV on Stalino. Unfortunately the weather bad. Cold, light rain. Behind the Dnieper is good road to Novomoskovsk, where we can do 90 km to hour. The road goes through the steppe, past the sunflower fields and corn, through Pavlograd, Trotskoye, Krasnoarmeiskoye to Stalino, where we arrive at about 18:00 a darkness. The road is disgusting. We get on side bypass roads, we make our way through the mud with speed of 10 km per hour. Three times we are blown away and spun on a slippery road. The driver keeps control and does not overturn us.

On the road, Schmelter talks about earnings and productivity when he is awake. He wants to raise productivity by reorganizing wages. In OT, he introduced a single pay of 80 pfennigs (in hour. - D.H.) for all skilled workers, which, perhaps, should be the prerequisite for a future uniform payment in the Reich. 80 pfennigs chosen as an average between 0.68 and 1.08 Reichsmarks (e.g. 1.10 Reichsmarks in Hamburg). Schmelter refuses to do so.

recognize that in this way he introduces an increase salaries; because those who previously received more than 80 pfennigs receive the difference in Germany as tax-exempt family assistance. Without a doubt, the flat fee is "not stupid" because it facilitates the transfer of labor from one firm to another. Big debate causes a contract on the system activity in the east due to new regulations.

Schmelter is a firm believer that there are huge reserves of productivity hidden in the existing workforce that can be mobilized with the right contractual terms. The old building contract in the east is a contract for

cost compensation. The firms here are, in fact, the ones who win the war. They get back everything they spend, plus a certain amount per day per person for prisoners of war, which they use. At the same time, they are interested in doing as little as possible with the largest possible number of prisoners of war. Of course, we can't generalize here...

October 18, 1942

In Stalino, in the Defland detachment, a clean apartment. Unfortunately, it became cold, the first snow. We stop for a day to get to know each other with the area around Stalino. First, to the Schneidera detachment. SA Oberführer Schneider, head of the OT front leadership, organized a reception camp here for prisoners of war. We are led around the camp, the impression is good. Prisoners coming here straight from the front are treated against lice. First, they are collected in a fenced area and Russian officers

ry, who were captured earlier, they are instructed.

They are told that they should be glad that fall into the ranks of the largest construction organization

pizatsiya of the world - OT. Behind the fence, the prisoners must undress. Clothing is separately treated against lice. People are shaved bald, then they must go down the stairs into the pool and completely plunge headlong: the beam under which they have to crawl through, makes them hang their heads under water to surface on the other sides. Then they are sent to the second pool. The timid are cheered up with light pushes of the stick. Then recording personal data and other information; then dressing ... Schneider, of course, seeks out for himself such a labor force with which the detachment can make more progress than before. They are like us they say they are very pleased and surprised at this current treatment, because now people needed more than at the beginning of the Eastern campaign.

Schneider chose the best singers among the prisoners (among them an opera singer from Moscow) and composed small camp choir. Just as we're here, choir rehearsing for a friendly evening scheduled for the evening. We are told that at the last departure of the prisoners, the choir at the station accompanied them with a song "Farewell to the gypsy camp." Anyway, prisoners of war in a good mood. I'm going in the evening with Schmelter to the Schneider detachment, where he sings Russian chorus: rare pleasure. There is also a Caucasian choir, which also performs its own songs. Peculiar mixture from oriental and Russian music. Bass, baritone and lead tenor solo. One Russian officer and fifteen year old boy dance. Both are from the Moscow ballet school. I don't know what touches and surprises me more: the singers in the front area, people who only yesterday were enemies - or such a man like Schneider, who, with all his building and supply concerns, is enough for such amazing musical ideas.

October 19, 1942

At 8.30 departure from Stalino. The light rain stops. Through Makeevka, one of the major industrial cities of the Stalino region, we go to Sugris, where we inspect one of the largest coal mines in Europe power plants. The destruction done here by the Russians is first class. Boiler plants are destroyed

us almost completely, the rest of the machines - partially.

Explosive devices mounted on powerful shafts and mighty cylinders tore everything to pieces.

It's hard to believe the eyes. The destruction is even worse than in Zaporozhye. Boilers can be restored.

Turbogenerators will be delivered from the Reich.

October 20, 1942

We allocate one day to inspect the construction big bridge in Rostov.

Bridge across the Don 370 m long, two spans, each 78 m each; the height of the load-bearing metal structures is 6.5 m. Construction began on 18 September. WITH using auxiliary supports were mounted above the water are large load-bearing trusses. Don in the place where the bridge is being built, has a depth of up to 16 meters...

Construction is impressive, first of all the view from the bridge to the earthen ramp leading to the city; on both sides of them all the houses were destroyed. Bridge launch ti originally scheduled for 25 October, not managed to survive due to traffic problems: here, as elsewhere, the same troubles.

1000 prisoners are employed in the construction of the bridge and 700 Germans. This unfavorable ratio is explained by the need for a skilled labor force.

In the rain we drive through the badly damaged city of Rostov. Entire streets lie in ruins. Only here and there there are usable do ma. One of the attractions of the city is the theater,

*mixture of Gropius and Mendelssohn. The student who leads us, explains the appearance of the theater of similarity
pow with a huge tractor.*

*Professor Bonwitch, born in Russia and fluent in the language, translates during conversations with Russians. We are talking to one of the service girls. as a skilled worker
of the highest class, she used to earn 400 rubles. Deductions from wages during the war amounted to 200 rubles, in peacetime about 120 rubles. Of them 40 rubles for a state loan, 15 rubles for a cultural tax, and so on. They paid from 1.5 to 2.5 rubles per kg for bread, 60 kopecks for lunch in a workers' canteen, a kilogram of butter - 40 rubles; dress material - 15 rubles per meter. I am convinced that these data completely coincide with what I knew from Novosibirsk 10 years ago.*

October 21, 1942

In the meantime, we decided to leave the thought of the previously planned trip to Stalingrad because of the uncertain weather. If we get stuck somewhere we can't move forward or backward. Unfortunately, we are forced to abandon this and decide to take the southern route...

In the evening - in Krasnodar, in Herbert's detachment. With Gross, the head of work, we inspect a large wooden bridge across the Kuban. Gross was in Krasnodar a day after the troops took it. From bridge to the front about 15 km. Romanians are standing on this site. Difficulties with supply are extremely great. Although the German track has been laid as far as Krasnodar, it is only with great difficulty that trains can be brought here. The platforms are always full. OT he here to quickly unload trains when the transport units think it's none of their business.

Wooden road bridge across the Kuban OT was completed in the shortest possible time. The work is still going on only on the access embankments. And h typical for the USSR mass use of labor strength. Prisoners are used as a "conveyor line". With small stretchers they go in long chains past digging people: a moving human ribbon. By type, there are few Russians: many Tatars, Mongolian races, eastern peoples.

The city of Krasnodar lies in a fertile area. The people are well dressed and we are just as well fed. This is especially true for women. Some hour These bodies are so highly developed that we are constantly discussing what it actually can be connected. Local OT staff explain that it has to do with the sunflower seeds that are eaten women and in which there is a lot of vitamin B.

In the Kuban region, local technicians have already been introduced into the leadership. OT also uses local engineers and craftsmen. Wehrmacht recruits here Circassians and Tatars into volunteer units, which will be used against the Russians in the forest war. As we have heard, they justify themselves. We saw some units in German uniform. They give the impression of being disciplined. FROM it is very difficult to recruit workers here. Exists the Fuhrer's order, according to which the local population cannot be forced to work. The day before taking In Krasnodar, the Russians opened all the shops for looting. They achieved by this that the population stocked up with the most necessary for several months, and not the German troops lost their supplies. Now on a search for hidden warehouses, he stumbles upon la difficulties.

October 3, 1942

At 9.30 departure from Krasnodar in the direction of Novorossiysk. We must take the northern route through Novomysskaya-Troitskaya to the Crimea, since the southern route lies in the main battle zone. Through not high hills we go to Verkhne-Bakanskoe. In the dark moving along the serpentine through the mountains to the Black Sea, which we reach in the evening. Under fire from medium-caliber guns and machine guns, we find apartments in Novorossiysk. Bor, the driver and I are in the same house, where we are friendly received by two Russian women with teenage boy. We get a good room with one bed and two mattresses on the floor.

October 24, 1942

At six in the morning we are ready to go. Women They made us tea and set the table! We also get hot water for washing and shaving. The city of Novorossiysk is quite badly broken, almost extinct. Beautiful the natural harbor juts out far inward. From the western side of the bay, 500 meters across the harbor the opposite shore is visible, where on the positions of le reap the Germans and Russians.

From Novorossiysk back through the mountains through the Upper Bakanskoye to the port of Anapa. Since there is no coastal road, we need to take a detour through the Kuban to the north, to the Taman Peninsula to the city of Taman, which lies on the coast of Taman Bay. The city is already showing In the dark. There is a ferry in the port, which is supposed to ferry us to Kerch. The battery of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns is being unloaded with all other equipment. It is amazing how quickly people transport heavy guns to the shore.

About half past nine we are together with the car Finally, we board the ferry. Everything is done extremely quickly, because the Russians bombard the harbor every evening. The ferry is a carry

beam structure, reinforced on two long pontoons, each equipped with a motor. Wooden house in the middle of the platform for command and control of the vessel. The moon shines again from a cloudless sky... Although you can see the reflections of anti-aircraft fire around you, this time an No. A few days ago a ferry loaded with Romanians was sunk. The team handed out life jackets to us. In the team room we have dinner camping rations and get a few narrow beds inside the pontoon. Deck hatches are open. We going downstairs to spend the night on the little ones spring mattresses. Despite the inconvenience and unusual situation, we sleep soundly and after how the ferry weighs anchor in Kerch and leaves. In the distance, at great distances, others are visible ferries. This is practiced from night to night, since the Russians attack from the air near the coast, and in the open sea the ferry seems to be more difficult to see and hit. I do not quite understand this, because in the moon In the present world we are a magnificent target.

October 25, 1942

We get up at five in the morning. At eight we go to Kerch port. A very beautiful city lying on a mountain is visible already published. On the way we pass a military ferry, a half-flooded Russian transport, which is used by ours as a target for rifle shooting. Above Kerch, at half the height, on a mountain ledge, stands a monument of the last century, a Doric peripter, which from a distance looks like a real Greek temple; next to the new German soldiers' cemetery. On at the top of the mountain are ruins.

At 13.15 we leave for the Crimea, direction Simferopol. The landscape immediately turns bright green... Romanian posts are everywhere in the mountains. Together with the Tatars

*with skim parts they comb through from time to time
mountains in which partisans are still sitting. Here too
Russians fire from the air. From time to time like
yesterday at Yalta, sailors on boats approached the
shore. All the time there are posters: "Attention,
guerrillas, keep your weapons ready!"*

October 26, 1942

*The car is in such a state that it must be left here
for repairs. Not only the brakes go out
building, but the rear axle shock absorber is also broken. At
the next breakdown, we would have remained standing on the road ...*

*At Alushta, halfway to Yalta, we again leave for the
Black Sea, from here along a winding road to Yalta.
Everywhere mansions and castles of the tsarist time,
for the most part spectacularly illuminated. The whole
area, where something was being built, more or less
disfigured. The Bolsheviks did their best on the rocky
ledges and slopes to plant round temples of concrete
jelly! Not far from Yalta there is a sanatorium
The OT we are looking for. Here we are going to wait
our car. The sanatorium is located in the middle
between Alupka and Oreanda, in Gaspra-Koreiz. Complex
luxurious, spacious park on the slope with old
trees. Until the First World War, the residence of the
Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich was here, which later
served as a resting place for Molotov. The castle was
completely burned out. Not far away in the park stands
an outbuilding used by Molotov as a guest house for
diplomats. Like the old castle, this new home
built in a borrowed Moorish style;
rooms are equipped with built-in washrooms
lockers and modern bathrooms. Nevertheless and
here is the well-known primitiveness of the new
Russian culture. Rarely does everything work.*

October 28, 1942

In the morning I go with Bohr and Schmelter to the neighborhood Oreanda to take a look at the landscapes for which Schinkel designed his royal palace (a 1:100 scale model of which we made in Berlin with Professor Ruster). I am amazed that Shinkel, although he was not in the Crimea, is very accurate on his colored drawings depicted vegetation, especially characteristic of this landscape; the park has also pines, yews, olive and almond trees.

At 13 o'clock Foreman appears, whom we waited. We immediately depart for those who have already arrived. car up to Simferopol. The path leads in long serpentine through the mountains. The turns are often so tight that the long car has difficulty unfolds. The weather is changing. The sun is still faintly shining, but a veil is already moving over the mountains. clouds that cover the highest peaks, more than 1000 m. Far above the sea - sparkling sunbeams ...

In front of Sevastopol there are again low mountains, often without a forest, but covered with dense, human-height shrubs.

Long before the city to the right and left of the road are visible numerous positions of Russians, well camouflaged by bushes on the mountains. Narrow trenches stretch everywhere. It seems that all the slopes are riddled with small fortifications and trenches.

Passing a deep gorge, we see Sevastopol.

On a large rocky plateau above the city, the sea a school and naval artillery barracks, now occupied by the OT and, where they are not completely destroyed, equipped for headquarters. From here, from the plateau, in the evening twilight we have a view of the whole city, which stretches along the opposite bank of the inner harbor.

The bay, a natural harbor, extends far into inland, between the plateau with the naval school and

slope where Sevastopol is located. From the side the harbor of the sea is protected by another, far outstretched ahead of the peninsula. City, as you can see still afar off, badly damaged. Although the walls of the houses sometimes for whole blocks, they are still standing, when you come closer, it becomes clear that we are talking about sex burnt-out ruins.

October 29, 1942

We are going through Sevastopol. Now there are 25,000 Russians here, before the fall of the fortress there were 125,000 of them. An original sight on one of the squares. Brother Lenin, much larger than a human being, thrown off the plinth, sank his head and upper body deep into the ground, under the soft asphalt.

For many weeks his own weight pushes him deeper and deeper into the earth. Us only the legs and right arm are visible.

We are going to Cape Khersones, which lies far from the city, to the place where the Russians put their last troops: he became the Russian Dunkirk. On the rocky devoid of any fertility landscape everywhere broken cars, weapons, a lot of ammunition. On steep banks of the still unburied dead Russians. There is an unbearable smell in the air. Here, there must have been terrible scenes.

To the rock Inkerman, away from the city. In big canyon, on both sides since tsarist times huge chambers were carved into the soft limestone, up to 20 m wide, 15 m high and up to 40 m deep. Here the Russians had warehouses of food and ammunition for owls. In addition, about 15 thousand people were evacuated from residents of Sevastopol. Before the fall of the fortress, the commissars blew up the rocks with sea mines. At this must have exploded the ammunition depot, because the destruction is huge. torn from

rocks, stone blocks the size of a house lie at the bottom gorges. It looks like the site of the battle of the Cyclopes. We climb among the rubble, corpses everywhere smell. The rocks are still completely mined. The Russians laid a whole system of underground passages here around Sevastopol.

Back in the direction of Simferopol, on the way we go to the large Russian fort "Maxim Gorky". From a distance, the fort is almost impossible to see. Here and there you can see only harmless looking hilly landscape. Closer examination reveals armored turrets with twin 32 cm barrels. The road at the foot of the mountain leads to the entrance to the casemates. Up on the hill shattered armored domes. One was destroyed by our sappers, the other was blown up by the Russians themselves. Here we see a hit by one of our railway guns, which were installed in the Bakhchisaray area. German non-commissioned officer, standing here on duty with by several Tatars, talks about an attack on fort, in which he himself participated. between attack and took exactly 2.5 hours. At the same time, the attacker the division is about a kilometer away from the heavy guns came under direct fire. Other soldiers who were also present, telling how severe the attack was. Small fortifications are often completely were not visible. After breaking through the 50-100-meter trenches and fortifications gave the impression that the breakthrough was a success, and then everything started all over again. Rus the skies often missed our attacking sappers and foot soldiers forward and attacked from behind with flamethrowers.

At about 10 o'clock we drive to Simferopol through the beautiful and soft Crimean landscape. We gradually leave the mountains behind and drive out to the plains in the Bakhchis district. Here we find a place occupied by our most powerful long-barreled artillery, for

which Brugman once built a large railway camouflage complex ...

With the development of operations, new units appear FROM. 36 teams were withdrawn from the railway program and sent forward, all the way to Stalingrad. On two railway lines in the Caucasus region, the gauge has not been altered, due to which the position of this will improve significantly in winter. Problems, as before, are created by the transport issue; worries connected and with the use of labor force; due to the lack of workers, some things have to be stopped. Besides new tasks arise, such as work in coal and energy sectors, and harbours. It is surprising with what optimism Brugman goes deep into all new things that can hardly be mastered. That, what has already been done is amazing. Under normal circumstances, this could only be done in Germany with a brilliantly working device ... "

...

In mid-June 1943, I accompanied Speer on an inspection trip to Kerch, where the strait between the Azov and Black Seas near the Taman Peninsula was crossed by a cable car built by the OT. Speer could report to the Führer on completion of the work on time and solemnly hand over the first flower-decorated barges, which could transport 7,000 people a day, into operation.

On the way back, Speer, along with several visited Askania-Nova with his old employees.

"June 15, 1943

... We are flying over the green fields of northern Crimea and the motley steppe of southern Ukraine, to the east lower reaches of the Dnieper to the one created over 50 years back by the German Falz-Fine to a magical oasis in the

*pi. Today the estate belongs to the Reich and above it
General Commissar Frauenfeld "rules".*

*Lütz Heck (of the Berlin Zoo) organized
here your animal farm. The only green spot in the vast territory
with trees, ponds and fantastic wildlife. In a huge open enclosure
- ostriches, yaks, wild horses; herds of wildebeest and antelopes
in the steppe. rich in the park*

*exotic bird world, water birds that
draw attention to themselves with unusual cries.*

June 16, 1943

*A beautiful day: walking and driving, eating and drinking and
sleeping in between . The food is excellent: milk, soft cheese,
honey, steppe tea, even
wildebeest roast, which we are particularly interested in, about
salad "with all sorts of tricks" and talking
do not have to. Toward evening, another trip with the boss to the
desert steppe, which stretches far to the east. A land from which
much can be achieved by irrigation from deep wells...*

*June 17, 1943, at 7.30 am - start. Describing
a big loop, we fly over the park and the steppe. Then
to the mouth of the Dnieper, to Kherson and Nikopol,
where we see the bridges that the OT is building. The
dam in Zaporozhye, restored by Brugman, stands in the stream li
which, branching widely through its many islands, gnaws its way
through the landscape.*

Like this dam, many power plants and bridges fell into the
hands of the Russians in working order,
who, during their retreat, realized the concept of "scorched earth",
which they had mastered well, with monstrous skill. Although this
has long been proven by documents, even today, in 1980, the
German press

with true passion repeats the Russian thesis that it was we who deliberately destroyed all the vital structures.

Subdivision of OT "Russia-North"

"September 22, 1943

"Douglas" Lufthansa five hours fly through Danzig and Königsberg to Riga. My friend Burmeister, President of the Land Office under the Reichskommissar. Big commotion because the general commissar of Cuba is killed (time bomb in the bed!).

Riga, a beautiful German center. View of the Daugava from numerous baroque domes on gothic, mostly churches, is very expressive...

In the evening at Burmeister, who talks about unclear political situation in the east, especially in Belarus. There is no clear political line, which causes trouble all the time. Lithuanians and Estonians fear Russia as strong as the hope of England.

September 24, 1943

With Burmeister and Dr. Vener we go to Pleskau. A good road goes through a beautiful green Lithuanian landscape. Slightly hilly land, birch and coniferous forests in luxurious autumn colors ... Before Pleskau begins - a barrier - a military area. In the dark, at 20.30, we arrive in Pleskau...

Early in the morning of September 26 - in Luga, halfway between Pleskau and Petersburg. Due to the danger of a partisan attack, we must travel in a column of three cars.

At 15 o'clock - further north to Mezhen, to the east from the main road, where we are looking for my friend Zunkel, the commander of the propaganda company of the 18th army ...

After a half-hour visit to the army commander, she had lunch at the casino. At a small round table Frank is on the right, I am on the left of the Colonel General... He is very kind, looks like an open and cheerful soldier. Praises the work of the OT, primarily the construction of roads, talks about the army and her armament. Russian artillery has a double superiority, but by no means in quality. The army is strong, the Russian infantry is bad. Relocation to France - a disgrace, he and his soldiers want stay here. There are few planes, and - first of all - mortars ... The Spaniards are brave. But the officers there is no such contact with soldiers as we have. Is the same mistake as the Italians. "Coalition war" is the most difficult. With Russian prisoners he in principle it works well. The partisans are weakening. The situation with Vlasov does not concern him, this is a political issue, can only be resolved by the Fuhrer.

During the conversation preceding dinner, the commander showed us the situation on the map, the Oranienburg cauldron (Russian positions covered by Kronstadt), then the front, which had remained unchanged for two years already, was extremely disadvantageous due to numerous protrusions and retreats and linked many divisions . The deepest protrusion to still 15 km from Shlisselburg and stubbornly preserved. The Volkhov Front, southeast of here, has become already almost a legend, so long and firmly settled down he is in swamps and mud. There is a popular anecdote: after fifty years of war on the Volkhov in water and mud - still neither forward nor backward. Two old field marshals with gray beards, with sticks in their hands, wrapped in mosquito nets are found in 1995 at the Volkhov positions. One asks the other: "What is your actually a civilian profession? - "Schoolboy!"

September 21.

At 6 in the morning we drive ... in two cars to the front area: from Mezhno, Siverskaya along the "outer circle", along the excellent road newly built from OT in the direction east-west, south of Leningrad to Tosno. Then more east, in Shapki, to the combat positions of the 320th grenadier regiment of the 12th division. The site is located southeast of the great Ladoga arc, east of Leningrad. After Tosno we drive slowly along the bed. The horns are gone. The entire transport, all the supply of the army, through the marshy forests through which not only it is impossible to pass, but can hardly get through. From early morning comes strong it is raining, and water splashes in the cracks between the densely lying pine trunks of the grassy road. Poor horses whose legs are not adapted to such a road! The logs crack, rumble, vibrate. If the hoof gets between the logs, the horses break legs. Where it is dry, our car rumbles through the quiet forest, champing more often. Although the forest of coniferous trees and birches are liquid, the undergrowth is very dense and impenetrable. The forest is young. Despite the rain, the colors are wonderful. Land with marsh vegetation a peculiar olive-green color, a little deaf. Lezhnevka is getting narrower, sometimes there are travel places. Finally, at about 10.30, after 4.5 hours of shaking, we arrive at the command post of the regiment Ogilvie... Everything is very well camouflaged in the dense, dry forest on a hill. Ogilvy explains the situation, takes a stick, gives us steel helmets, and leads us forward. Past firing artillery positions (1.5 cm), in neatly dug in yellow dry sand, narrow trenches of the front line ... Further, to an observation post lying 80 meters from Russian positions. There are no more trees in the forest through which we walk back to the command post. only bare trunks and funnels. Lunch with Ogilvy

*"officer's casino", that is, in an earthen bunker.
Confident young officers. Missing mi
nomets.*

*Back at Hats, some sun is breaking through. From there
to MGU, large, marked on all maps
railway junction southeast of St. Petersburg.*

*An "idyllic" city, it is impossible to imagine better: a
palisade of sticks that were once trees. Plans of buildings
are visible, brick chimneys are standing here and there,
strangely undamaged.*

*water tower, burnt wagons, overturned locomotives,
funnels, puddles and sloping roads.*

This is Mga - once a summer cottage suburb of St. Petersburg.

*We get to the command post of the division north of
Mga. We are received in his bunker by Lieutenant General
Schultz, who used to fight with Manstein
near Sevastopol. The division underestimates an important
position on the Sinyavinsky Heights south of Shlisselburg,
from where a view opens deep into the enemy
area, to Lake Ladoga and Leningrad and two
new Russian railway lines running along the Ladoga coast.
Three days ago, the division recaptured*

*la previously lost height and now lies in
damp funnels in dire straits; these are the most
hot battles of Army Group North.*

*The Russians want to recapture the railway junction,
for this they fought all, so far in vain, battles near
Ladoga. It's getting late, we can't move anymore
forward, to the heights, and are forced to confine
themselves to inspecting artillery positions. In the mud of
the swamp we follow the general, who seems to want to
show us how much a pound is worth. He is in his rubber
boots goes without choosing the road, we are bravely for
him, breathing heavily. Shoot 15 cm
guns, with difficulty installed on rare dry
islets and well camouflaged. nearby
from artillery positions field infirmary under*

earth bunkers. Losses due to attacks on Sinyavino heights three days ago - 400 people killed and wounded, at the location of the division in a week - 800 people! Did the division change yesterday? Everything is in motion.

Back to divisional command post. We are asking the general. Are Russian weapons better in quality? No, it's just much more practical. T-34 on this area is better. Automata are more primitive more ammo in the magazine. Nevertheless, our bullets are better, our artillery is at least that the same level; Russian mortars keep firing; human material far exceeds 15-18 and 45-65-year-old Russians - there are almost no others. Combat the spirit is also much higher than that of the Russians. "Do you have enough weapons and ammunition?" enough, plenty of ammunition, "I can afford any fire attack on any target without look at the amount of ammunition. "Tigers"? — "Good, very good, if only I can get them where I need them." No wonder in this swampy area. What is missing? "Mortars with ammunition. We are suffering heavy losses due to Russian mortars." Schultz "smuggled" 20 Russian mortars here from near Sevastopol and is firing German ammunition. Mortars are the commander's main request to Speer. He also needs schnapps to collect copper in the front area. "For six centners of copper - a bottle of schnapps, it's not terrible." He hopes to collect even more if there is alcohol.

Describes the successful attack on the reclaimed height and the enthusiasm of the soldiers for our chemical mortars ("Nebelwerfer". - D.Kh.). "Soldiers need such things. I would love to use more drums and pipes. I need something to support guys who go on the attack. Schultz is a man concentrated. Always hits by all means in

one point. So, yesterday he had a five-minute fire from 100 guns destroyed the Russian positions and - as the defector testified - thwarted their attack. Delivery ammunition to the front line - difficult, lying roads that are constantly being repaired by sappers and people from the Organization Todt, and wooden roads, that is, trolleys with U-profile wheels that move on logs. Wooden roads themselves fully justified. Schultz is a hunter. Hunt whose adventures in the front-line area: elk, deer, black grouse, hazel grouse. Game, oddly enough, is. After dark - farewell (just delivered a defector - a poor 55-year-old). Back in the dark along the road. Here at 6 o'clock dark. Along the Neva-Tosno front, on the outer "ring" to Mezno, to Zunkel's apartment.

At 10:00 am - dinner. Bread and whiskey grog organized by Burmeister.

28 September early in the morning we go to the north ... Through Gatchina - the castle is not as interesting as the whole vast park complex. A good road, on both sides there are St. Petersburg dachas. Lots of classicist architecture. Feels very close royal residence. Further on to Krasnoye Selo, where the front-line area begins ...

A wide road goes to the sea between the Leningrad front and the Oranienbaum cauldron. From the height from which the road descends to the sea, there is a view of Leningrad, a huge city that as in the palm of your hand lies on the opposite shore in sunbeams. Through camouflage barriers from the branches and foliage to the east of the road, we look at the city through binoculars. Then so quickly as far as the road, rutted and broken by arrows, allows - to the sea. Our artillery on the right and behind - 21 cm guns - fires already half an hour. We see heavy smoke from hitting

Leningrad, as well as an outbreak of a corresponding severe batteries in Kronstadt. Black fountains of earth strike behind us and to the right next to us. Russians, however, respond with a delay. Russian planes. Once, a scout, a few minutes later, not far from us, shoots down anti-aircraft guns from a distance of approximately 8000 meters, a long stream of fire, but without smoke, he enters spinning and hitting the ground...

Along the coast, again behind the camouflage wall, we go past small castles to Peterhof. Fabulous the royal palace with cascades near the park facade facing the sea burned out. Only the outer walls stand. Back to the sea, view of Leningrad and Karelia. All still lively artillery fire. Now we are as close to Leningrad as Zellendorf and Steglitz¹ towards the center of Berlin. Here you can see burned-out Leningrad trams. Huizing is scary rejoices when, having launched one in the direction of Leningrad after another Zunkel propaganda balloons, sees how they drop flyers and those snowy flakes slowly descend on the city.

At noon we drive through a beautiful forest landscape to Narva. German center with tall dark brown rooftops: near the river, the Hermannfeste fortress, the farthest German outpost of the order knights in the northeast. Opposite the incredibly heavy Ivangorod, formidable Asian fortress: a closed large rectangular stone complex with several round towers barely peeking out from behind the walls ... Terrible a gloomy structure, openly opposed the clear appearance of the tower of the German fortress, which stands along the axis of the road leading from the east and is visible already from a distance of 20 km. Here begins Germany there is no doubt - and here, on the other side of the river, Asia begins. Above the fortresses amazing sunny sky with thick clouds.

¹ Districts of Berlin.

Through Järva to Saka, to the camp of the OT "Bal oil" detachment ... There are five billion tons in Estonia oil shale, that is, a billion tons of oil. Today's production is 160,000 tons per year, it will soon should reach 500,000 tons; further goal is 2 million tons per year. Deposit by quality comparable to Baku, although processing is more expensive, but no more than hydride plants in Germany. September 29 in the morning we go to the oil region. At first to a large factory in Kotla-Jarve. Huge construction with numerous structures, at first the view is comparable in scope to the construction of a bunker ditch for submarines on the Atlantic Wall ... After lunch, continue on to Kotla-Jarve ... "

...

Zunkel gave me a copy of a diary translated by his propaganda department, which was found in the Bryansk cauldron with a murdered Russian commissar. I am quoting here excerpts from this amazing document¹.

**DIARY
MAJOR OF STATE SECURITY I.S. SHABALIN
HEAD OF THE
SPECIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE 50TH ARMY,
BRYANSK FRONT**

August 12, 1941

At 7 am, I leave Ulan-Ude for Moscow by passenger train No. 3... Nadezhda, Petrov, Ilyin, and Kosyrev escort me to the station. My feeling: for a long time, perhaps forever, I part with my family and my beloved, dear friends.

¹ Diary of I.S. Shabalin was first published in Russian by Pavel Polyan in the journal Otechestvennye Zapiski, No. 4 (30), 2006, based on a Russian translation of a German captured document. <http://www.strana-oz.en/authors/?author=728>.

August 23. Moscow.

I was in the People's Commissariat, read the order, I received the rank of major of state security ...

25-th of August.

I'm nervous. No car tires, no gasoline. Not the whole team is there. At 17 o'clock we leave Moscow for Tula...

August 27th.

We arrived at our destination in the village of Vyshkovichi, not far from the city of Bryansk. They settled in an agricultural technical school.

August 29th.

I started work, the apparatus entered into action. The enemy is making raids on the city of Bryansk. Bullets and anti-aircraft guns are knocking. German planes fly back with impunity. Our little hawks are not yet it is seen.

September 5th.

While visiting the front line, I swam in the Desna River and watched the bombardment of our forward lines by German aircraft. The bombardment lasted about two hours and was heavy. The planes dived four times during the raid and all retired without punished.

6 September.

The army is not at all what we are accustomed to imagine in the rear. Colossal shortcomings. On the advance of our armies is defeated...

September 7th .

We are interrogating a red-haired German, a ragged guy, covered in lice, extremely stupid ...

September 30th.

The situation with personnel is exceptionally difficult; the whole, almost the whole army consists of people from the territories occupied by the Germans. They long for home. Inaction at the front, sitting in the trenches demoralize the Red Army. There are cases of drunkenness on the part of the political command staff. People sometimes don't come back from reconnaissance. From the enemy weak fire from mortars. It fundamentally strengthens

advanced positions.

Yesterday, on September 29, the commander of the army summoned me to the command post. It was an exceptionally interesting conversation about the political and moral state of the troops and our activities. At night I rode back to my dugout, without light in terrible darkness. Twice I almost rolled over on my "emka". I arrived very upset, things are going badly. Does Moscow know about the real situation at the front? On the way through the collective-farm fields, one can see a lot of grain collected in sheaves and stacks, or not collected at all. How much good is lost! It becomes scary. Red Army soldiers gather grain for horses, dig potatoes for the kitchen and prepare firewood.

October 1, 1941

Got up early. Lieutenant colonel of state security Tutushkin and lieutenant colonel of state security and head of the special department of the front Vegma arrived from Moscow. The device received a good "push". Then everyone dispersed to divisions, including my two deputies. in divi
the situation is unimportant, both with our apparatus and with the commanding political staff. They don't work well. Ho

A good lesson for us is the catastrophe with 42 Red Army men from the 258th division and the same situation with 18 soldiers from the 217th division. It is a shame that we overslept, and the investigation of the incidents did not give the required results. Conclusion: the situation in the 50th Army is not too good. Almost entirely it is made up of people who lived in the territory occupied by the enemy. Concrete actions are needed on our line and on the line of the command political staff. Peaceful sentiments continue among many military leaders and among part of our apparatus. This is exacerbated by the fact that the army has been on the defensive for almost two months and sees only artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire - and then only intermittent and very weak. At night, people sleep on the front lines, while the Germans set up posts and go to sleep in the village. This is not a war, but a parody. There are no active actions, no offensives - and this gives rise to unhealthy phenomena among the Red Army soldiers. Today I saw the Muscovites off, returned to the dugout, and am writing these lines by candlelight. The soul hurts, the structure is bad. Still, the situation must be urgently

2 October.

I got up at 8 in the morning, had breakfast with bread, cheese and tea ... A message came that the enemy was advancing on the flank of the 13th Army of our front. We hear continuous artillery fire. I am thinking of our "guns", which the Germans call the "devil's artillery". If we had these guns now, they would immediately raise the spirit of the army. Enemy planes fly over us all the time, we can hear the firing of our anti-aircraft guns. Yesterday a captured German was brought in, a ragged and lice-ridden "baby sucker". Their mood is by no means combative, but their head is full of rubbish, more precisely, their head is empty, full of darkness. This me

not expected. At 5 p.m., the enemy launched an offensive along the entire front, in many areas he pushed our units back and crossed the Desna River. Artillery fire can be heard throughout the day.

October 3, 1941

I slept in a dugout, got up at 7.30 in the morning. General Kolesnikov is reported to have arrived. So I'm going to the second platoon¹. We are exchanging opinions about the attack against the nickname. It is a shame that the enemy again achieved victory, broke through the front of the 13th Army, took the Kroms located 30 km from Orel, cut us off and occupied some points on our front. Cowards are sitting in the rear, who have already prepared to flee. My God! How many pests are here! Kolesnikov says the NKVD in Orel has already evacuated. But from us to Orel as much as 150 km! What is this chaos, what is this helplessness? A firm hand is needed here. One well-thought-out assault, and not a Metz will run without looking back. His forces, compared with ours in some areas it came as a surprise to the Germans. Another 1.10. one of the German soldiers appeared and said: "Tomorrow we will attack you along the entire front." He saw strength in the face of our army, but this "strength" trembled and gave the enemy the opportunity to cross the Desna with impunity at many points.

However, in the area of the 258th line of the division, our artillerymen did a good job, gave a light to the enemy, who left many dead and wounded on the battlefield.

October 4, 1941

Early in the morning, together with General Kolesnikov, who came to my dugout from the village of Chaikovichi, we go to Petrov. We sat for about two hours and

¹ In the German text - Staffel.

exchanged views on the course of the German steps.

The situation of the 217th division division looks as follows: on 2.10 the German carried out reinforced artillery preparation, defeated

nests, pressed our front lines, and his soldiers in full growth, screaming, went on the attack. Of course, they were crushed. His aviation was active

and did not give our forces the opportunity to raise their heads. Result: the division is defeated, regiment No. 766, operating on the right flank, is lost, there is no communication, and no one can tell where it is. There were hardly 20 men left of the 755th regiment, the rest were killed, wounded, missing! The division lost control, the Red Army soldiers were left to their fate. Everyone comes with a weapon. No more than 3,000 men remained of the division, and they were dispersed. Today the German does not attack, he is engaged in reconnaissance. It seems that his powers are severely shattered. Today it was necessary to take an offensive, but there is nothing for this. There are two exhausted armies, and one is afraid of the other. In the evening they say that the Eagle is on fire. They bypass us. The whole front gets into pincers - these are three armies. What are our generals doing? They think". It has already become a habit. "I am getting out of the way. We're leaving the front." So what's now? Although it must be said that some parts of the front are holding up perfectly, the retaliatory strike was unpleasant for the enemy. Nevertheless, we are in a semicircle. What will be tomorrow? At 22 o'clock I go to the forest and talk to the commander of the army, Major General Petrov, about the state of affairs. He said that the front could no longer help him, and asked: "How many people have you shot during this time?" What are these laughs? The comm

October 5th .

We get up at 8 am. I'm going to shave. A long queue. I didn't wait. For an hour we stood with the car. The motor is not running. At 11 o'clock I went to the location of the 260th division, spoke with the chief of staff, went to the 2nd platoon, made a mistake and ended up in the forward positions of one of the battalions. I found the 2nd platoon in the village of Ormenka, shaved and washed. I went to give both with the head of the special department, Gen. Kleinman, the dinner was excellent, as was the service. The division withdrew very little, heavy losses. Against the 260th division, the enemy holds three divisions. The Germans go on the attack at full height, ours gloriously mow them down. At 4.10 our tanks come into action, they work perfectly and return after completing the task back to the village of Shemantino, where they are fired upon by the enemy. These idiots put them in a bunch and didn't disguise them. So: the division is fighting excellently, the Red Army men are showing courage. The Guards arrived yesterday. The commander of this "hellish artillery" said that the Germans also fired at them. In part three "Katyusha", they have not yet received a task on our front. German soldiers go around in tunics, they take off the overcoats from the dead Red Army soldiers and wear them. For identification

they roll up one sleeve to the elbow.

The tanks withdrew in the direction of Bryansk. Seems, they are waiting for the enemy from behind.

October 6th.

Kolesnikov was here for about two hours. explained that goes to the headquarters of the front. Somehow my heart hurts. I tried to dissuade him. Then he said: "Okay, go, but come to my place to spend the night. We will exchange views on the day." At 15.30 a message came that enemy tanks surrounded the headquarters of the front. There is shooting. After that, there are no messages about the headquarters

front. Around 17:00 the tanks returned to Bryansk. The second platoon stood on the "wheels" and moved to the village of Gololobovka. In the evening intelligence reported that there were 6 tanks and 5-6 vehicles with infantry in Bryansk. The second regiment is thrown forward to drive the enemy out of Bryansk. There are anti-tank guns, the infantry of the 154th division has not yet approached, Bryansk is obediently burning, the bridge over the Desna has not been blown up. The enemy is acting irresistibly. The guard unit left at the disposal of the commander of the 290th page of the division. There is no par

5 am.

I am in a dugout. Rifle divisions take their former positions. A battle is going on outside the city of Bryansk. Both of our regiments of the 154th Rifle Division repulsed the enemy attack. By 6 p.m., the enemy had largely captured the city of Bryansk. The defeat of the Bryansk Front is an event unprecedented in history. The enemy came up from behind and surrounded almost three armies, i.e. at least 240,000 men, who occupied a territory of about 600 km with a rugged line of defense. A message came from Moscow through the line of the General Staff: the entire front must retreat. Colossal efforts. Clearly, the flight of personnel is beginning. We haven't seen a single plane of ours in recent days. We give up cities almost without a fight. The front command lost leadership from the first days of the German offensive. They say the idiots have already left for Moscow. Retreat!

But the efforts that were made to strengthen the line of defense turned out to be in vain, colossal efforts. The line will be used by the Germans when we drive them back. From 06.10 the command of the front was temporarily transferred to Petrov. It is interesting to note: I come to Petrov, and he says: "Now I will soon be dispersed too

are shooting." "For what?" I ask him. "Yes," he says, "I was only temporarily appointed to command the front." I answer: "If you are appointed, then you must take matters into your own hands and strive for victory." "Well, yes, but you see the position of the front and the armies. I do not know what is happening in both armies (3rd and 13th) and where they are.

October 8th.

Ogor village. I stay up all night. At five in the morning I sent the 2nd Platoon. Eight operatives and two cars remain in the village. At 10 am, the four of us drink a bottle of vodka and have a hearty breakfast. I fell asleep in the car and slept well. Edinov woke me up. I am driving further in a truck to establish contact with the command post, which has been relocated to

another place, no one knows where.

The population is all at home, harvesting potatoes. You can't hear the arrows. How quickly the horrors of war are forgotten. At 6 o'clock in the morning there is a very loud noise of motors. Artillery firing and machine gun fire.

At 9 pm, Yedinov arrives with a group of people who have driven up from the command post. 150 wounded arrived and occupied the school under the infirmary. I sleep in the car.

At 1.30 a.m. the Germans began firing mortars at a field not far from the headquarters. The army headquarters, under cover, left in disorder for the village of Avdiivka. There is already a pandemonium of cars on the road, people are circling above four German planes, it's strange that the planes don't drop bombs, they probably don't have ammunition. The position of the army is sad, where is the rear, where is the front, it is difficult to say. The ring occupied by the army is getting narrower. The convoys turn into a burden. Entire columns are gathered here. What they don't drag with them, bicycles, barrels, plywood, etc. The army bears heavy sweat ri in people and technology.

12 October.

At five in the morning we came to the village of Buyanovich. We had breakfast right away. I drank a glass of vodka and went to sleep in the car. Woke up at 10 am. I shaved to the sound of the cannonade and drank some tea. The population in these villages does not receive us very friendly. This is easy to see. Having driven up to the cemetery, I stopped the car, walked along the edge of the cemetery and watched the enemy firing from mortars and the chaotic flight of the army headquarters. Approximately a thousand cars move in three rows. The commander of the army rode by and pointed to the forest with his hand. We got into the car and drove into the forest 1 kilometer from the village of Buyanovich. We are going to move back, in the direction of the village of Frolovka. In the forest, I stopped the car and ordered to go to the crossing over the river. He went on foot through the forest. When I approached the crossing, I met the gene. Edunov, Zaitsev and Chaliapin. We stood at the crossing and watched the road being repaired. At the same time cars were transported. Our cars would already be on the other side. Suddenly, three cavalymen galloped up and reported that the Germans had appeared. At the same time, the Germans began firing at us with mortars and machine guns. There was a commotion, ours began random shooting, Zaitsev and I slowly retreated into the depths of the forest, bullets and fragments of shells flew around. I lost all the operational staff, wandered through the forest until the evening. Shooting came from all sides of the forest. The commander, members of the Military Council and the chief of staff left. They were no longer in the forest. In the evening I received an order to withdraw at night to the village of Nehochi. Unclear time is shrinking.

October 13th.

I didn't sleep all night. I lost two cars. Yesterday In the evening I also met General Yedunov. This morning, Roma met the driver Fedotov, who said that all the operational staff was in order. The devilish cold has come, there are no mittens, there are no warm clothes. I go in a tunic and cap. We're moving so damn slow, we're stuck in a swamp. There were about a thousand cars in total. All night long we built a crossing, peretas the cars nodded like a tractor and still couldn't finish it by morning. Up to fifty trucks got stuck in the swamp, and about the same number remained on the field. At 6 am the Germans began firing mortars. We took cover near a small stream, where a German observer discovered us, he gave a sign, and the enemy opened fire on our convoy. We made a stop at the river.

The night passed quietly. We are building a bridge.

October 14.

The enemy took us into the ring. Continuous canon yes, a duel of artillerymen, mortarmen and machine gunners. The cuckoos work. Dangerous and scary almost all day. I'm not talking about the forest, swamps and overnight stays. From the 12th I did not sleep, from 2.10 I did not read the newspapers.

October 15th.

Terrible. I stagger, corpses, the nightmare of war, constantly under fire. I took a bottle of alcohol. I went to the forest to explore. The destruction is complete. The army is defeated, the carts are destroyed. I am writing in the woods by the fire. I lagged behind the Chekists, I was left alone among strangers. The army collapsed.

16 October.

I sleep in the forest. I haven't eaten bread for three days now. There are many Red Army soldiers in the forest, there are no commanders. All night and morning the Germans shelled the forest with all kinds of weapons. We

Li in the morning at 7 o'clock, and went north. The shooting continues. During the stop, I washed up. We gathered food and cooked dinner. We ate well. I found a small blanket, a flask and a bag for myself. It has been raining since morning. Then the rain turned into sleet. We got wet as hell. We are more and more thirsty. We drink raw swamp water. In the evening we arrive at the village of Khotomiri chi. Hell cold. Damp. We set up tents, light fires, dry clothes, four of us go to the collective farm and bring straw. We sleep very restlessly. On the road we saw a not very large German convoy, let it pass, stumbled upon a dead Red Army soldier. There are a lot of abandoned gas masks and helmets

17 October.

I wake up hungry. The Red Army soldiers had already lit a fire. I'm going to dry my overcoat, which stands like a wooden one. Soon breakfast, and we move on. For three days we have not eaten bread. We go to the edge of the forest to explore. We are detected by a German observer and fire five mines at us. In the evening we cross the railway and the canal, collect hay for the night. We are discovered by a German patrol and fired from a machine gun and mortars. Leaving, I throw hay. The night is terribly cold, although we sleep in the forest

18 October.

Without breakfast, we continue to move through the forest. We saw a German patrol. There was no shooting. As always, we walked through the swamp. About 12 o'clock we stopped to have breakfast, dried our clothes, ate warm porridge and soup, and shared a piece of meat, some potatoes and peas among four. I shave. At night I have to cross a highway that is under fire, unfortunately I no longer have a blanket, because it disappeared yesterday while crossing the railway line. Damn cold.

19 October.

All night we walk in the downpour through the marshy area. Around impenetrable darkness. I got wet like a dog to the last thread. The right leg was swollen. Walking is terribly hard. At dawn we make a stop in the forest. Just in case, I dried off and changed by the fire, without eating or sleeping. Next, we have to go through a treeless area. We divided the squad into two parts.

Half don't have any weapons. During the day I went into the forest as a shelter. To no avail. Reconnaissance behind the forest in ... (?), but there is a German. Cannon fire is mortars...

The translation is correct.

Zach, Oberleutnant and translator.

This is the end of Major Shabalin's diary. The next day, 10/20/1941, he met with Major General Petrov and died with him in the evening at 4 pm southwest of Passeika.

Dmitry Khmel'nitsky
HISTORY
IN THE SUBJUNCTIVE

Beautiful literary and historical reminiscences, when taken literally and put into practice, most often turn out to be nonsense.

The people do not necessarily deserve the government they have; the truth is not in the middle, but anywhere; history has a subjunctive mood, etc.

Disagree with the last statement - and public This is declared personally, most often by supporters of the traditional Soviet version of the history of the Second World War. This version ordered to perceive what happened to the USSR as the only possible variant of events and not to puzzle over why they happened and how this could have been avoided.

We have been brought up with historical determinism. In the mind of the Soviet man, life flowed from one inevitability to another: the victory of the revolution was inevitable, the victory of Stalin too, collectivization, industrialization and the Gulag were inevitable. War with Germany was as inevitable as victory in it.

One of the main prejudices characteristic of the Soviet worldview - confidence in the historical and moral inevitability of the anti-Hitler coalition with the USSR. As if the allies were thrown into the arms of Stalin not by tragic circumstances, but by natural preference for communism over Nazism.

The reason for this phenomenon, probably, is that for all seventy years Soviet society had not the slightest

our influence on events. And neither on real events, nor on the interpretation of past events. From here and the popular maxim already mentioned above - "history has no subjunctive mood." istoria, of course, is implemented in only one version, but it could look different.

History as a science exists only in the subjunctive mood. It explores the causes and patterns of events that happened, and automatically answers the question of why some events happened and others did not, and under what circumstances the historical process could look different. The study of history is an enumeration of possible options.

Just asking yourself the question: "What would happen, if circumstances had turned out differently? you can understand the meaning of what is happening. Especially when it comes to such an intricate and multidimensional situation as that which developed in Europe after the First World War.

For example, supporters of one-dimensional history limit themselves to stating the fact that Germany attacked the USSR on June 22, 1941. From this, the on-duty conclusion is drawn that Germany is the aggressor, and the USSR

The conclusion is stupid, because there are not many possible answers. A victim of the USSR or an aggressor, even if it did not take place at that moment - this is determined primarily by their own Soviet intentions and preparations. Which are fairly easy to calculate if we discard the unscrupulous maxim about "history without the subjunctive mood" and on
hide your brains.

One of the first to do this was Viktor Suvorov in the late 1970s—astonishingly late, considering that the war ended in 1945.

He proved that the catastrophic situation of the 1930s was created not by some "historical objectivity", but by the evil will of specific people with a criminal psyche. Moreover, the course of events itself depended heavily on melo

whose and accidents. If Hitler had not guessed Stalin's plans in 1940, and if Stalin had not made a mistake in calculating the timing of the attack in 1941, the fate of Europe could have turned out differently. With this approach, the analysis of the historical process is a fascinating activity.

Of course, it is impossible to calculate all the nuances. Let us single out only the main factors that determined the events of the 1930s—constant and variable.

The stable factor can be considered the nature and the strategic goals of the three main opposing sides - the USSR, Germany and Western democracies. The aims of Hitler and Stalin were the same: to expand their empires as far as possible. Although Stalin's intentions went much further than Hitler's. Hitler's maximum program in 1939, before the conclusion of the pact with Stalin, did not go beyond the unification of the lands inhabited by Germans through blackmail by military force. Hitler did not plan to start a world war.

Stalin's maximum program envisaged precisely a world war in Europe with the involvement of the maximum number of countries in it. A war in which the USSR will intervene at a convenient moment in order to remain the only winner.

The unchanging goal of the West is to offer passive or active resistance to both aggressors, trying not to provoke a world war.

Variable factors:

- the success of the revolutions in Russia and Germany, which depended on many more or less accidental causes;
- the success of the implementation of the strategic plans of both dictatorial regimes - that is, who would be more successful in deceiving opponents and attacking first;
- success in creating an atomic bomb - that is, to whom of the three main participants in the events, it would have been possible to make it earlier than others.

Let's try, taking into account these factors, to calculate the main scenarios for the development of events.

Option 1

The October Revolution failed. Reasons - quite real - could be many:

- 1. Kornilov's rebellion is a success.**
- 2. The provisional government in a timely manner (in July - October) arrests Lenin and his comrades and disarms the Red Guard.**
- 3. The Left SRs win in July 1918 and are forced daily return to the Constituent Assembly.**
- 4. The Red Army loses the Civil War (as later happened to the communists and anarchists in Spain).**

Russia, to one degree or another, remains democratic. In this case, Hitler, even having won the elections, is dealing with a united democratic Europe and more than likely that he does not decide on the Second World War. In peacetime, the Nazis would not have gone to the genocide of "inferior races." A relatively liberal Nazi regime (liberal in relation to the Soviet regime, that is, without mass terror, as it was in Germany before the war) would have existed in isolation for several decades and would gradually democratize back. Moreover, Hitler almost did not socialize the economy. Totalitarian regimes wither away without extreme conditions—civil or foreign wars, terror, pressure from outside, and armed consolidation of society as a response to this pressure. If the Nazis had not also come to power, Europe would have been guaranteed a golden age.

Option 2

Stalin is in power, but Hitler is not. Germany remains democratic. Stalin fails to push Germany against England, Poland and France. He is dealing with a united, undivided Europe and is forced to look for another way to unleash a howl.

Well. Perhaps he follows the path of Hitler, blackmailing from grabbing pieces from neighboring countries until he hits a wall and, most likely, does not decide on a world war. Most likely, he could not even count on pieces, as it was in the 1920s.

Unless, of course, he manages to be the first to make atomic bomb. But this is another, completely catastrophic option.

Option 3

Quite real. Both Stalin and Hitler come to power. But Western countries (first of all, the USA) were cautious enough to refuse the USSR to buy military technology in the late 1920s and early 30s. Stalin fails to build in a matter of years an automobile, tractor, tank and aviation industry and a combat-ready - at the European level - army. Having no chance of final victory in the world war, he does not dare to provoke it by proposing to Hitler to conclude a pact on the division of spheres of influence and a joint attack on Poland. And for Hitler, the USSR with a primitive, non-motorized army is not of interest as a military ally (this option was analyzed back in Mein Kampf). Maybe Hitler would have succeeded in some conquests in Europe, but things would not have come to a world war.

A local consequence of such a development of events would be the physical impossibility of forced industrialization in the USSR. There would simply be nothing to build. Consequently, collectivization, which served as a source of funds (financial and material) for industrialization, would most likely be much less bloody. And industrialization itself would not be worth such sacrifices. Less terrible would be, most likely, all the waves of terror in the USSR.

Option 4

Completely historical version, that is, what happened in reality.

Hitler got ahead of Stalin and in the summer of 1941 defeated the Red Army prepared for the attack. Stalin is forced to turn to Western countries for help. Together, the Allies defeat Germany. Instead of all of Europe, Stalin gets only its eastern part. By the end of the war with Stalin

there are chances to return to the original pre-military plan and try, after the victory over Germany, to continue the offensive to the West - pre to turn, as it was originally supposed, the world war into a "world revolution". The balance of military forces in Europe in 1945 was such that it is unlikely that anything other than an atomic bomb could have stopped Stalin and Zhukov.

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki not only killed hundreds of thousands of Japanese, but also forced Japan to immediately capitulate, which saved the lives of millions of Americans and Japanese: an assault on the Japanese islands would have cost, according to American estimates, about a million soldiers only to the United States - so great would be the readiness Japan to defend

In addition, and perhaps most importantly, Stalin was shown what would happen to Moscow if he decided to continue the war. In fact, Hiroshima saved Europe. The cold war never turned into a hot one. The Soviet Union was late with the development atomic weapons for three or four years and, as it turned out, forever. Since then, no matter how tense the council neither Stalin, nor Khrushchev, nor Brezhnev succeeded in narrowing the gap in the level of nuclear weapons. Which was until 1989 the only real guarantee

peace.

Option 5

The Americans are several years late in obtaining atomic weapons. In 1945, Stalin takes the war to the West, throws the Americans into the sea and seizes Europe. A few more years or months later, the Americans still get the bomb and immediately use it. Europe, most likely, could have been liberated, but what would it cost and what would be the consequences are hard to imagine.

Option 6

Stalin manages to obtain atomic weapons before the Americans - not in 1949, but in 1943-1945. He immediately and with great joy turns the war into an atomic one with the same goal - the immediate capture of all Europe and Asia. He no longer needs allies and, having destroyed Berlin, he continues his aggression against the West. The Americans make the bomb not too late, in 1945-1946, and also not slowly use it. In the mid-1940s, a world nuclear war begins with an unclear result.

volume and hundreds of millions of victims.

Option 7

In the science fiction novel "Reserve for Academicians" Kir Bulychev developed, at first glance, an unexpected, but nevertheless quite real option. A particularly perspicacious scientist convinces the chiefs of the NKVD to create an atomic sharashka in the early 1930s. The first atomic bomb was tested in the USSR in 1938. True, Kir Bulychev went further along a spectacular literary path, which led to an almost "happy ending". Stalin, ill with radiation sickness, decides before his death to take revenge on Poland for the defeat in 1920 and in 1939 drops the first and only atomic bomb on Warsaw captured by the Germans at the very moment when the secretly arrived that

yes Hitler takes a military parade. The death of both dictators paralyzes the world war, it ends, barely starting.

It is, of course, pure literature. Reality could be much scarier. Stalin, who got his hands on the bomb in the late 1930s, would no longer depend for his actions on an actual or imaginary alliance with Germany. World War II would have started at the same time, in the late 1930s, but immediately nuclear and, God forbid, victorious for the USSR.

Option 8

This is the most interesting option, and its study, most likely, will become the main subject of research by historians of the Second World War in the very near future. This is the option actually planned by Stalin and destined for implementation by him.

Until the spring of 1941, everything was proceeding as it actually did. In 1939, Stalin and Hitler jointly start a war, each seizes what is stipulated by secret agreements. In the summer of 1940, Hitler realizes the danger of a stab in the back and begins to prepare an attack on the USSR, without waiting for the final victory over England, but does not have time. Stalin and Zhukov in July 1941 are implementing their plan of attack on Germany.

The German army, standing in a vulnerable position on the eastern border, is surrounded and perishes as the Red Army perished in reality. The difference is that Hitler did not have a second echelon that could meet the enemy in the depths of his own territory, and there are no such reserves of territory, such human and raw material resources as Stalin had. Most likely, he would not even have had time reserves to come to an agreement with England and America on the joint resistance of the USSR. Stalin has great

chances in a short time to capture all or almost all

Europe, already defeated by Hitler. And not only Europe.

Having broken out into the European expanse and the European autobahns, the Red Army takes Berlin and moves on. France no longer has its own army, and the communist movement is strong. There is someone to rely on and there is someone to create local authorities from. In Germany, the picture is the same, especially since there are millions of recent communists and communist sympathizers. The situation that led to the creation of the GDR after the war is played out much earlier, but already throughout Germany. Simultaneously with the attack on Germany, Finland is occupied - the echo of these plans can be seen in the senseless bombardment of Finland on June 25, 1941.

Bulgaria, Türkiye and Iran are also among the top targets.

Then, perhaps after a short respite, it is the turn of Southern Europe. In Spain, the communist mood is strong - to complete what was not achieved during the civil war does not seem to be an unsolvable task. And so on.

In the occupied countries, economic and political reforms begin, as happened in reality in the Baltic states and Eastern Poland in 1939-1940. There is resistance, suppressed by the usual methods - mass terror. On a European scale, these are tens of millions of victims.

The position of England remains the same, as before, she is isolated from the mainland, only now Stalin is in charge of it. America, which is unable to provide serious assistance to Europe on its mother ke, fights at sea until he gets an atomic bomb, and drops it, but not on Hiroshima, but most likely on Tula or Chelyabinsk.

The war of liberation resumes in Europe, but with an incalculable number of victims.

**If Stalin also manages to get an atomic bomb
boo, then the war becomes nuclear on both sides.**

**In the light of this perspective, the realized version of
the Second World War with 50 million victims seems
relatively harmless. It is safe to say that Hitler's desperate
attack on the USSR in 1941 saved Europe (including the
USSR) from a much worse fate.**

.. .

**As is well known, the archives of the Soviet General
Staff are tightly closed, and very little is documented
about Soviet military planning before 1941. I think that
the reason is not only and not so much that you can find
documents there that unequivocally confirm the USSR's
plans for an attack on Germany. Evidence for the
existence of these plans is already abundant. These are
separate documents that accidentally flew out of the
archive, and - most importantly! —the actual military
preparations of the USSR in 1940-1941, which are well
studied and cannot be interpreted in a defensive sense.
And there are no self-respecting historians willing to do
this for a long time.**

**But the attack on Germany in itself made sense only
as a first step towards the conquest of Europe (and in
general everything that Stalin could reach).**

**The defeat of Germany, like the defeat of the USSR
by the Germans, was supposed to be in the form of a
blitzkrieg, it was unlikely that more than one or two
months were allotted for it. Plans for the further
development of events must have been considered and
drawn up by Stalin and Zhukov in the first months of
1941. It is these plans that will become a real sensation
when the archives of the General Staff are ever opened - and if th**

**But even in the worst case - in the event of the
liquidation of archival documents - doubts about the nature**

these plans and the approximate sequence of actions cannot be. Like they don't exist today.

It is unlikely that these plans in terms of goals and means (except for the appearance of atomic weapons) are very different from the plans of the Warsaw Pact to seize Europe, which are well known to the NATO countries.

In principle, the military plans of the Warsaw Pact in the 1960s-1980s. - this is just the development and refinement of the plans of the Stalin era, both pre-war and post-

...

You can continue to delve into this exciting activity - the options will multiply and branch. A world war could have assumed a completely different character if the Nazis had obtained the atomic bomb before anyone else (during the war they were closer to this than the Soviet specialists). One can go a little deeper and imagine what the USSR would have looked like if, after the death of Lenin, the country had been headed not by the cynic Stalin, but by the idealistic fanatic Trotsky, who dreamed of an immediate world revolution. Or the humanist Bukharin, without conditional, would have preserved the NEP (he is a humanist, of course, only against the background of other cannibals). In both cases, a completely dif

The eight listed options are, as it were, the most obvious cases. At the same time, it cannot be said that the fourth - realized - variant is less fantastic than the others. In many ways, the opposite is true. Who could, for example, have predicted in advance that the cautious and far-sighted, strategically thinking Stalin would make such a fatal mistake in his calculations and allow Hitler to attack first? And this, as it turned out, is the only alignment of events in which the West could, in the end, be the winner. To what miracle should we be grateful that the atomic bomb was at the disposal of America in the summer

1945, and not a few months later, when Stalin could stand at the English Channel? It must be recognized that the masses got off lightly.

.. .

Engaging in historical fantasizing is not an empty business with everything. Today, sixty-five years after the end of the war, the problem is not abundance of historical data, but in their understanding. Absolutely false historical stereotypes worked out in the fresh wake of the Soviet victory are very tenacious. One of the main ones is the general confidence in the historical and moral inevitability of the anti-Hitler coalition led by the USSR. Which is not true at all.

For the Western allies of the USSR, the Nazis and the Communists were equally disgusting. But at different times they are dangerous in different ways. In the conflict between them, it made sense not to support the most attractive (there was simply no such choice), but the weakest. The half-broken Soviet Union, which had won with the help of its allies, was much less dangerous for humanity than the Third Reich, which had dealt with Stalin alone. And vice versa.

If Stalin had succeeded in realizing his plans and attacking Germany in 1941, the West would have been forced to support Hitler in one form or another. Manual, half-broken Hitler is not very dangerous for civilization. And it is impossible to imagine anything worse than the Soviet Union on the scale of the whole of Europe.

Hitler, having attacked the USSR, declared himself the defender of mankind against communism. The injured Stalin turned to the West for help in the fight against world fascism. But they both lied.

CONTENT

<i>Dmitry Khmelnitsky is talking to</i> Viktor Suvorov. The USSR was preparing for the wrong war	5
<i>Mark Solonin. A Simple Cause of a Great Disaster</i>	20
<i>Andrey Burovsky. Day H</i>	72
<i>Dmitry Khmelnitsky. The only defeat of Stalin. ...</i>	146
<i>Valery Danilov. Stalin's strategy for starting the war:</i> plans and reality.....	182
<i>Kirill Alexandrov. "A strike was planned on Romania in</i> the direction of oil fields"	206
<i>Mark Solonin. Attack on airfields - myths and facts</i>	241
<i>Peter Zaporozhets. Border battle in 1941 in</i> Ukraine	287
<i>Keystut Zakoretsky. On the periodization</i> of the Great Patriotic War	307
<i>Rudolf Walter. Diaries 1941-1943</i>	351
<i>Dmitry Khmelnitsky. History in the subjunctive</i> mood	402

Literary and artistic edition

THE TRUTH OF VICTOR SUVOROV

**Solonin Mark
Suvorov Viktor**

**Author-compiler
Khmelnitsky Dmitry**

VICTOR SUVOROV:

KNOCKDOWN 1941

WHY STALIN "SLEEPED" THE BLOW?

**Published by author's edition
Managing editor Art editor I. Petrovsky
Technical editor Computer P. Volkov
proofreader V. Kulagina
G. Klochkova
N. Khotinsky**

**OOO "Yauza-press"
109439, Moscow, Volgogradsky prospect, 120, bldg.
2. Phone: (495)
745-58-23, fax: 411-68-86-2253.**

**Signed for publication on March 17, 2011. Format
84x108 1/32 - Typeface "Magazine". Offset printing. Conv. oven I.
21.84. Circulation 4000 copies. Zach. No. 4132010**

**Printed at OAO Nizhpoligraph,
603006 Nizhny Novgorod, Varvarskaya st., 32.**

ISBN 978-5-9955-0261-6



9 785995 502616 >

Катастрофу 1941 года не раз пытались объяснить в «боксерских» терминах – дескать, пропустив сокрушительный удар, Красная Армия оказалась в глубоком НОКДАУНЕ и смогла подняться лишь в самый последний момент, на счет «десять». Но война с Гитлером – это не «благородный» поединок, а скорее «бои без правил», где павшего добивают беспощадно, не дожидаясь конца отсчета, – и если Красная Армия выстояла и победила даже после такой бойни, спрашивается, на что она была способна, не «проспи» Сталин вражеское нападение, которое едва не стало фатальным для СССР...

Историки бились над тайной 1941 года почти полвека – пока Виктор Суворов не разрешил эту загадку, убедительно доказав: чудовищный разгром Красной Армии стал возможен лишь потому, что Гитлеру повезло поймать Сталина «на замахе», когда тот сам готовился напасть на Германию. И как бы ни пытался кремлевский агитпроп опровергнуть суворовское открытие, сколько бы ни отрицал очевидное, все больше специалистов выступают в поддержку «Ледокола». Новая книга проекта «Правда Виктора Суворова» обосновывает и развивает сенсационные откровения самого популярного и проклинаемого историка, перевернувшего все прежние представления о Второй Мировой.

ISBN 978-5-9955-0261-6



9 785995 502616 >